FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 25 OCTOBER 1946 No. 1

THE BEAM AND THE MOTE

By R

"THE friend of every country but his own!" No American Secretary of State wishes to have George Canning's contemptuous tag applied to him: he knows that it is the duty of our government in Washington to frame and press policies which will protect and advance the interests of the people of the United States. If this is accepted as the basis of the international action that we should attempt, it follows that every other state is entitled to take the same view of its foreign policy. Hence our Secretary of State, in addition to being sure of what he wants, must be prompt in detecting dangers from other quarters, even before they are expressed in the form of wants or demands.

At a time when Burke was denouncing the French Revolution, Walpole advanced the opinion that "no great country was ever saved by good men." This philosophy we repudiate and, in so far as foreign policy is concerned, we agree to — indeed pride ourselves on — one important requirement: the means as well as the ends of our policy must pay a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind."

Present discontents in the international field (a euphemism for relations with Russia) derive in part from the fact that Russia seems to attach little importance to the opinions of mankind, and even to suggest that the opinions do not matter. In saying this, I am not unmindful of the jibe which has sometimes had a good basis in fact, that we are prone to judge what other states want in terms of our ideals and to weigh our own international desires and actions on the scales of expediency; that we think the acts of others are irrational, but see reasons for our own conduct which elsewhere is not regarded as rational. Present discontents do not result from that kind of muddled thinking. They are due to a fundamental cleavage.

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What the interests of a people seem to be at any epoch is determined by their national history and position, by the political philosophy they accept, by the form of government under which they live, and by the way of life which they seek. The methods which spokesmen use to protect and advance interests internationally will be similar to the methods which they use nationally when they must make continuous and difficult adjustments between rival groups and sectional pressures. A statesman who in Washington is a Mr. Hyde cannot go abroad and suddenly become a Dr. Jekyll. If in Moscow he is a Dr. Jekyll, he cannot in Paris get out of character and play Mr. Hyde. Neither Dr. Jekyll nor Mr. Hyde can become a Caspar Milquetoast willing to jettison what he thinks are interests of real concern to his people.

A few at least among my readers are now about to say: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" My answer to the impeachment is that the biblical injunction does not apply: that there is no hypocrisy in refusing to cast out first the beam from our own eye in order to see clearly to pull the mote from our brother's eye. For when we examine that beam we see that it is nothing less than our whole political heritage. We prize it highly and intend to preserve it. And the mote in the Russian eye comes out of Marx via Lenin to Stalin. Nowhere in the ruling circle in Russia is there any desire to cast it out, and the western world cannot pull it out. Then let us be frank in describing the shape and substance of our beam, and of the Russian mote, that we may deal with the situation as it is.

II

It is a failing of Americans to take their political heritage for granted — at any rate, so long as there is no suffering from the slings and arrows of a contrary fortune. Free governments do not call upon their people to beat drums and chant a creed. It has been said that although a camel is hard to describe, everyone knows one when he sees it. But we reflect on our liberties when we believe them to be threatened, and we ponder our political way of life when things are going badly.

Our heritage goes back of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. The men and women who settled America sought to escape from arbitrary power and to obtain religious and political freedom. Their adventure made an impact on all subse-

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quent political thought and action. Man could seek freedom. In a new land he could strive to make real the principle that Colonel Rainboro stated in the Cromwellian Army Debates: "I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the richest he." In America a man's life could be his own, not to be managed or controlled by king or church. He had a right to create for himself that liberty which Milton so truly declared to be above all other liberties: "the liberty to know, to think, to believe and to utter freely according to conscience." Rainboro and Milton cried in the wilderness a century and a third before the Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men were created free and equal. Our history since then can be written in terms of a sincere, and, by and large, a successful search for institutions and laws which would preserve and expand freedom and permit the individual citizen to seek to enjoy his "inalienable rights" to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

There have been many brief statements of the freedoms that matter to us and of the essential norms of our political way of life. In his first inaugural address, in 1801, Jefferson used these words: "Equal and exact justice to all men, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of person under the protection of the *habeas corpus*, and trial by juries impartially selected — these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us." The Nazis annihilated all these freedoms by first annihilating freedom of speech, of the press and of association. I think that Jefferson would now emphasize that the architectonic freedom is that of speech, of the press, of the radio, of public discussion. When its citadel begins to crumble all other freedoms are lost.

During the early struggle to build foundations under this citadel, printers bore the brunt of the labor. They fought their battle long before there were any newspapers. Elizabeth's Star Chamber confined printing to London, Cambridge and Oxford and attempted to search out and destroy all unlicensed presses. Against a similar ordinance of the Long Parliament, Milton in 1643 issued his "Areopagitica, A speech . . . for the Liberty of Unlicens'd Printing," itself an unlicensed book.

"If anyone ask what a free government is," Burke exclaimed, "I answer that for any practical purpose it is what the people think so; that they and not I are the natural, lawful and competent judges of this matter." The Russian people are the natural judges of their Government, and it may be that they are well

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content. They were serfs until 1861 and emerged from feudalism in 1917. But without freedom of discussion a people cannot determine whether they are competent judges and whether they want to improve or change the régime under which they live. Nor can we determine this about them. We repudiate with horror the notion that a government can have the duty or the right to coerce its citizens into a way of thinking that dooms them to live what they may believe is a life of falsehood. Whether a government is monarchical, parliamentary or presidential — whether elections go by the calendar or result from dissolutions of the legislature when it is in conflict with the executive — these are matters of relatively little importance. Elections can be postponed, as they were in Great Britain for four years beyond the constitutional date, and if there are political parties and a free press the government remains representative. Rousseau was wrong when he declared that the British people were free only at a general election and that through the decision then made they enslaved themselves. The ballot boxes may continue closed for a time. There still will remain, in countries of free discussion, knowledge about what leaders are doing and the ability to criticize it. This is the indispensable thing.

Sometimes, of course, we suffer by reason of those who say, as did Carlyle's statesman: "I lead because I follow." In democracies, where government is by discussion, the "good men" referred to by Walpole may not, to use a further expression of his, "go to the lengths that may be necessary." Disclosures on the events of the days preceding Pearl Harbor show how unwilling were those in the seats of the mighty in Washington to reach decisions which they feared might not be supported by public opinion, or to take action which might, even by international standards, be described as immoral. They were unwilling to fight fire with fire until the flames had blazed up. We consider this sort of lethargy in action at worst a venial fault. In short, we are willing to pay the price of government by discussion, following decisions taken in accordance with "the sense of the meeting," whether that happens to be a group of responsible officials, a legislature, or the community as a whole. Further, in this government by discussion we permit outsiders to participate. Recently Mr. Gromyko told 14,000 people assembled in Madison Square Garden at a meeting called by the International Council of American-Soviet Friendship that the early activities of the

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Security Council "have revealed a tendency on the part of certain countries to play a dominating part in the organization to the detriment of the cause of peace and security." His hearers knew that the United States was one of the countries he had in mind. The American response to that statement was not an angry assertion that Mr. Gromyko should not have made it but a consideration of whether there was any merit in what he said.

We know that among us "equal and exact justice to all men" is not always a reality. "In its majestic impartiality," said Anatole France, "the law forbids both the rich and the poor to sleep under bridges." The costs of litigation and local prejudices occasionally make equality before the law seem theoretical rather than actual. But it has been the glory of our institutions that they have sought to minimize discrimination against classes and races and to treat poor and rich alike. Indeed, to treat enemies and aliens alike as well! Nazi saboteurs who were landed from submarines received a fair trial and were represented by counsel. A Russian naval officer thanked the Seattle jury which found him not guilty of espionage. Courts are not those of a political party; they are free of control by the executive. They administer laws openly debated and enacted and backed by public opinion. They make no distinction between public officials and private individuals. In times of crisis the protection of *habeas corpus* may be temporarily in abeyance but a free parliament and press are adequate safeguards against abuse. During the war the chief criticism of the British Home Secretary was that he too hastily released persons whom he had interned rather than that he arbitrarily kept in custody some whose previous actions and associations did not justify the belief that they might prejudice the safety of the realm. We tolerate no secret police, and the accounts of governmental agencies must be public so that the citizen knows what they cost and how the money is expended.

The purpose of this congeries of ideals and institutions is to create a political climate in which the ordinary citizen, no matter how humble, has a chance of a better life and can strive to break the bonds which tie him to his station. Latterly the state has provided assistance. Here is a freedom that Jefferson did not include in his enumeration. There was no necessity of it then. Life was still relatively simple. The tortoise of political wisdom had not then been left far behind by the hare of scientific invention and economic change. Enlightened states no matter how "capitalis-

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tic" must now prevent the struggle for the survival of the fittest from becoming so cruel that those who are least fit cannot survive. This is a freedom that has to be created by government restrictions wisely thought out and intelligently administered. We reassure ourselves by maintaining that restraints, when self-imposed, can always be lifted; but the dilemma democracy faces is that, save in moments when war achieves national unity, democratic methods are ill adapted for dealing with some important economic problems.

As ideals, and to the greatest extent as realities, we hold these to be truths. The beam which is in our eye is the importance we attach to the freedoms *of* speech and expression and worship, and *from* want and fear. We seek these freedoms at home. We desire to see them established everywhere, even though we recognize the fact that other governmental systems can be based on different philosophies. Our traditional policy, interrupted at times by aberrations, has been that stated by Washington in the last letter he wrote to Lafayette, on Christmas Day, 1797, only a few months before his death: "My politics are plain and simple. I think every nation has a right to establish that form of government under which it conceives it shall live most happy, provided it infracts no right and is not dangerous to others."

Washington's important qualification was repeated by President Roosevelt in a little-noticed gloss that he put on the provision of the Atlantic Charter affirming "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Speaking on February 12, 1943, he said: "The right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right of any government in the world to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its own people or of any other peoples in the world." To "Nazism, Fascism and Japanism, if I may coin a new word, the United Nations can properly say . . . two simple words: 'Never again.' "

A second corollary of the American system is that if might does not make right at home, it does not do so in relations with other states, and particularly smaller ones. A century ago the United States took this view when, although not small in size, it was a weak power internationally. Steady territorial expansion, a rapidly increasing population, the development of ample natural resources, and a tremendous growth of industry made the United States a Great Power before it thought of itself as a World Power.

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It has on occasion been guilty of high-handed action vis-à-vis the smaller republics to the south. The Good Neighbor Policy is relatively recent. But there have been few examples in history of a Power which could so easily have extended its boundaries and yet refrained from doing so, or which could have made satellite states of neighbors and instead allowed them to determine their own ways of national life.

Democracies can of course make tragic mistakes, nationally and internationally. Who would now assert the wisdom of American withdrawal from the world in 1920, or of our foreign loan policy, or of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff? Because of unpreparedness and appeasement from 1937 on, Great Britain narrowly escaped ruin. But errors and miscalculations are not, happily, the monopoly of governments by public discussion. What states have made as great mistakes as did Germany and Italy under Hitler and Mussolini? Bagehot once made a famous generalization that the faults that contemporaries find in public men are not the faults that historians find. The historian can see the consequences of what was done. Napoleon had a maxim, "I judge men only by results." If great designs succeed, then there may be approval. The Axis designs did not succeed.

Similarly in 1914–1918 the régimes which collapsed were the non-democratic ones, including that of Russia. In the Second World War, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Fascist satellites crumpled. Russia was on the victorious side, but the defeat of her armies would have been certain without supplies from Great Britain and the United States. These two world conflicts demonstrate that there has been resilience and staying power in governmental systems which are based on discussion and in which the people think of statesmen as their hired men. For this very practical reason also we value the beam that is in our own eye.

III

Eight score and ten years ago the men who peopled the thirteen colonies unshackled their chains. That was a world-shaking event. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was a world-shaking event also, but its purposes and results were vastly different. The colonists thought only of themselves, and their aims were primarily political. The Russian Revolution was designed to free masses of men from economic slavery. It was the first step in what the Marxian dialectic confidently predicted would be a world movement; and

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until the process was completed, they said, there could be no political liberty. This fundamental difference is the principal reason for the diplomatic line-up of Russia and her satellites versus the western world, and failure to realize the fact is largely responsible for the muddled tolerance with which present difficulties are frequently weighed and for the careless unawareness of difficulties still to come.

For, with one exception, there can be found in Russia none of the freedoms which matter to Americans. Save the little that seeps out on the white market, the only information reaching the Russian people is what a government department decides is harmless and proper. Government departments determine whether, when, and what part of President Truman's or Secretary Byrnes' speeches may be printed. Publishing, the press and broadcasting are used by the government to manufacture mass opinion. In Russia there could be no meeting for a free discussion of American-Russian relations, and if there were, the Ambassador of the United States would not be permitted to speak. Even in the Middle Ages, Erasmus could travel through Europe and spread enlightenment. That would not be possible in Russia now. Still in the Russian future is an assault like that of 300 years ago against Elizabeth's Star Chamber. If it were launched now its instigators would be purged.

The leaders of Russia are leaders because they permit no opposition to, or within, a single minority party. Any known contenders, even aspirants, for their posts have been physically exterminated. Entry of travellers is rigorously limited. The movement of citizens within the country is watched and the government decides what few of them will be allowed to visit in foreign lands. The law courts are party courts. There is no public accounting for the expenditure of public funds and a secret police is a swooping omnipresence. The number of political prisoners is unknown, but the lowest estimate is several million.

First Mussolini and then Hitler did no more than adapt — and, in the latter case, badly brutalize — the methods of the Communist state. They also paid more attention to the theatrical trappings of government — colored shirts, salutes, parades — and cajoled as well as directed. Mussolini and Hitler, nevertheless, were at a disadvantage. They had no coherent respectable body of doctrine which they could instil into their followers. "Das Kapital" deserves and gets intelligent attention from

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economists. "Mein Kampf" had special interest only for statesmen who did not heed it and for psychiatrists who were tardy in reading it. Moreover, Communism so far makes no distinction of race, and its profession that all men are equal has an undeniable appeal to millions, particularly in backward areas. Fascism and National Socialism never did that.

Neither of Lenin's two imitators seemed to regret that "guns not butter" was their slogan. They did little in respect of what is the only part of the American credo of freedom that the Russian rulers think important: the development of an economic system designed to give the average man a higher standard of living and to enable him to live a better material life than he had lived before. The future will determine Russia's measure of achievement in this respect.

The contrasts stated here rather summarily are well known. They have been drawn time and time again. There is no difference of opinion on fundamentals. Caveats go only to details.

The fundamental cleavage between the two systems must be a major factor in any discussion or diplomatic negotiation between the United States and Soviet Russia. Western states are accustomed to elections and to decisions by legislative assemblies in which there must be losers as well as winners. Harsh, even libelous language is sometimes used in the campaigns and debates. But when the die is cast the controversy is over; the losers hope to win next time. People know what has happened and can say what they think about it. But in Russia political decisions are reached in the small group of the Politburo, or perhaps by Stalin himself against a majority of his colleagues. Then the decisions are imposed. No one can challenge them. The Russian people are permitted to learn no more about them than is thought wise in order that their regimented reaction may be the one desired. This technique is not suited to the conduct of international affairs. It cannot be used against states which (unlike, say, Hungary or Poland) are not helpless.

The technique described does, however, free the Soviet Government of any domestic obstacles to changing its policies overnight or to pursuing two conflicting policies at the same time. Before the war was over, Stalin was being hospitable in Moscow to a committee of German generals and ex-Nazis, and simultaneously was calling for the severe punishment of a large group of German leaders. More recently, Molotov has made a complete

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about-face in respect of Germany's future industrial strength and military might. At San Francisco, he offered to withdraw Russian opposition to the admission of Argentina into the United Nations if the United States would lessen its pressure in respect of the composition of the Polish Government. Who doubts that the Russians would cease caring about Franco if they were allowed their way on the Danube and Adriatic? Such changes and swappings are not possible for governments which have to pay attention to public opinion.

Nor can countries where there is free discussion stand on what they declare to be their dignity and refuse to discuss the merits of issues. In December 1939, when the Russian-German pact was under consideration in the League Council, Molotov sent the Secretary-General a telegram: "If the Council of the League and the Assembly were . . . convened to consider Rudolf Holsti's application [Holsti was resident representative of Finland at Geneva] the Soviet Government would not deem it possible to take part in these assemblies. This decision is also supported by the fact that the communication of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and . . . reproducing the text of Holsti's offensive and slanderous letter, is manifestly incompatible with requirements of due respect for the Soviet Union." How many incidents in the Council of Foreign Ministers and in the Security Council have disclosed the same attitude?

In Russian domestic affairs the battle has been to the strong. In international affairs the Russian theory has frequently seemed to be that the battle will be to the strong language. Two Russian diplomats, Litvinov and Maisky, are now kept close to the Kremlin. In London, the latter, gaining as much for his country as could any representative of a different type, acquired many friends and a reputation for urbanity. The behavior of subsequent Russian negotiators has given currency to the remark that they seemed anxious to prove that "we are men, not Maiskies." Russian statesmen select their names to stir, even frighten, their peoples. When we see the names we infrequently remember their meaning: Stalin, "man of steel," Molotov, "sledge hammer."

Given the political way of life existing in Russia, Russian leaders are doomed to ignorance of the outside world, despite the free press in western countries and irrespective of the expense of the Russian intelligence services. A group of leaders who indoctrinate their people must sooner or later come to believe much

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of what they teach. Russian statesmen and diplomats may have been taught, but they have not been educated, for they see everything through prisms fashioned inside the intellectual prisons where they have lived. Eighteenth century ambassadors bribed the mistresses of kings and curried favor with others who were influential at court. Now ambassadors and their staffs must seek to know a whole country — its editors, educators and labor leaders — and to learn the thoughts of men in all walks of life. Only thus can a diplomatic representative or an economic or labor attaché feel that he is correctly interpreting what he is told or what he reads in the press. Russian diplomats isolate themselves (and their families) from everyday contacts. They are afraid not to do so.

Does their fear extend also to the transmission of impalatable judgments about the trend of affairs in the countries where they are accredited? So it often seems. Mr. Stalin may not realize it, but the foreign offices of many countries are almost certainly better informed on the currents of opinion in and the personalities of the United States — including the labor movement — than is the Kremlin. A foreign minister should report to his government not what it wishes to hear but what he believes are the facts. He must remember his possible prejudices as a man of the Left or of the Right, as an aristocrat or a proletarian; and those at home who read his dispatches must be mindful of the personality of their author. The Russians have different views. There is no curtain which they cannot easily push aside when they want to see and find out things, but they have not learned that the most dangerous encirclement from which a nation can suffer is one that is self-imposed.

This may account in part for the lack of freedom of decision which is allowed Russian emissaries. It is said that the Russians came to a meeting with the Americans in Germany and demanded three changes in a memorandum of agreement on certain matters relating to the occupation. The Americans considered the proposals and said: "We accept. Now everything is settled." "Oh, no," the Russians replied. "You see, we did not expect you to agree and now we shall have to telegraph for further instructions."

IV

I began by saying that Russia was entitled to frame and press for a foreign policy which would protect and advance the inter-

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ests of her people. How far her shifting policies seem to threaten the interests of the American people is not my present subject. Nor shall I attempt to say just where a reasonable search for security ends and where deliberately incandescent imperialism begins. Only a soothsayer could answer such questions. We know so little of what is behind Russian policies; and they may change tomorrow.

Assuredly the Soviet Government wants peace until its country is less impoverished, its air power stronger, and the know-how of the atomic bomb is no longer our secret. Will Russia or will she not cease grabbing when the peace tables are finally cleared, and will her manners then become better or worse? If western states seem friendly, will fifth column activities be abandoned or intensified? Will possession of the know-how of the new weapons result in a more real self-confidence or in a new arrogance and willingness, even eagerness, for a showdown? When Russia has attained a decent standard of living, will many of her recent threats and manœuvres appear to have been due to suspicions and fears which history has justified: invasion by the Germans in 1914 and 1941; by the Allies in 1919; by the Poles in 1920 — invasions which cut deeper because of the precedents of Napoleon and the Poles and the Swedes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? No one can blame Russia for not wanting that to happen again. But nobody outside of the Kremlin can know what is in the minds of Stalin and his colleagues on these subjects.

Ignorant of Russian purposes, we can still say that they cannot justify many of the means that the world has been witnessing. Nor is it sure that those means in themselves may not prove as shortsighted and as futile as the construction of the Maginot Line. What is sure is that Russian means and our own means highlight a deep abyss between the two ways of thinking and acting. Bridges may be difficult to throw across, and even if they are constructed they may be able to bear only a few light loads before they break. Then we shall have to plan the construction of new bridges.

Meanwhile, we must make our representative institutions more efficient for solving grave economic problems. Here as everywhere the architectonic freedom is freedom of speech. Hungry men cannot eat it; but only through knowing and uttering can men achieve freedom from want and at the same time remain free.

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VOTES AND VETOES

By James B. Reston

THE first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York is a good time to review some of the theories on which the United Nations was founded at San Francisco, to test those theories against the developments in the United Nations since the first General Assembly meeting in London, and to analyze the record and speculate on the future.

The United Nations was founded on the basic theory that there must not be a world war every generation; that the death of some 40 million human beings through war during the past thirty years was enough; and that it was imperative, if the nations were to justify the notion that they were civilized, to combine together to prevent, and if necessary to repel, future aggression.

Nobody denies the validity of this basic premise. It is still good. Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin may argue about everything else but they agree on this. There is very little evidence that the nations have learned as much as they have suffered or that they are willing to do without the things that lead to war; but peace, they unanimously proclaim, is a good thing. So the first theory stands.

The second theory on which the United Nations was founded was that peace depended on the unanimity not of all the states, as the Wilsonian doctrine held, but on the unanimity of those states which had the power to wage modern war.

There was a corollary to this theory which is not clearly understood, at least in the United States. This was that there was never any intention that the United Nations should have power to coerce one of the great states. These states promised each other and the world to abandon war as an instrument of policy, and on the basis of this promise, which they insisted was sufficient, agreed that the United Nations did not need to have, and should not have, sufficient force to coerce one of "The Five."

Many delegates and observers at San Francisco thought the security organization should have such power, and apparently many more persons think so today, but in this argument, as in many others, it was conceded by the vast majority at San Francisco that the approval of the great states was essential; and these states insisted — with the eventual approval of the rest —

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that the organization was designed not to police them but to police everybody but them.

It was out of these two ideas — 1, peace depends on the unanimity of those who have power to wage modern war; and 2, those who have power to wage modern war will not agree to create an organization with power to coerce any of the Big Five — that the veto grew.

In its inception the veto was believed to be a positive thing. The idea behind it was that action by a security league would not be effective unless it had the coöperation of the Big Five. Therefore, each of these five was given the right of veto over all questions of substance dealing with the maintenance of international peace.

A complete analysis of these theories would fill a library rather than a few paragraphs in a magazine, but one or two points seem pertinent at this time. The first is that there is still general agreement that peace depends on the agreement and unity of the Big Five. The second is that if the nations gathering for the United Nations General Assembly were meeting to draft the Charter all over again, they would, in the opinion of the overwhelming number of observers in this country, still insist on the rule of unanimity, and therefore the veto, for the Big Five.

In short, they would still reject the alternative of a security parliament with power to legislate and enforce its decisions on its members. Indeed, the relations among the great states being what they are, they would probably emphasize even more than they did at San Francisco, if that is possible, the necessity of creating not a system of law, enforceable on all states, but an association of sovereign states with executive and veto power resting in the hands of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

The small Powers still believe in the doctrine of a security parliament, in a system of law enforceable against all; and, as Mr. Huxley has remarked, doctrines do not necessarily die merely because they are killed. But everybody who knows anything about Soviet policy, and anyone who is willing to make an objective judgment about the Senate of the United States today, must agree that these two large nations, the most powerful, the most influential, and the most inexperienced in the annals of world leadership, are not prepared to agree to such a change.

It may be that what the multitude says is so, or soon will be,

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and if this honorable doctrine is correct, there is hope for a basic change in the structure of the United Nations at some future date. But as of today, despite the fact that the British Government and a growing section of the American intelligentsia are siding with the views of the small states on the necessity for a security parliament, the Soviet Government and the American Senate are opposed to it, and no group of nations can withstand such a coalition in the United Nations.

But the theories on which the security organization was founded, and the general assumptions about the way in which those theories would be carried out, are two different things. It is not enough to say merely that 1, everybody agrees on the necessity for international organization to prevent war; 2, peace depends on the collaboration of those who have power to make war; 3, a security parliament is a political impossibility at the present time, and in an association based on sovereign equality, effective action depends on the unanimity of the Big Five. These basic theories, still valid or politically necessary, were known at San Francisco to depend on several basic assumptions about the way in which the theories would be put into practice, and these assumptions need to be recalled and compared with the record of the past nine months.

The first basic assumption at San Francisco was that, since this organization was based on the principle of "sovereign equality," all member states, large and small — and especially large — would "fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter," including the principles and purposes of the Charter. Among these was the fundamental obligation that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

It must be said here — for it is being said by diplomats in private all over the world — that the Great Powers have not always fulfilled in good faith the obligations they assumed.

Specifically, the general opinion among those who have followed the activities of the Security Council in its first nine months is that the Soviet Union did use force and the threat of force against the political independence of Iran. In contradiction to the sanctity of international agreements, on which the entire organization rests, the Soviet kept troops in Iran beyond the date when it had promised to withdraw them. In contradiction to the

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sovereign rights of Iran, the Soviet Union prevented the central government of that state from carrying out its duties to maintain and administer the law, and even to move freely about its own territory. In contradiction to every acknowledged law that governs the relations between sovereign states, it threatened to use its force to put into power in Azerbaijan political elements favorable to the Soviet Union. And in contradiction to its obligations to allow Iran to appeal freely to the United Nations, and to remain in the Council chamber while the question was being discussed, it boycotted the Iranian debate, warned the Iranian premier that any appeal to the United Nations would be considered an "unfriendly act," and instructed the Soviet representative in the Security Council not only to oppose the right of the Iranian representative to be heard but to oppose the right of the Security Council to consider the case under the agreed terms of the Charter.

Because it is still recognized that effective action in the security field cannot be taken without the collaboration of all the big states, and because the organization was based on the promise of its members to uphold the principles of the Charter, the organization was powerless to deal with the case effectively and lost prestige when it tried to do so. Historians may very well decide that this was the first important test case of the United Nations, that the Soviet Union weakened the principle on which the association depended, and that it carried out a policy of aggression by political and military infiltration in defiance of the organization and in violation of the first basic assumption on which the organization was founded.

The second basic assumption on which the United Nations was founded was that the big states would not have the right of vote or veto in the *peaceful* settlement of controversies *to which they were a party*, and that while they would have the right of veto on all other questions of substance, this right would be used "sparingly."

Again, as in the implementation of the obligation to carry out the purposes and principles of the Charter, it is a matter of opinion as to whether this second basic assumption has proved to be correct; but it is certainly a fact that nobody except the Soviet delegate at the United Nations and a few of his friends think that it has. The Soviet delegate himself has used the veto five times against the majority on questions where the vital interests of

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the Soviet Union were not at issue, and by a unilateral interpretation of the veto provision his government has sought to expand the veto beyond the intent of the San Francisco Conference.

So much has been said during the battle of the veto that it is necessary to go back and define the voting issue as discussed and decided at Yalta and San Francisco. The second basic assumption listed above contains a principle, which was proposed by the late President Roosevelt, and a promise, which was given by the big states at San Francisco. The acceptance of the principle by Premier Stalin at Yalta induced the United States to back the voting formula that was proposed at San Francisco, and the promise of the Big Five induced the small and middle Powers to accept the veto provisions.

The principle was that, while the Big States had to have the veto on *all* decisions involving *punitive* action, regardless of whether they were involved in these cases, and even on decisions involving the *pacific* settlement of a controversy in which they were *not* involved, *they should not have the right of vote or veto in the preliminary or peaceful settlement of cases in which they were involved.*

This principle was put forward by Mr. Roosevelt as a compromise. Originally, the Soviet Union wanted the right to vote on all cases where punitive action was proposed, even against the Soviet Union; and on the *pacific* settlement of disputes regardless of whether the Soviet Union was a party to the case. The United States and Britain met them part-way. There was no opposition to the request for the right of veto on punitive decisions. Some members of both the American and British delegations at Yalta (like the majority of the delegations at San Francisco) thought there should not be a veto on the peaceful or pacific settlement of *any* case before the Council. In the last analysis, however, Mr. Roosevelt agreed to the veto on the peaceful settlement of disputes, but insisted that no state, large or small, should have this right regarding decisions involving the peaceful settlement of a controversy to which it was a party.

This principle of abstention from voting on the peaceful settlement of cases in which a state is involved has not been carried out by the Soviet Union, any more than it carried out the principles of the Charter in the Iranian case. The Soviet Government has sought to minimize or abolish the abstention principle in several different ways. In the Indonesian case, it did so by having

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its case presented by the Ukraine (thus enabling the Soviet to say it was not involved in the case and had the right of veto). In the Spanish case, Poland made the formal charges, with the same result. In the Iranian case, where the Soviet representatives were directly charged, however, they switched tactics and, at one point or another, made these arguments: 1, that while they accepted the Yalta compromise that the parties to a dispute should abstain from voting on peaceful decisions, it was necessary first to find that a "dispute" actually did exist; 2, that it was also necessary for the Council to find that the "dispute" actually threatened international peace and security; and 3, that the Council could not properly hold that a "dispute" existed or that that "dispute" threatened international peace and security without the vote of the Soviet Union, which had a veto, and could even make that veto effective merely by being absent from the Council when the vote was taken.

There is nothing in the record to support this construction of the rules, and much to oppose it. It is true that the Yalta voting compromise referred to "parties to a dispute" because Chapter VIII, Section A, Paragraph 5, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which was before the conferees at Yalta used the phrase "parties to a dispute." But time and again, in the official explanations of the veto and in the official report on the San Francisco Conference, the word "dispute" is used synonymously with "situation" and with "case" and "controversy."

In explaining the voting formula after Yalta, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., then Secretary of State, said of the abstention clause in the Yalta voting agreement: "This means that no nation, large or small, if party to a dispute, would participate in the decisions in the Security Council on questions like the following: whether the *dispute* or *situation* is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace." On this occasion, Mr. Stettinius uses the words "dispute" and "situation" synonymously, as the Canadians did in their official report on the conference. Moreover, in Mr. Stettinius' report to President Truman on San Francisco,[1] he uses the broader word "case" to emphasize the intention that the abstention clause should apply to all peaceful settlements of "cases" in which a member is involved. "The principal decision made at Yalta," said Mr.

[1] *Cf.* "Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference." (Department of State Publication 2349.)

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Stettinius in the report to the President, "was that the unanimity requirement should apply to procedures of pacific settlement but that it should not be carried to the extent of permitting a member of the Security Council to take part in deciding a *case* to which it is a party. . . ."

So much for the principle involved in the second basic assumption. The promise was equally clear. The Big Five, explaining the voting procedure at San Francisco, said: "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their veto power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council. . . ." The official American report was even more explicit: "During the course of the debate on the . . . voting formula itself, it was stressed by the Great Powers that their special voting position would be used with a great sense of responsibility and consideration of the interests of the smaller nations and that therefore the 'veto' would be used sparingly. . . ."

Of course, it is perhaps open to each nation to define "sparingly" as it pleases, but there is no doubt that in the opinion of the vast majority of those who have observed the United Nations since its inception, the Soviet Union has violated both the Roosevelt principle and the Big Five promise which make up the basic assumption about the veto.

The third basic assumption about the United Nations was that the General Assembly would serve as a forum in which the real issues among the Powers would be discussed, and where the nations, by joint positive action on common international questions, would develop habits of coöperation that would eventually produce a conciliatory spirit in all the organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council.

This assumption has not proved to be correct either, and maybe it was based on a misconception to begin with. In the first place, the nations have not dealt, and perhaps could not possibly deal in public, with the "real issues" that divide them. The "real issue" for the United States and Britain in the Spanish and Greek questions, for example, was the possible spread of Communism and Soviet influence into the Iberian peninsula and the eastern Mediterranean. They did not want to assist in the exchange of another Mikhailovitch for another Tito. But while these questions were debated *ad nauseam* in the Security Council, nobody even mentioned the word "Communism."

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The same thing was true in most of the other debates during the first nine months of the General Assembly and the Council. The "real issue" in Iran was not oil, as has been so widely contended. At both the Tehran and Yalta Conferences the United States and Britain stated they had no objection to the Soviet Union getting oil concessions in that country. The issue was aggression by political and military infiltration, and while the American and British foreign offices had all the information on how the trick was done, and while they know today that we have seen only the first chapter in the Soviet campaign to get the British out of all Iran and get a "friendly" government established in Tehran, nobody did anything more than skirt around the question of aggression.

Moreover, there was very little evidence in the first meetings of the General Assembly that it was capable of effective work on positive questions. Indeed, instead of a conciliatory atmosphere spreading from the General Assembly into the Security Council, the tendency has been for the acrimonious discussions of the Council to spread to the Assembly.

It is possible, of course, to place too much significance on these sharp arguments. Our ears are still attuned to the polite pianissimo of the old diplomacy after new leaders with new and noisier instruments have taken the stage. Words are no longer chosen by leading diplomats and statesmen as carefully as they used to be. (Mr. Byrnes, in referring to the Palestine issue recently, used "partition" when he meant "federation," with results that every student of foreign affairs can imagine.) The practice of understatement has been replaced by the process of declamation and denunciation. The latter, though harder on the nerves, may be no worse than the former. For the moment, however, the third basic assumption, like the other two, has not been carried to realization.

It has not been carried out, and neither have the others, because the most important of all the basic assumptions about the United Nations has not been fulfilled. This assumption was that the great states would manage to have a little faith in each other; not much, maybe, but at least enough to operate an association that depended on unity.

"It was taken as axiomatic at Dumbarton Oaks," said Mr. Stettinius' official American report on the San Francisco Conference, "that the cornerstone of world security is the unity of

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those nations which formed the core of the grand alliance against the Axis. . . ." It was hoped that somehow the Russian emphasis on power as a weapon to be wielded as of right and the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on power as a responsibility could be brought closer than they were on the opening day of the San Francisco Conference. But this does not seem to have happened.

Still, if it is true, as we in this country sometimes think it is, that the imponderables are often as important as the ponderables, it cannot be concluded that all the developments of the past year in the United Nations have been for the worse. The gap between reality and hope is certainly great. The judgments of most of the delegates to the first General Assembly in New York are more melancholy than the visions many of them had at San Francisco. But it cannot be said that there is not a bright corner to the picture or that the United Nations itself is in some way responsible for the gloomy prospect.

No American who left San Francisco a year ago last July would have predicted that the United States Senate would have ratified the Charter by 89 to 2. Few would have predicted that the United States would be taking the lead, as it is today, in the United Nations. And certainly nobody would have believed it possible that the United Nations would have before it today a proposal backed by the President and the Secretary of State (though, in all honesty, it should be noted, not yet approved by the Senate) that the veto be abandoned in the realm of atomic energy.

Too much should not be assumed from this latter fact. American policy on the veto is wavering. In the executive branch of the Government there is a strong movement toward minimizing it as much as possible. In the country as a whole, the pressure of public opinion for the moment is seeking not to limit the powers of the United Nations, as it was after the San Francisco Conference, but to widen it. Even in Congress, it would undoubtedly be possible to get the veto abolished on *all* questions involving the pacific settlement of controversies. But beyond this it would not be safe to rely on Congressional approval.

At the present moment, the Truman Administration is wavering and perhaps even inconsistent. It favors the abolition of the veto in the realm of atomic energy, after certain safeguards (unacceptable to the Russians) have been agreed upon, but it opposes the Cuban motion to abolish the veto altogether. It argues for a liberal trusteeship policy by the British, but hesi-

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tates to adopt one for the new territories the United States has acquired in the Pacific.

Moreover, it may be charged that Mr. Truman has repeated the mistake of Woodrow Wilson, and to a certain extent of Franklin Roosevelt, in that he has not emphasized to the American people the necessity of making clear that now, as before, the United States will fight any nation that consistently seeks to destroy the principles and purposes on which world order rests, even if there is no express commitment to fight for them under a legal charter.

But aside from these hesitations, the United States has moved more rapidly toward a position of world leadership than ever before in its history, and is more and more making the United Nations the center of its policy. Those who are directing American policy in the United Nations are fully aware of the fact that the Soviet Union is attempting by interpretation of the rules to get the kind of charter they wanted in the first place: a charter in which the nations of the world are expected to approve and carry out the prearranged decisions of the Big Five, and in which each of the Big Five has a veto on the others. The Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians both attempted to interpret the Constitution of the United States to fit their original desires, and that fight is still going on.

The United States does not want that kind of a security organization. Our officials and even our Congress have come to the realization that in the realm of security the interests of the United States and the interests of the vast majority of the nations of the world are similar if not identical. That is why Mr. Byrnes seeks to increase the number of nations at the peace conferences and why Americans are glad to see all the United Nations attending the General Assembly.

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TWENTY YEARS OF RUSSO-GERMAN RELATIONS

1919-1939

By John W. Wheeler-Bennett

THE relations between Russia and Germany (or Prussia) for the past 200 years have been a series of alienations, distinguished for their bitterness, and of rapprochements, remarkable for their warmth. Who, for example, could have foreseen in 1761, when Russian troops had overrun Prussia, occupied Berlin and humbled Frederick the Great, that the sudden death of the Empress Elizabeth would bring to the throne Peter III, the inveterate admirer of Frederick and of Prussia, and that he would promptly make peace with his hero? Or that, nine years after this reprieve, Russia, Prussia and Austria would — in Frederick's blasphemous phrase — "take Communion in the one Eucharistic body which is Poland?"

A cardinal factor in the relationship has been the existence of an independent Poland; for, in general, it is true that when separated by a buffer state the two great Powers of eastern Europe have been friendly, whereas a contiguity of frontiers has bred hostility. In the period between the first and third partitions of Poland (1772–1795), Russia and Prussia were in the positions of two gangsters, who with a weaker confederate — Austria — were dividing up a rich haul of loot. While the division was in process, relations between the partners remained amicable, save for the growlings which arose if one or the other took rather too much. When Poland had vanished from the map of Europe, however, Russia and Prussia confronted one another with nothing more to devour than each other.

The outbreak of the French Revolution and the rise of the common enemy, égalitarianism, averted any major clash, and Napoleon's creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, under French protection, still further improved Russo-Prussian relations. Russia was the dominant partner. The bond, forged in the common task of freeing Europe from the Napoleonic hegemony, was a one-sided partnership, and not without its strains and rifts. The Napoleonic wars carried both Russian and Prussian troops onto each other's soil as invaders. A Prussian contingent ac-

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companied the Grand Army to Moscow, and though by the Convention of Tauroggen (1812) d'Yorck paved the way for Prussia to join the Russians as an ally in harrying the retreating French armies, it was through Prussia and other parts of Germany that the Russians had to fight their way before reaching France. From 1815 to 1860, Prussia was virtually a vassal of Muscovy. After grovelling to Napoleon for 15 years she now grovelled to Russia for 45. And not Prussia alone. The omnipotent presence of the Tsar was felt in every princely German Court. "If," as Prince Bülow wrote of his childhood days at the Court of Strelitz, "the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz said that the Tsar would have wished this or that, it was as if God himself had spoken."

Bismarck created a unified Germany as much in reaction against Russian tutelage as stimulated by rivalry with France. It was the emergence of this new force in central Europe, and the final extinction of Poland, which exacerbated Russo-Prussian relations in the later sixties. Bismarck, however, when he had made Germany independent of both France and Russia, bought the friendship of the latter with the Black Sea Agreement of 1871, and made the maintenance of this friendship a salient objective of his policy, successfully avoiding major controversies with his powerful eastern neighbor throughout his long term of office. In the political precepts which he laid down for the guidance of the young Emperor Wilhelm II, friendship with Russia transcended all other considerations.

This policy was not prompted merely by a dread of a "two-front war" but by a sincere belief in the possibilities of Russo-German coöperation. Contrary to common belief, Bismarck was not a proponent of the Pan-German doctrines, which he regarded as fantastic. He did, however, believe in the "manifest destiny" of Russia and Germany to share *Weltmacht*, and he was confident, not without reason, that together the two Powers could do anything they desired.

Herein lay the germ of the deep-seated rivalry which existed in the German Foreign Office and High Command after Bismarck's departure: the battle for power between the eastern school, which barred the old Prince's policy of collaboration with Russia, and the "greater Germany" school, which sought the aggrandizement of Germany, if necessary at Russia's expense.

The greater Germany school won the day; the erratic policy of

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Wilhelm II and his avowed preference for Austria-Hungary sapped the foundations of the structure of alliance that Bismarck had built so laboriously, and drove Russia into the arms of France, and ultimately made possible the formation of the Triple Entente. The First World War was thereby brought within measurable distance, since Germany had contributed to her own *einkreisung*, and thus produced her claustrophobic state of mind.

II

The process of alienation was completed by the humiliation of Russian arms by Germany in 1914–1917, the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, and the "Tilsit Peace" of Brest-Litovsk in which the greater Germany school gave free rein to its ambitions. To many it appeared that in no foreseeable period could Russia and Germany be found in the same camp. But one of the unpredictable rapprochements was again to occur. It is a curious fact that, just as the overvaulting ambition of triumphant German militarism had dictated the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, so now this same German militarism, grown humble and cunning in defeat and concerned only with its own survival, brought about the renewal of amicable relations. In the shifting of power which followed the collapse of the monarchies of central Europe, Bismarck's tradition again asserted itself; Germany and Russia found themselves drawn together as pariahs and discovered that they had grievances in common.

The chief artificer of this strange rapprochement was General Hans von Seeckt, the creator of the Reichswehr, and one of the dominating characters in Germany's Weimar period. Concerned purely with the preservation of the German military tradition, von Seeckt set himself the task of circumventing the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which prohibited conscription and drastically restricted manpower and armament. He was to succeed in making the Reichswehr a volunteer professional force more formidable than most conscript armies. But how should this force be equipped and trained? How else than with Russian collaboration?

This revolutionary idea was not generally approved by von Seeckt's colleagues. General Hoffmann, who had been an eye-witness of the devastating effect of Bolshevik propaganda on both Russian and German troops, regarded Moscow as the root of all evil, and advocated the sinking of differences between

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Germany and the Allies in a joint crusade against a common enemy. General Groener, who had succeeded Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General, had also seen Bolshevism at first-hand in the Ukraine after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and viewed it with fear and repugnance.

Von Seeckt, himself, had served on the eastern front — he was the hero of the break-through at Gorlice in 1915 for which von Falkenhayn took the credit — but he had fought the Tsarist armies and not the Bolsheviks. He nevertheless knew that the Russians were magnificent fighters, whether they were well or badly led, and he saw in the Red Army a valuable instrument for his policy. Germany, he argued, had been virtually ostracized from the European society of nations and must needs, therefore, consort with the other outlaw, the Soviet Union. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. was not bound by the Treaty of Versailles. She had, in fact, been pointedly ignored by the Peace Conference of Paris, even though, *in absentia*, she had greatly influenced its decisions. The U.S.S.R. alone, therefore, was in a position to manufacture and supply those categories of military equipment which the Treaty forbade to the Reichswehr. On the other hand, the Red Army only lacked that discipline which German training could impart to make it a very useful factor in German policies. Admittedly the Soviet Union was a dangerous ally, but she was at this juncture better than no ally at all.

The head of the Reichswehr propounded these ideas as early as February 1920, during the outcry in Germany against the surrender to the Allies of the Kaiser and the German political and military leaders for trial as war criminals. Von Seeckt informed his colleagues, in terms which are still of interest, that if the Government of the Reich consented to hand over the leaders of the old Army, the Reichswehr must oppose such action by every means in its power, even if that entailed the reopening of hostilities. In this event, the German troops would retire, fighting step by step, to defensive positions behind the line of the Weser and the Elbe. But in the east they would launch an offensive against Poland, join hands with the Red Army and, having crushed the Poles, march westward to meet the British and the French.

These drastic measures were not destined to materialize at this time, since the Allied Governments did not press the issue of the surrender of the war criminals, but they contained the germ

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of that threatened "Red Army on the Rhine" with which the Reichswehr made so much play in years to come. The most important result, however, was that von Seeckt obtained support for his general thesis from the two powerful leaders of the eastern school, Baron von Maltzan, head of the Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office (described by Lord D'Abernon as "the cleverest man who has worked in the Wilhelmstrasse since the war"), and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the former Foreign Minister, who had become a hero in Germany as the man who had refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

With this backing, von Seeckt took a further step forward. He had retained on contract in the offices of the *Reichswehr-ministerium* in the Bendlerstrasse the retired Colonel Nicolai, who, as head of the German Secret Service during the First World War, had made all civil departments of the Empire tremble at his nod. Seeckt dispatched him secretly to Moscow early in 1921 with a tentative suggestion for the transfer of German airplane factories to Russia. In the same year official negotiations were opened by von Maltzan for the conclusion of a Russo-German economic agreement.

The Russian response to this dual approach was guarded but by no means hostile. The Soviet Union had no reason to love Germany but, at the moment, she had reason to love the rest of the world still less. Troops of the Allied interventionist forces were still upon her soil and British, French and American money was equipping the counter-revolutionary armies within her borders. Moreover, the Peace Conference of Paris had drawn the eastern boundaries of Europe without reference to Russia's interests, and an "imperialist" Poland, with British and French assistance, had wrested from Russia by the Treaty of Riga (March 1921) a further cession of territory, of which the inhabitants, if they were not Russian, were certainly not Polish.[1] Russian fortunes were as low as Germany's. Civil war and famine ravaged her territory, and her economic life, pending the success of the NEP, was at a standstill. The new Red Army, which both Trotsky and Stalin claim to have developed, had fought well against Poland but had shown certain technical deficiencies, which had resulted in its defeat when confronted with the

[1] Poland was at this time indulging in a number of chauvinistic adventures, *e.g.*, the seizure of Vilna from Lithuania in 1920, the attack on Russia in the same year, and the Upper Silesian episode of 1921 with Germany.

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superior equipment and staff work with which Britain and France subsequently supplied the Poles. These deficiencies could be repaired. No harm, therefore, and perhaps some gain, could result from a friendly response to the German overtures.

So Colonel Nicolai was successful in his mission to Moscow and his journey inaugurated a series of such visits by high-ranking German officers, including General von Hammerstein, who succeeded von Seeckt in command of the Reichswehr, and General von Schleicher, who ultimately became Chancellor of the Reich. Von Maltzan's negotiations also bore fruit in a Russo-German economic agreement signed in Berlin on May 8, 1921.

Thus in two short years the animosities engendered at Brest-Litovsk were forgotten, and the liaison between the two general staffs became an essential factor in German foreign policy. This was among the strangest of the many curious phenomena of the Weimar period. It was typical of von Seeckt that he used the Reichswehr with equal ruthlessness in suppressing a Communist rising or in collaborating with the Red Army.

III

The season was confederate to the advancement of Russo-German relations. In an attempt to bring both states into the European family of nations, David Lloyd George and Aristide Briand proposed the Genoa Conference, but when it met in April 1922, the Germans and Russians found themselves cold-shouldered. They utilized the meeting to their own advantage, however, and, to the amazement and indignation of the other Powers, announced on April 17 that Wirth and Rathenau, German Chancellor and Foreign Minister respectively, had signed with Foreign Commissar Chicherin at Rapallo a formal treaty of friendship, reëstablishing the diplomatic and commercial relations which had been severed with the repudiation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in November 1918.

The Treaty of Rapallo was complemented by a secret military agreement which enabled von Seeckt to send each year to Russia a certain number of officers to act as instructors to the Red Army, and a further number to gain all possible experience in the handling of heavy artillery, tanks, armored cars and other weapons forbidden to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles.

There ensued a period of 11 years during which Soviet-German

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relations could not have been more halcyon. The two general staffs worked harmoniously for the dual purpose of circumventing the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and of modernizing the Red Army. The economic and industrial brains of Germany were utilized by Russia in the operation of the first Five Year Plan. And on October 13, 1925, a new Russo-German Treaty of Commerce cemented still more closely the trade relations of the two countries.

In Germany, the Rapallo policy was welcomed by all classes, especially by the nationalist conservatives, who saw in it a means of correcting the policy of conciliation toward the Allied Powers which Stresemann had inaugurated in 1923 and from which the Locarno Agreement developed. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had been appointed Ambassador in Moscow, was among the fiercest and most able opponents of the Locarno policy, and great was the triumph of the nationalists when, as a result of the abortive attempt to admit Germany to the League of Nations in March 1926, they were able to persuade Stresemann to sign a pact of neutrality and non-aggression with the Soviet Union.

Throughout the period of this strange *mariage de convenance* the German General Staff was actuated by pure expediency. Given the opportunity and the means, it would have fought Bolshevist Russia with the same intense efficiency with which it now collaborated with her; it treated with the Soviet Union on a purely technical basis, and maintained a stern watch on any possible infiltration of Communist doctrines into the ranks of the Reichswehr. Russia, for her part, was equally undeceived as to the fundamental nature of the cordiality obtaining between herself and Germany.

With the downfall of the Weimar Republic in January 1933 and the founding of the Third Reich, a change was to be expected in Soviet-German relations, due partly to the fact that under the Nazi régime the clandestine circumvention of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was no longer necessary, and partly to the very definite views of Adolf Hitler toward Russia. "A Russo-German coalition, waging war against western Europe, and probably against the whole world on that account, would be catastrophic," he had written in "Mein Kampf;" and, again, "The fact of forming an alliance with Russia would be the signal for a new war. And the result of that would be the end of Germany."

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Politically and doctrinally opposed to Russia, Hitler proclaimed a deathless war against Communism and reverted in his planning to the imperialist designs of Ludendorff and the German General Staff at Brest-Litovsk for a German *Lebensraum* in the Baltic lands and the Ukraine. Yet the Fuehrer did not at once completely disrupt the course of German-Russian relations. While the Comintern and the Goebbels propaganda machine poured forth a flow of reciprocal venom and recrimination, the German Government was careful to maintain the economic agreements with Russia, and went so far, in 1933, as to renew the Pact of Mutual Non-Aggression for a further period of five years.

Moreover, Hitler was either unable or unwilling to break the liaison of the German General Staff with Moscow, and comparatively amicable relations were maintained on this level, due largely to the persistent efforts of General Putna, the Soviet military attaché in Berlin (later transferred to London), and General von Niedermayer, who, having succeeded Nicolai as chief liaison officer with the Red Army in the late twenties, was quickly appointed by the General Staff, on Hitler's advent to power, as military attaché in Moscow. By a curious anomaly these relations continued until the Russian military purge of July 1937 when the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Marshal Tukhachevsky, and six other high-ranking officers, including General Putna, were court-martialed on a charge of high treason and summarily executed. In the drastic reorganization of the Reichswehr in February 1938, which followed certain disclosures concerning the lady whom Field Marshal von Blomberg had recently married (with Hitler and Goering as witnesses), the Fuehrer took occasion to dispense with the services of General von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, and a dozen other senior general officers, many of whom had been nurtured in the Seeckt tradition. The liaison was thus brought to an abrupt termination.[2]

One reason for Hitler's circumspection in his early dealings with the Soviet Union was that his first acts of terrorism and threatened aggression had produced an acute tension with the

[2] In 1935 Hitler told M. Josef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, that General von Schleicher "was rightfully murdered, if only because he had sought to maintain the Rapallo Treaty." (Polish White Book, "Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933–1939," London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., p. 29 and 216.) Thereby Hitler indicated — for the benefit of Poland at least — that he had endeavored to break off the Russo-German General Staff relations at an early date after his advent to power. It will be remembered, however, that this was not the reason which Hitler gave for von Schleicher's murder in his address to the Reichstag of July 17, 1934, when he assumed full responsibility for the Blood Purge of June 30.

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western Powers and with Italy, and he was anxious not to have all Europe against him simultaneously. Another reason was that, though undoubtedly planning against the Soviet Union, the Fuehrer also had designs on Poland; yet such was his guile that he wished to lull Poland into a state of false security while utilizing her as a cat's-paw against Russia. Thus, at the signing of a pact of non-aggression with Poland on January 26, 1934, the Fuehrer, and also Goering, impressed upon the Poles the evil which Weimar Germany had consistently worked with Russia against Poland, who, they insisted, had been the intended victim of the Rapallo policy. This, said the Nazi leaders to Pilsudski and Beck and Lipski, was all changed now; the Third Reich entertained only the friendliest feelings for Poland and was ready to protect her against the Soviet aggression.

In short, beginning in 1935, it became one of the chief objectives of Hitler's foreign policy to exacerbate Soviet-Polish relations and to dazzle the Poles with promises of gigantic territorial aggrandizement. In all their conversations with the Poles, the German leaders were studiously modest in describing their own prospective demands upon Russian territory. These, they said, were confined to annexing the Baltic States and establishing the paramount position of Germany on the Baltic Sea. Germany had not the slightest design upon the Ukraine, not even upon part of it, and looked upon this fertile land as the perquisite of Poland, to whose western Ukrainian provinces, taken from Russia in 1921 by the Treaty of Riga, it should be united.[3] With these honeyed words the Nazi leaders pushed Poland forward against the Soviet Union, while at the same time preparing the destruction of the Polish state.

IV

The Government of the Soviet Union was by no means blind to the new forces which now threatened it from the west. Perhaps because of the extreme Russian sensibility to the problem of security, perhaps because of the acute ideological antithesis which existed between National Socialism and Marxism, Russia was more vividly aware of the menace of Hitlerism than were many of the western Powers. She was concerned for her own safety from the militant Moloch which had appeared in central Europe, but she was also alive to the fact that this apparition might also

[3] Polish White Book, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

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react to her own advantage, since it would inevitably force the western Powers to woo Russia back to the family of European nations.

The calculations of Moscow proved exact. No sooner had Germany banged the door behind her after her final exit from Geneva in October 1933 than tentative feelers were put out toward a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. The first move came from France where Foreign Minister Louis Barthou, fearful of the imminence of a German-Polish rapprochement, was becoming more and more anxious to redress the balance of Europe by enlisting Russia's support.

The U.S.S.R. had certain reservations as to the advisability of joining the League, and at first said that a military alliance with France was a prerequisite. The French demurred on account of the provisions of the Locarno Agreement, under which France had incurred certain reciprocal obligations to Britain, Italy and Germany. Accordingly in May 1934, Louis Barthou and Maxim Litvinov agreed upon a tentative alternative for an "Eastern Locarno" pact, which should extend the provisions of the treaties concluded in 1925 among Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and France to include Russia, the Baltic States and Finland. The combined efforts of Britain and France failed to induce Germany or Poland to agree to such a proposal.[4] As a result of these difficulties, and of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the League without further preliminaries. She was accordingly elected to membership and to a permanent seat on the Council on September 15, 1934.[5] With considerable enthusiasm, born of a growing sense of danger, the Soviet Union threw itself into the work of building a system of European security against Nazi aggression — a policy which the Nazis themselves at once described as "encirclement" of Germany.

Germany's announcement on March 16, 1935, that she had unilaterally repudiated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and consequently had reintroduced compulsory military service and created an air force was the signal for open panic in the capitals of Europe. Though the Stresa Conference

[4] However, Poland did on May 5, 1934, renew for a period of 11 years the Treaty of Non-Aggression signed with the U.S.S.R. on July 25, 1932.

[5] Soviet membership in the League terminated on December 14, 1939, when, as a result of her attack on Finland, the Council resolved that "by its own actions, the Soviet Union has expelled itself from the League of Nations."

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(April 11, 1935) gave the appearance of a united front in the face of this new example of Nazi ruthlessness, nothing was in fact further from the truth. Italy, already meditating her descent upon Ethiopia, was not disposed to take any part in sanctions against Germany; and scarcely was the ink dry on the Stresa Declaration when Britain was openly condoning the rearmament of Germany by initiating negotiations for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement which was finally signed on June 18.[6]

The effect on France was to revive once more the flagging interest in Franco-Soviet relations. These had flourished under the trenchant realism of Louis Barthou but had languished when, on Barthou's assassination in October 1934, the reins of power had passed into the soiled hands of Pierre Laval. Now it was as if the ghost of Barthou rose and pointed the way, and Laval was stirred to sign a Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Paris on May 2, 1935, and subsequently to make a visit to Moscow (May 13–15.)[7] This was what Russia had originally proposed just a year before at Geneva, but to safeguard the French commitments under Locarno, and to assuage the alarm of certain strata of the French political world who feared the effect on Germany — as well as on France — of an out-and-out treaty of alliance, an important protocol was appended to the Franco-Soviet Treaty by which Germany was invited to join as a contracting party, either at the time of signature or subsequently, thereby transforming the treaty into a tripartite agreement of non-aggression and mutual assistance. The protocol also made provision for the ultimate conclusion of a multilateral "Eastern Locarno" agreement as previously proposed by Barthou and Litvinov, which would include France's central and eastern European protégés and Russia's western neighbors.

The uncertainty of this palladium did not, however, satisfy the needs of Dr. Beneš, who perceived the menace of a Nazi Germany more clearly than any other European statesman. Anxious to reinsure the frontiers of Czechoslovakia against aggression, Beneš concluded on May 16, 1935, his own treaty with Moscow, identical with that signed two weeks previously between France and Russia, and designed to bring Russia to the assistance of Czechoslovakia, in the event of German aggression,

[6] The significance of the date, the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, was not lost upon France, who had not been consulted.

[7] With a certain puckish humor the Soviet authorities took the occasion of Laval's visit to the Bolshoi Theater to give the first performance of the new ballet, "Paris en Flammes."

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as soon as France implemented those obligations incurred under the Franco-Czech Treaty signed in October 1925 at Locarno.

The Soviet Treaties with France and Czechoslovakia did not immediately provoke any outburst of resentment in Germany. In a speech to the Reichstag on May 21, Hitler gave as his reason for not joining the proposed Eastern Locarno pact simply that Germany's governing ideas were diametrically opposed to those of Soviet Russia; and he proclaimed Germany the "deadliest and most fanatical enemy" of Bolshevism. His actual references to the treaties were, however, of the mildest. This restraint was deceptive. The Fuehrer was deeply concerned at the new alignment. He was planning a further gesture of defiance toward the western Powers, to be delivered at the bidding of his "intuition." With considerable satisfaction he watched the growth of ill-feeling between London and Paris as a result of the Anglo-German naval agreement; and he was moderately confident that, given reasonably good fortune, he could insert the necessary wedges, not only between Britain and France, but between France and Russia also.

V

The moment for the new *coup de théâtre* came the following spring. Though the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty had been ratified by both parties within a month of signature, the Treaty with Soviet Russia had hung fire in the Chamber of Deputies, largely due to Laval's deep distaste for the instrument to which he had been forced to put his hand and his marked preference for a deal with Germany. The Pact was, however, ratified by France on February 27, 1936.

Hitler's reply was dramatic and forceful. On March 7 he denounced the Rhineland Pact of 1925, which formed an integral part of the Locarno Agreement, on the grounds that that Agreement had been violated in spirit by the Soviet-French Treaty, which "it is an undisputed fact . . . is directed against Germany." Concurrently he announced the occupation of the demilitarized zone by German troops and dared the Locarno Powers to do their damnedest. Their damnedest was very little indeed and went no further, at the League Council meeting on March 19, than a spirited display of finger-shaking. Hitler, confident from the first that nothing would happen, but satisfied that he had damaged Franco-Soviet relations, now turned his

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serious attention to counterbalancing the new group of Powers by forming his own ideological alignment.

The Soviet decree of August 11, 1936, reducing the age of conscripts for the Red Army, received a swift answer from Germany. On August 24 the period of compulsory service in the Reichswehr was raised from one to two years; and the annual Congress of the National Socialist Party at Nuremberg in the following month was the signal for the declaration of a holy war against Bolshevism. In his speech on September 10, Goebbels denounced Czechoslovakia as an advance-base of Bolshevism in central Europe. Two days later, in an address to the *Arbeitsdienst*, the Fuehrer allowed himself a veiled revelation of territorial designs upon the Soviet Union: "If we had at our disposal the Urals, with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine, under National Socialist Leadership the country would swim in plenty."

The hint was not lost in Moscow, and the reply came not from the mouth of Joseph Stalin or of Maxim Litvinov, the Foreign Commissar, but from Marshal Voroshilov, the People's Commissar for Defense, who in a radio address on September 16 assured the people of the Ukraine that "the Red Army will be fully able to meet the enemy wherever he prefers or whenever he turns his crazy attacks on Soviet territory."

By the autumn of 1936 Hitler's secret diplomatic negotiations bore strange fruit. On October 25, there was forged the Rome-Berlin Axis between the two Fascist Powers, and this was supplemented a month later (November 25) by a German agreement with Japan. This provided for coöperation against the activities of the Third International and for severe measures "against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities." To this Anti-Comintern Pact there subsequently adhered Italy, Spain, Manchukuo and Hungary.

In concentrating his attack on the Comintern and not specifically upon the Soviet Union, Hitler displayed acute political perception. The French and British Governments, both of which were conservative in character, had an inherent distrust of Communist activities, and a fear that Moscow wished to precipitate a war among the capitalist powers from which Soviet ideology

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would reap the ultimate advantage. Many members of the Radical and Labor Parties in the two countries were also alienated from Moscow by the deep and abiding doctrinal cleavage between the Second International and the Third. By attacking "Communism" rather than "Russia," Hitler divided his antagonists on a doctrinal and ideological basis. He thus influenced them to refuse the aid proffered by the Soviet Union, for fear this should prove a Trojan Horse for the Comintern.

The year 1937 brought little improvement in Soviet-German relations. The two states clashed head-on over the issue of foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and the Kremlin was impartially caustic both as regards the reprehensible nature of German and Italian policy and the supineness of Britain and France in allowing this policy to go unchecked. Indeed, throughout the year M. Litvinov, happy in the guise of an angel rushing in where fools fear to tread, whether at Geneva or at the Far Eastern Conference at Brussels, constituted himself denouncer-in-chief of Fascist aggression, and of the timidity of the western Powers and the League of Nations. He was ably seconded by M. Maisky at the meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee in London. But the forces of appeasement were too strong to be deterred by warnings, cajolery or scorn, and the reports of the treason trials in Moscow during 1936–1938 gave little confidence that all was well within the Soviet Union itself. The ideological war between Germany and Russia raged with ever-increasing fierceness and the day seemed approaching when it would develop into active hostilities.

On March 12, 1938, German troops crossed the Austrian frontier and the *Anschluss* of Austria with the German Reich was proclaimed two days later. This action, taken by Hitler in defiance of half a dozen guarantees and treaty pledges, was seized upon by the Soviet Union as an opportunity, perhaps the last, to rally the anti-Nazi forces. Three days after the *Anschluss* had been proclaimed, the Narkomindel addressed to the Governments of Britain, France and the United States a proposal for a conference to discuss collective action to prevent further German aggression. No suggestion could have been more unwelcome or have met with a more signal rejection. The United States was definitely unprepared, militarily, politically or morally, for any such departure, even though American opinion, both official and public, was wholeheartedly opposed to aggression. In Paris and

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London the Soviet plea for action was received with little short of horror, and was summarily rejected. Mr. Chamberlain informed the House of Commons, on March 24, that the Soviet proposals envisaged "less a consultation with a view to settlement than a concerting of action against an eventuality which has not yet arisen."

As the terrible year drew on and it became more and more clear that Czechoslovakia would become the victim of German rapacity and Allied appeasement, the Soviet Union became more vividly aware of the danger which this curious combination presented to herself. She took every opportunity to prove her willingness to fulfil her obligations to France and to Czechoslovakia; again and again this was emphasized in London, in Paris, in Prague, in Geneva and also in Berlin, to the acute embarrassment of the British and French Governments. According to all available evidence, the conduct of Russia was exemplary throughout the Czech crisis. She even went beyond the letter of her bond, threatening to denounce her non-aggression treaty with Poland if that state joined in an attack on Czechoslovakia; and finally, after the desertion of the Czechs by their French allies and the enforced abandonment by President Beneš of the Russian Alliance, the Soviet Government offered to give aid to Czechoslovakia if she should elect to resist German aggression, even if unsupported by France and Britain.[8]

The Soviet efforts were destined to fail in every respect. The apparent willingness of Russia to fight proved an added source of suspicion to the western Powers. At no point during the spring or summer of 1938, nor during the last poignant days of September, does there appear to have been any serious intention in London or in Paris to consult with the Soviet Union or seek her coöperation. The fear and distrust of Bolshevism was stronger than the fear and distrust of National Socialism. "Better Hitler than Stalin" was a remark frequently heard in Paris that summer, and even in Prague itself the Agrarian Party opposed resisting German aggression with the sole support of the Red Army. "Better to be invaded by Hitler," they said, "than be saved by Voroshilov." It was alleged that in certain circles in London there

[8] Just what form Soviet assistance could have taken and how efficacious it would have proved is difficult to say. Poland and Rumania had expressed unwillingness to permit passage of Red Army troops through their territory unless Germany had been formally proclaimed an aggressor by the League of Nations. The only possible assistance, therefore, was from the air, and in this branch the Red Army was not strong. Nor had Russian and Czech aircraft types been standardized.

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was a secret hope that if the tide of German expansion could be turned eastward it would dissipate its force on the steppes of Russia in a struggle which would exhaust both combatants. Moscow was not unaware of this school of thought.

Thus for a variety of motives Russia found herself excluded from the Conference of Munich on September 29, 1938, and she regarded its consequences with mingled contempt and dismay. Among the consequences were the disappearance of France as a power-factor in central Europe; the expansion of Germany down the Danube; the naïve action of Britain and France in entering into Declarations of Friendship with Germany (October 1 and December 6); and the formal abrogation of the Mutual Assistance Pact with Czechoslovakia (October 21). The western Powers had abruptly terminated Russia's return to Europe by banging the door in her face.

VI

In taking stock of his position after Munich, Stalin saw that it was only a matter of time before Germany attacked the Soviet Union. He considered that it would be impossible for the U.S.S.R. to bank upon the support of Britain and France. Security was Russia's vital necessity and her security depended upon the extension of the Soviet boundaries to the westward in order to provide an elastic defense against a German attack. This was the essential to be achieved at all costs. The means and the opportunity must be found, accordingly, in consonance with a policy of stark realism for survival. Such was the Soviet thesis.

The Russian suspicions of German intentions were wholly justified. The object of the Munich Agreement had been to eliminate Czechoslovakia as an independent military, political and economic factor, and to prepare for further German expansion toward Poland and Russia. The first directive alerting the Reichswehr for the destruction of the remnant of the Czechoslovak state was issued on October 21 — just three weeks after the signature of the Munich Agreement — but in order to mask his ultimate designs on Poland, Hitler continued to talk in terms of "a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact." [9] Poland, caught as so frequently in her history between her two powerful neighbors, sought to appease both. She dared not break openly with Germany and yet was

[9] October 24, 1938 (Polish White Book, *op. cit.*, p. 47).

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unwilling, even in these dangerous circumstances, to accept guarantees from Russia. To temporize, she agreed to the joint Soviet-Polish declaration of November 26, which stated that the relations between the two states were, and would continue to be, based "to the fullest extent" on their pact of mutual non-aggression.[10] By this means Poland sought to avoid the necessity of either joining the anti-Comintern front or of concluding a definitive alliance with Russia.

The year closed with Germany in a state of active preparation for war and Russia watchfully awaiting the next move from Berlin, while keeping the door to possible Anglo-French coöperation from being irrevocably barred. No one had long to wait. The annexation of Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, 1939, destroyed the flickering, futile hopes in London and in Paris that an agreement with Germany might be reached by the method of appeasement and laid bare the necessity of preparing on a grand scale for the approaching trial of strength. The reaction of Russia to the destruction of the Czechoslovak state was defined in her note of protest to Germany in which she refused to recognize the Protectorate and described the action of the German Government as having "violated political stability in Central Europe and dealt a fresh blow to the security of peoples." [11] On the same day (March 18) the Soviet Government proposed a conference of Great Britain, France, Poland, Turkey and the U.S.S.R. to clarify their position on German aggression,[12] a proposal similar to the one it made after the annexation of Austria 12 months earlier. Now, as then, Mr. Chamberlain deemed this Soviet initiative to be "premature," but sought with France to build up, by means of guarantees to Poland (March 31) and other threatened states, a "peace bloc" which should deter Nazi Germany from further aggression. In his efforts to advance this objective he sought to enlist Soviet coöperation. Negotiations were begun by Lord Halifax with M. Maisky in London during the month of March but failed to develop, largely due to Poland's refusal to be associated with Russia. As a result Britain and France embarked on a policy of offering unilateral guarantees to those states menaced by German aggression, and in mid-April they again sought Soviet collaboration. The negotiations, begun

[10] *Ibid.* p. 181.
[11] *Soviet Russia To-day.* April 1939. p. 5–6.
[12] *Ibid.* May 1939. p. 6.

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in London, were transferred to Moscow in June, when Mr. William Strang was appointed to assist the British Ambassador, Sir William Seeds, in conducting them.

In the meantime Hitler was intensifying his demands to Poland for a right of way across the Corridor and the return to Germany of the Free City of Danzig. On March 21, Ribbentrop told the Polish Ambassador, M. Lipski, that Germany expected an immediate solution of the Danzig question — on Germany's terms — but accompanied this information by a proposal to create a German-Polish military union against Soviet Russia.[13] The Poles temporized and received in due course on March 31 the guarantee from Britain to supplement the Franco-Polish Treaties of 1921 and 1925.

By the end of April, Hitler had learned of the tentative proposals being made to Russia by Britain and France, and with that quick *volte-face* of which only totalitarian rulers are capable he abandoned his previous approaches to Poland and determined to out-bid the western Powers. Forthwith the Soviet Ambassador was summoned to the German Foreign Office and the Soviet Military Attaché to the offices of the German General Staff.[14] Both officials left immediately for Moscow.

Though there is no doubt that the German protagonists, Hitler and Ribbentrop, pursued a policy of the deepest duplicity and bad faith in the negotiations which followed, there is reason to believe that some of Hitler's advisers were probably sincere in wanting a pro-Russian policy. One such was the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von der Schulenburg, the disciple of Maltzan and Brockdorff-Rantzau and almost the last of the eastern school in the German Foreign Office. The idea of signing a pact of non-aggression with Russia would represent to him the return of German foreign policy to the sanity of Bismarck's genius, and he undoubtedly played his rôle in the drama with a zealous sincerity and enthusiasm, not contemplating treachery.[15]

Thus by April the contest was on between Berlin and London for the favors of the Kremlin. Hitler was prepared on the grounds of expediency to purchase Soviet neutrality during his

[13] Polish White Book, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[14] French Yellow Book. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940, p. 148.

[15] It is of interest to note that Count von der Schulenburg, together with the few remaining survivors of the Seeckt school on the General Staff, was among those executed by Hitler after the abortive *putsch* of July 20, 1944.

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projected attack upon Poland at the price of territorial concessions on Poland's western boundary. On the other hand, Mr. Chamberlain, now become a mighty warrior before the Lord, was prepared to sink his mistrust of Soviet Russia in the furthering of his grand design of creating a "peace bloc" against Hitler. But he did not know what Russia's terms might be, and he had given a guarantee to Poland without first discovering whether the Poles would accept Russian help.

Stalin was suspicious of both Hitler and Chamberlain. He knew well that both were driven to their present pass by sheerest necessity. He knew that many members of the Conservative Party disliked and feared the Soviet régime almost as much as did Hitler and the Nazi Party. If either Hitler or Chamberlain could have got along without Russia, he certainly would have done so. Stalin, believing that a war which would sooner or later embroil Russia against Germany was now inevitable, and considering the interests of Russian security paramount, pitched his terms to the maximum point at which these interests could best be safeguarded.

In so doing Stalin was reverting to the age-old Russian policy of the *Peredyshka* (the breathing-space), pursued by Alexander I in dealing with Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807 and by Lenin in negotiating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 110 years later. Russia was not sufficiently prepared to withstand the military might of Germany in 1939. She needed time to make up the leeway in her armaments program; above all she needed additional territory in the west to provide for her defense in depth. She was prepared to follow the same course which Britain and France had pursued at Munich — to buy peace and time for preparation at the expense of small nations. But she intended to be more successful.

The Russian price was high. The terms which she stated both to Germany and to Britain and France demanded a free hand in the Baltic states. If she received this from the western Powers, together with provision for mutual aid among the three Powers, she would join in guarantees to Poland and Rumania; if from Germany, she would remain neutral while the German armies attacked Poland, but would demand a say in the settlement which followed. She also required from Germany that Rumania should re-cede the province of Bessarabia, which had been taken from Russia without her consent in 1920 by the Conference of Paris.

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The Baltic states recoiled from the prospect of Soviet "protection" and sought refuge in treaties of non-aggression with Germany and in declarations of neutrality. At the same time Poland and Rumania, for whom Russian assistance was sought, refused to countenance the presence of Red Army troops on their territory, knowing full well that the slogan of Joseph Stalin was somewhat akin to that of Surtees' immortal Mr. Jorrocks: "Where I dines I sleeps."

The parallel negotiations dragged on through the late spring and into the summer with but one clear indication as to which group of suitors was the more favored. Maxim Litvinov, the protagonist of collective security and coöperation with the western Powers, was retired on May 3 from the post of Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to be succeeded by Vyacheslav Molotov, who was believed to be an advocate of an "agreement of accommodation" with Germany.

The British and the French could not bring themselves to condone the annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, for the demands of Russia were tantamount to that, since the protection of small states against aggression was now the touchstone of their policy. Nor could they see their way to comply with the military conditions required by Russia.[16] Meanwhile the German threats to Poland were becoming more and more violent, and news was reaching London of the growing rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow. On August 11 Mr. Strang left Moscow without the negotiations having been brought to a successful conclusion, and for a brief moment the diplomats were replaced as negotiators by military and naval missions. But by August 25 these too had failed and had departed. Meanwhile the German negotiators in Berlin and in Moscow had pressed their advantage, accepting the Russian terms *in toto* and throwing in for good measure an offer for the partition of Poland. Hitler could afford to be more generous because he intended to take all this territory — and more to boot — from Russia in the fullness of

[16] According to M. Daladier's recent defense of his policy before the French Constituent Assembly, the British and French Governments did finally overcome their objections in this respect. M. Daladier accordingly telegraphed instructions to the head of the French Military Mission to sign the military convention. General Doumenc received the telegram the evening of August 21. Early next morning he requested a meeting of the military missions for that afternoon. But by this time Ribbentrop was on his way from Berlin and Marshal Voroshilov put the general off with vague evasions. As General Doumenc left the interview he heard the press report that Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow the next day. (See *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, July 19, 1946, p. 2681.)

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time.[17] The end of the tragi-comedy was reached on August 23, two days before the British and French military missions departed, when Ribbentrop and Molotov signed a Pact of Non-Aggression as well as a Secret Agreement embodying the price exacted by Russia and paid by Germany for the first document.[18]

By this "Pact of Mutual Suspicion" both parties had gained their immediate objectives. Germany had obtained Russian neutrality in the attack upon Poland and had secured her rear in the event of a war with Britain and France. Russia, on the other hand, had gained her *Peredyshka*. The fact that she was able to withstand the initial onslaught of the German armies in their surprise attack on June 22, 1941, is evidence of the good use to which she put it, and provides justification for Stalin's consistent suspicion of German intentions. Yet though Stalin undoubtedly entertained these suspicions of Germany, he was almost equally distrustful of the western Powers, whom he suspected of consistent efforts to inveigle Russia into the war against Germany. It was this belief which prompted him to reject all warnings which reached him from British and American sources regarding the forthcoming German attack as unsolicited meddling and transparently self-interested.

Within a month of the signature of the Soviet-German Agreement the two Powers had repeated the blasphemy of Frederick the Great in completing the Fourth Partition of Poland, and it seemed as if a blood-brotherhood had been consummated. Yet two years later Germany and Russia were at each other's throats; and thus they remained until the final nemesis of Potsdam (August 1945) when Russia participated with Britain, France and the United States in partitioning Germany. A new phase of Soviet-German relations now opened, of which, as John Brown remarked on an historic occasion: "The end is not yet."

[17] On August 15 the German Secretary of State, Baron von Weizsaecker, hinted to Sir Nevile Henderson "that the U.S.S.R. would even in the end join in sharing in the Polish spoils." (*Cf.* British Blue Book, "Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939." New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939, p. 119.)

[18] The contents of this latter agreement was published in the press of Britain and the United States two days later, and was confirmed by Baron von Weizsaecker in evidence before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on May 21, 1946. A German-Soviet Commercial Treaty had been previously signed on August 19.

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EUROPE DEBATES NATIONALIZATION

By Barbara Ward

SINCE the end of the war, a large part of European industry has been either nationalized or earmarked for nationalization. The process has not been uniform and the degree of nationalization varies from country to country, but there is no mistaking the trend.

In some countries — Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania, for instance — practically all industries employing more than a few men are nationalized. Finance, insurance, mining and heavy industry have been nationalized in the Russian zone in Germany, and it is likely that a similar if more limited measure of socialization will be introduced in the British zone. The German coal owners of the Ruhr have already been expropriated and it is not likely that the mines will be returned to private control. The Governments of Austria and Hungary, after some hesitation, have decided to nationalize finance, insurance and heavy industry — partly in the hope that this transfer of ownership will frustrate Russian demands for reparations. In western Europe the trend toward nationalization is more hesitant, but in France and Holland the central bank has been nationalized and the socialization of heavy industry is under discussion. In addition, the French Government has nationalized mining, public utilities, civil aviation and insurance. Finally, on the western fringe, in Great Britain, the Bank of England, civil aviation and the coal mines are already nationalized and the transfer of transport, public utilities and important sections of the iron and steel industry to public ownership may be completed within the lifetime of the present Parliament.

It is tempting to explain this European trend in a single formula. Since nationalization has gone much further in the lands bordering on Russia (with the exception of Finland), and appears to diminish as Russian occupation ceases and Russian influence declines, it is easy to argue that the Soviet Union has simply imposed its own economic pattern on Europe. But this explanation does not fit all the facts — for example, that already before the war about 60 percent of the heavy industry in Poland, in spite of an anti-Socialist and anti-Russian Government, was already nationalized. In Turkey, too, an authoritarian and

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anti-Communist Government owned the country's entire metallurgical and mining industries, finance and transport. Indeed, it was an ideological paradox that dictatorial, not to say "Fascist," governments such as the Beck régime in Poland or the Attaturk dictatorship in Turkey pursued a much more vigorous policy of state intervention in economic matters than did the Socialist Governments of New Zealand or Sweden.

Again, to attribute Europe's trend toward nationalization solely to Russian influence gives no explanation of the fact that primarily conservative and fundamentally anti-Russian parties such as the Popular Republicans in France or the Catholic State Party in Holland have passed measures nationalizing the central banks of their countries and, in their party programs, have accepted further extensions of state ownership and opted for the principle of government planning. It is not Russian pressure that has led the British military authorities to expropriate the mine owners of the Ruhr; nor is the hand of Moscow anywhere discernible behind the program of the Labor Party in Britain. Russian influence is certainly one factor — and a tremendously important one — in Europe's contemporary economic development; but to allot it anything like sole responsibility would be to simplify and distort a complex historical process which has been at work in Europe and the world for a hundred years.

The beginnings of nationalization in Europe go back almost as far as the origins of capitalism. It was only in certain western communities that an independent merchant and artisan class had the wealth and the political elbowroom to begin the process of capital accumulation and industrial development without state aid. In 1846, when a vast railway boom was giving millions of British speculators the opportunity to help thousands of independent British entrepreneurs to cover the country with a network of railways, a large part of Europe's economy was still based on the least mobile and adaptable form of property — serfdom. By the time feudalism had been undermined in central Europe by the revolutions of 1848, and in Russia and eastern Europe by the abolition of serfdom in the sixties, a new type of industrial society already existed fully fledged in western Europe — wealthy, expansive and tremendously powerful.

No state with any pretensions to greatness could afford to risk the competition offered by the businessmen and industrialists of western Europe. Moreover, the late survival of the political

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and economic forms of feudalism put the countries of central and eastern Europe at a double disadvantage. Not only were they starting late in the industrial race. They were also starting very ill equipped. The middle classes, the backbone of western industrialism, were weak and diffident in central and eastern Europe. There had been no Reform Bill of 1832 to give the new groups a measure of direct political responsibility. Above all, the concentration of wealth in landed property was a brake on the development of mobile capital. In these circumstances, the state itself had to intervene. The classic example is the Germany of Bismarck. To fit the Germans for great powerhood — and to unify the new Reich — Bismarck saw that an intensive reorganization and modernization of transport were necessary. He also saw that private capital was insufficiently developed to carry the burden. Accordingly he introduced a complete system of nationalized state railways in the seventies and eighties. Nor is Germany the only example. Austria-Hungary's railway system was largely financed by the state. In Russia — economically an even more backward community — not only railways but sections of the mining and iron and steel industries were developed by the state as nationalized enterprises. This phase of "state capitalism" in Europe coincided with the renunciation of free trade. Protection — another powerful instrument of state intervention in industry — was introduced to shelter the weak beginnings of industry from the powerful and fully-developed industrial competiton of western Europe.

But the chief spur to state intervention was not fear of competition. It was fear of war. Ever since Peter the Great started ironworks in the Urals to supply him in his fighting, a government's need for weapons and equipment has been a powerful factor in bringing about state ownership and state control. The Hindenburg Plan for industry worked out by the German General Staff in the First World War was the model of Goering's Four-Year Plan; and one of the largest nationalized enterprises in Europe between the wars — the *Hermann Goering Werke* — began as a state enterprise to exploit, for the making of munitions, low-grade ores which could not be mined and worked profitably by private industry.

But perhaps the two most striking instances in this century when eastern states played the part taken in western Europe by private capitalists are found in Poland and Turkey after the

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First World War. There was virtually no middle class in either in 1919, and almost no reserve of private wealth apart from landed property. Yet the governments of both countries, led by vigorous dictators, Pilsudski and Attaturk, were determined to modernize and strengthen their communities. Only one way was open to them — to entrust the development of heavy industry to the state. The textile industry could be left largely in private hands, but in Turkey the transport, the mines and the metallurgical industry were financed and owned by the state banks and operated as nationalized enterprises. In Poland, the extent of state ownership was not quite so complete, but 60 to 70 percent of mining and heavy industry was nationalized. Neither government sought to give any ideological or theoretical justification for this policy. They simply ascribed it to necessity in the shape of the poverty and technical backwardness of their countries.

II

Although the industrialization of western Europe began in private hands and in an atmosphere of strong hostility to any form of state intervention, later developments tended to contradict the promise of its untrammelled origins. As soon as industrial capitalist society became fully articulated, it began to suffer from the recurring crisis of the trade cycle; and the crises tended to grow more severe as industrial society grew in wealth and complexity. Explanations of this disturbing phenomenon — no two agreeing — filled more and more shelves in the economists' libraries, but between the two World Wars the theory of the trade cycle elaborated by Lord Keynes gradually received a growing volume of support and, chiefly in Britain but also in western Europe, became the new orthodoxy.

There is a very close connection between this theory of the trade cycle and the extension of state intervention and ownership. Lord Keynes attributed the recurring crises of capitalist society to an inherent instability which uncontrolled private enterprise could not remedy. Two tendencies are at work in an unplanned economy. One is a tendency for the investment of capital in heavy industry to be cyclical, broadly speaking, because the demand for the most important products of heavy industry — capital goods in the shape of factories, plant and industrial installations generally — is not continuously self-renewing as is the demand for consumers' goods. The other is the tendency of

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established industry to become increasingly rigid and stagnant, "enterprise" taking the form of protecting existing markets and building up monopolies rather than of experimenting in new demand and creating new capital. The consequences of these two tendencies are, on the one hand, to introduce a permanent element of instability into capital investment and, on the other, to slow down its pace until there is almost no new capital development. But the key of Lord Keynes's theory of the trade cycle is precisely that without a high and stable level of investment in heavy industry, in capital goods as opposed to consumption goods, industrial society is unable to avoid recurring crises of unemployment. These crises begin in the laying off of men in the capital goods industries; through the resulting falling off of demand they spread to the industries producing consumers' goods; and presently the whole economy is involved in a downward spiral of unemployment and declining demand. And since unregulated capitalist society produces no automatic corrective to these two tendencies, it must inevitably fall into recurring crises of depression and mass unemployment.

The facts upon which the Keynsian theory rests are incontrovertible. In the twenties and thirties industrial society was twice shaken by an appalling economic depression, originating in the iron and steel industries where the slackening of demand for capital goods first created unemployment. Nor can there be any doubt about the tendency toward economic stagnation in such old industrial communities as France or Great Britain. Throughout the thirties, expansive investment in France virtually ceased. When, last year, M. Monnet published the figures connected with his plan for the industrial modernization of France, they revealed that throughout the thirties, the French economy, far from renewing its capital equipment, was actually falling behind. Productivity in 1929 was 25 percent greater than productivity in 1938. In 1929, the total production of France stood at 565 billion francs. In 1938, the figure was only 430 billion. In Great Britain, although there was no actual decline in productivity, the amount of new capital investment, estimated at only 3 percent of the national income, was certainly far from that "high and stable level of investment" necessary, in the Keynsian view, for full employment and expanding productivity.

The figures for the British steel industry are particularly revealing. In the new plan for steel, recently published by the

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British Iron and Steel Federation, it is estimated that a thorough modernization of the industry (without much expansion) will demand an investment of £22,500,000 a year for seven and a half years. But in the late thirties, annual investment was running at the level of only some £6,000,000 and in the late twenties fell to a figure between £1,000,000 and £2,000,000. The coal mining industry in both Britain and France offers another example of enterprises which, starting early in the industrial race, have fallen behind their competitors through lack of sustained modernization and capital development. And the restrictive attitude of mind represented by this decline is not confined to one or two branches of industry. The tendency to replace competition by price fixing, trade associations and cartels is endemic in British economy and is at least part of the explanation for the very low level of capital renewal between the wars.

The recurring breakdown of industrial society in violent depressions and the slow paralysis of industrial society due to insufficient investment both tend to state intervention and to foster the introduction of nationalization in industry. The slump of 1929 was the signal all over Europe for a vastly greater intervention of the state in economic affairs. In their efforts to save central and commercial banks and keep some semblance of stability, governments found themselves taking up stock and becoming shareholders in all manner of financial undertakings. This process was particularly marked in Germany where the slump struck society with greatest force, but it was prevalent throughout the Continent.

The need for modernization, reëquipment and higher capital investment generally has also paved the way for the nationalization of industry. One of the most widely accepted arguments for the nationalization of the coal mines in Britain is the scale of investment necessary to bring their equipment up to date. The sum of £150,000,000 has been mentioned; clearly the industry, in its moribund state, could not raise so much new capital on its own private account. The state would thus have been compelled under any arrangement to become a majority shareholder. The same problem faces the steel industry. The figure named for reequipment — £168,000,000 in seven years — can probably be raised by the industry itself, but there is much doubt whether it is sufficient to launch a really ambitious expansion scheme for British iron and steel. If greater investment is needed, public

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funds are the only source from which it can come and, once again, the government would become a major shareholder.

The state as a majority holder is a form of public control already practised in France — in the state railways — and the Monnet plan which aims to invest some $28 billion in reëquipping and modernizing French industry may lead to some extension of this principle. Even outside the sphere of French nationalized industry — mining, civil aviation, public utilities and (possibly) iron and steel — the new capital to be raised is so large that private investment may prove inadequate. In which case, the only alternative is to draw on public money with a corresponding increase in state intervention.

III

But technical arguments, academic theories, industrial necessities and rational solutions have not been sufficient to produce the present transformations in European economy. Nationalization is not simply a technical expedient. To many, it is the goal of the dreamer, the great panacea, the modern philosopher's stone. The development of European industry from its unfettered beginnings in the workshops of Britain to its latest manifestation in the leviathans of modern "monopoly capitalism" has not been only or even primarily a dry record of economic change. It has been the storm center of every political and religious passion in the last hundred years. The Marxist analysis of the capitalist system need not be repeated here; the essence of it is that private profit, based on "exploitation," is an insufficient regulator of economic development, since it cannot cope with the problem of the cyclical demand for capital goods, nor distribute to the working population a sufficient volume of purchasing power to permit demand to keep pace with increased productivity and output. But these dry bones of exposition are not the motive force behind Marxism. The power behind it springs from moral indignation on the one hand and the passions of the dispossessed on the other. For Marxists and Socialists, the capitalist system is not simply inefficiently inclined to slumps and booms and to the arteriosclerosis of monopoly. It is the root of all evil, the primal sin of exploitation, the final barrier to the brotherhood of man.

In this sense, it can be argued that the emotional force behind the demand for nationalization came in part from the breakdown of the traditional moral and religious synthesis of Europe. The

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old beliefs were discarded. In their place, a new heaven and the new earth were to be founded on the hither side of capitalism, and nationalization was the key to the good life. This moral and emotional approach to the problems of industrial society was not divorced from technical criticism of the defects of capitalism — on the contrary, Marxist critics preceded the Keynsians in analyzing the inevitable tendency of industrial capital investment to fall into cyclical expansions and depressions — but it put behind a rationalist analysis the full force of moral condemnation and, at the same time, of class hatred. For the sufferers from the irregularities of capitalism were the working poor, and the victors in the fight for nationalization and state planning would be the common people.

In the twentieth century, the issue of Marxism has come to dominate almost all others and any estimate of nationalization policies in Europe today is inseparable from the growth in strength — and in contradiction — of Marxism in the last three or four decades. Two factors more than any others have led to a steadily increasing conversion of European thinkers and workers to the Marxist critique of industrial capitalist society. The first was the evident crises in capitalist society itself. The two great depressions of the twenties and thirties were facts which could not be exorcised or dismissed. They left millions desperate and out of work. They led to a destruction of wealth only surpassed by war. They had appalling political consequences in the shape of the rise of Mussolini to power in Italy after the first crisis and the rise of Hitler to power in Germany after the second. Above all, they destroyed the liberal synthesis of the 19th century — the belief in a self-regulating beneficent system of private enterprise. Something had to take the place of the old beliefs and, particularly with young people, Marxism had the advantage of being not only an economic solution but a philosophy of life.

The other great factor was, naturally, the Russian Revolution and the building in Russia of a planned and nationalized economy. But the Russian Revolution has been an equivocal factor. It has converted one group — the Communists — to an uncritical acceptance of all its methods and all its aims, and to an unwavering support of Russia as the "vanguard of world Socialism." It has converted others — Socialists and progressive thinkers generally — to the conviction that a planned society based upon nationalized industry can greatly increase a nation's indus-

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trial capacity without exposing it to the hazards of boom and slump. This group, however, is divided from the Communists on the issue of Russia's methods, condemning the Soviet dictatorship and claiming that Socialism can be achieved fully only in a free and democratic society. On the other hand, another great body of opinion dismisses even the technical achievements of the Russian system and claims that Socialism and nationalization are inseparable from regimentation, bureaucracy and the totalitarian state. Finally the extremists on the Right — the Fascists, the National Socialists — while rejecting every form of genuine social reform, have nevertheless adopted the Russian political formula of the single party, mass propaganda and police terror in order to fight the rising tide of Socialist criticism and the clamor for radical change which inevitably followed the two great economic slumps. With the rise of Fascism in 1922 and its reinforcement by National Socialism after 1932, the polarization of European politics between two political extremes was complete, with the issue of nationalization at the center of the resulting tension.

As in all political struggles, the issue was not clear cut. The Fascists did not reject "the organizing powers of the state." The Nazis in Germany created in such enterprises as the *Hermann Goering Werke* the largest nationalized undertakings in Europe. What the Fascists rejected was not so much the technical implications of Socialism as its political and moral content. They had no objection to planning, if it was planning for war; and no objection to nationalization, if it reinforced their war economy. But they rejected absolutely the vision of a reformed equalitarian society without classes and without privilege, which European liberals and Christians at least preferred to Fascism, which Socialists believed public ownership would bring about, and which, in the teeth of all the evidence, Communists asserted to exist in Russia.

Once the Nazis had achieved power this cleavage between themselves and progressive opinion in all its forms soon brought Catholic and Communist, Socialist and liberal together in the same concentration camp. And when the Nazi onslaught on Europe had transferred the struggle to the international plane, the pattern of opposition and resistance already prefigured in the camps emerged in the resistance movements of every invaded and occupied land. The war was in part a national war,

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fought by the Germans for aggrandizement and by the other nations in self-defense; but the ideological and social issue was inextricably bound up with the issue of national survival. At first, it was opposition to the Nazis that brought together men of every belief and social background in the concentration camps and later in the underground Resistance movements, but the character of the war made this merely negative alliance short lived. The Nazi Party had achieved power in Germany with the support of the "traditional forces" — military circles, the landowners and industrialists — and in extending their control over Europe and building their New Order, they looked for support among these same groups wherever their armies went. It would be an exaggeration to say that these social groups collaborated with the Nazis *en bloc* — as a class. It is, for instance, obviously untrue of either Holland or Belgium. But the generalization comes nearer to the truth in eastern Europe, where the shadow of Russia fell more darkly; and whatever collaborators there were anywhere in Europe tended to be drawn from the wealthier and more propertied classes. As one writer put it: "If according to Proudhon, *la propriété c'est le vol*, according to the Resisters, *la propriété, c'est la collaboration*."

This fact naturally made a very deep impact on the resisters in the European underground. An intense feeling of disgust at the collaboration of their own old order with the Nazis' New Order united men of very different political belief and social outlook in a strong desire to sweep away the corrupt past and build a new society. The obvious model was Socialist; the Nazis had made Socialism the target of their bitterest attacks; many members of the class most strongly opposed to Socialism were now collaborating with the Nazis; and, within the resistance movements, the fruit of twenty years' slow growth in Socialist thinking in Europe was ready for harvest. By 1944 the men of the Resistance — the future leaders of Europe — were willing to accept a measure of Socialism and a measure of nationalization as the program or blueprint of a future in which the Nazis, the collaborators and the "decadent past" would all have been swept away.

Two of these programs — the Kosice Program drawn up by the Czechoslovaks and the program of the French *Conseil National de Libération* — are typical of this wartime mood which has had such a decisive influence on the development of nation-

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alization in Europe since Hitler's defeat. Both these programs were drawn up and signed by all parties and every shade of opinion from the constitutional Right — such as the Czech conservatives or the followers of M. Louis Marin in France — to the Communists. They represent in the first place the protest of patriots against the betrayal of a class. But they represent much more than this. They represent the doctrinaire Socialism of the Marxists. They represent the conversion to the idea of State planning of the technicians and hitherto non-political sections of the middle class. They represent a general feeling that, so appalling is the destruction and dislocation caused by the war, only vigorous state intervention can restore the national economy. They represent the only solution the men of the Resistance saw to the problem of restoring the ownership of industrial enterprises which the Nazis had, with or without the consent of their owners, transferred to German management within the New Order. Incidentally, in the case of the Czechs, they also represent a mood of nationalist revenge. As President Beneš pointed out in the pages of this review:

> . . . the question arises what should be done with the big industries and the banks which belonged to the "Sudeten" Germans who were guilty of treason against the Republic. (For instance, the paper and porcelain industry was in the hands of "Sudeten" Germans belonging to the Nazi Party.) There is no better solution than to take this property, the profits of which paved the way economically and financially for Munich, and transfer it to the state as the confiscated property of traitors.[1]

The Czech and French Charters are the clearest examples of the mood of the European underground, for they were formally drafted and signed. But less official similar agreements expressed the unity of purpose in the Belgian and Dutch Resistance and have left their mark on the conservative parties, the Catholic State Party in Holland and the Catholic (Christian Socialist) Party in Belgium. During the war both parties acquired a much more liberal left wing; in Holland this has made possible a hitherto unthinkable coalition of Catholics and Socialists in a Cabinet whose first act was to nationalize the Netherlands Bank.

In eastern Europe, the position is less clear. On the one hand, the fact that the countries were liberated by the Red Army gave an enormous stimulus to the Communists and to their program. The Russians' selection of Communism as their "chosen

[1] Eduard Beneš, "Postwar Czechoslovakia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1946.

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instrument" in the lands they occupied also made it inevitable that once the Red Army had driven the Nazis from eastern Europe, the Communist program of nationalization would be carried through. Equally, however, first the threat of Communism and then the predominance of the Communist Party alienated even the moderate Right and prevented the achievement of the broad coalitions that were built up in western Europe. In the case of Poland, the London Government and the Polish Home Army made promises of radical change and of land reform similar to those already published by the Lublin (later Warsaw) Government, but the attempt to fuse the two wings through the mediation of Mr. Mikolajczyk has so far failed. Similarly in Rumania, an attempt to form a joint bloc among Socialists and Communists and the "Historic Parties" (Liberals and Peasants) in 1944 failed and has not been renewed. In Hungary, all parties subscribed to nationalization and land reform as soon as the coalition government of General Miklos was set up in 1944, but the conservative Small Landholders after their electoral victory in November 1945 were reluctant to put the industrial side of the agreement into practice until Russian pressure and the fear of losing most of their industrial assets as reparations compelled them to introduce the necessary legislation. The Catholic People's Party in Austria showed a similar hesitation after their electoral victory but have now followed Hungary's example. Both countries illustrate a fact which is obvious all over western Europe, that the predominantly Catholic Right Wing of the anti-Fascist parties — the Christian Democrats in Italy, the Popular Republicans in France and the Catholic Parties in Belgium, Holland and Austria — are rather lukewarm converts to the practice of nationalization and that the unity of program inherited from the Resistance has been dissipated in the first year of peace.

IV

It is this quick dissipation of the measure of unity achieved against the Nazis that offers the most disquieting prospects for the future. It is not confined to particular countries or individual resistance movements. It splits the Big Three as radically as it splits the Polish peasants or the industrial workers of the Ruhr; and the fact that the Big Three are divided exasperates the divisions in Europe, each side looking to its powerful backer

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among the Great Powers. The issue of nationalization is, obviously, one of the central problems of the new ideological division of the world. The United States is the symbol of private enterprise and ownership, free trade and laissez-faire economics, Russia of nationalized industry, a planned economy and state regulated foreign trade. The political outlook of the two countries is no less polarized, the Americans believing that political freedom is inseparable from a free economy, the Russians arguing that in capitalist society only the property owners are free while the rest are "wage slaves." And the Russians, moreover, insist that it is only a matter of time before all unfettered economies, faced with economic depression, go the way of Germany and develop into Fascist dictatorships.

This great debate is echoed in every European land today. For instance, in Poland, the legal opposition of Mr. Mikolajczyk and the illegal terrorist opposition gathering, unhappily, behind him both look to British and American diplomatic support and regard the British and American decision to withhold loans and credits from Poland until elections have been held as a direct encouragement to their opposition to Mr. Beirut's Communist-dominated coalition. The disputes at the Paris Conference on free trade along the Danube have been generally accepted in eastern Europe as a struggle between the exponents of state control and the supporters of free capitalism. It is inevitable that in this debate the groups of the Right, both constitutional and extremist, should look westward, just as the Communists in western Europe look eastward. It is equally inevitable that both sides hope for foreign support, and that this should give an added bitterness and violence to the political cleavage between Right and Left. The instability and potential danger of such a situation are obvious. Civil wars today always invite and sometimes result in outside intervention, and an outbreak of civil strife might be the signal for an undercover struggle between the Great Powers. And even if this tragic extreme is avoided, the continuing state of tension and suspicion in Europe stands in the way of every effort at political pacification and economic revival.

V

Is the polarization complete? Does nothing point in the direction of compromise or at least of a *modus vivendi* between the predominantly state-controlled nationalized economies of eastern

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Europe and the free economy preferred by European conservatives and supported by America's prestige and great economic strength? The outlook is certainly not entirely dark. There are hopeful features of which the two most striking are, in the east, the potential impact on Russia of the Russian occupation of Europe, and in the west, the experiments in democratic Socialism on which several nations, chief among them Great Britain, have embarked. It is sometimes forgotten how different are many features of the new régimes in eastern Europe from conditions prevailing in Russia itself. In Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Russian-occupied Germany, and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria, there are opposition parties, the government itself is composed of a coalition of different political groups, there is limited freedom for an opposition press, and a certain amount of elbow room for free discussion and criticism. There is also a fringe of small independent business enterprises and, so far at least, no attempt has been made to collectivize agriculture. On the contrary, individual ownership and coöperative organization seem at present to be the more likely future pattern for agriculture. Now all this may be far from the unfettered political freedom of western Europe or the United States, but it is very great freedom compared with the total state monopoly of press, party, economy and agriculture that exists in Russia. It is, therefore, relevant to ask whether the Russian system itself may not be profoundly influenced by the existence of relatively freer versions of its own régime just beyond its frontiers. May not the Ukrainians look with envy at the measure of political freedom enjoyed in Poland? May not the Russians themselves, finding some liberty and some flexibility to be compatible with state ownership of industry, begin to fret at their own restraints? It was, after all, the impact of Europe on Russia after the Napoleonic Wars that set the spark — in the Decembrist rising — to the long train which led to the great explosion of 1917. Is it not possible that the influence of Europe should have some effect today?

The other factor — the experiments in democratic Socialism in western Europe — is best exemplified by Great Britain. The Labor victory in 1945 was due in part to the inevitable reaction from 25 years of almost unbroken Conservative rule, but this negative feature was less important than the fact that the Labor Party emerged at the election for the first time as a national rather than a class party. Its core was still the trade union move-

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ment — the organized working classes — but millions of its voters were drawn from the middle class and only one-third of its elected members were trade unionists. A surprisingly large number were young men of good education whose belief in Socialism tended to be of a very practical character and to stem much more from Keynsian economics than from Marxist faith. This fact gives some leading members of the Labor Party an empirical and undoctrinaire approach to the problems of nationalization and state control, and promises more flexibility and more compromise than did the rigid Socialist orthodoxy of 20 years ago.

The Party can also hope for the support of many non-Socialists who are disturbed by the technical backwardness and the sluggish state of many sections of British industry and are ready for nationalization provided it means rationalization, modernization and complete technical reëquipment. There is thus in Great Britain a certain amount of practical common ground in economic theory and practice which is divorced from ideology and can be the basis of agreed industrial experiment. It is too early to predict how far this promise will be fulfilled. The first board of the first nationalized industry — coal — is still advertising for staff. But the climate of opinion is not unfavorable, and if the grafting of new economic forms on to a traditionally free and constitutional community is successful in Britain a new pattern of society may emerge, to bridge the gulf between the partisans of laissez-faire and freedom and those of nationalization and control.

The danger in the present situation is the strength of the old ideological cleavage and the relative weakness of the new growing points in economic and political life. If Europe could be certain of 20 years' tranquil development, very likely the system emerging at the end of that time would represent a fruitful compromise between the rival principles of freedom and control, of personal initiative and public ownership. But the outlook for two peaceful decades is not promising. The "gale of the world," blowing from Moscow and London and Washington, sweeps strong and cold across Europe, embittering every dispute and shrivelling the beginnings of coöperation. The great debate has reached too high a level for local plans and compromises to influence its course. Thus the fate of social peace in every European country hangs upon the decisions and policies of the Big Three. No nations have ever carried so heavy and all-embracing a responsibility.

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THE BERMUDA PLAN: WORLD PATTERN FOR AIR TRANSPORT

By John C. Cooper

THE Agreement signed at Bermuda on February 11, 1946, between the United States and Great Britain, and subsequent similar agreements with France and Belgium, indicate a major shift in United States policy for the operation and development of air transport. The announcement by the State Department on July 25, 1946, that the United States would withdraw from the Chicago Air Transport Agreement in a year's time was concrete evidence of the changed policy foreshadowed by the "Bermuda plan." The Air Transport Agreement — to which only the United States, Sweden, the Netherlands and a few other countries had subscribed — was the product of the sharp disagreement between Great Britain and the United States at the Chicago Air Conference in 1944.[1]

No one questions the importance of this "Bermuda plan." On February 26, 1946, President Truman followed the unusual course of giving out a special statement expressing his satisfaction with it. Official statements in the same tenor were made in both Houses of the British Parliament; and in the House of Lords, on February 28, Lord Swinton, the Conservative ex-Minister of Civil Aviation and Chairman of the British delegation at Chicago, called it "probably the most important civil aviation agreement that this country has entered into." The renunciation of the Air Transport Agreement was preceded by the action of the Assembly of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (the body created by the Chicago Interim Agreement and now functioning at Montreal) in May of this year, postponing consideration of a proposed multilateral international civil aviation agreement which had been prepared after long study by the Council of PICAO. That action also clears the path for the Bermuda Agreement.

The principles on which the Agreement stands are not those for which either Great Britain or the United States contended so bitterly at the Chicago Conference. Admittedly the plan represents a compromise. There are still important differences be-

[1] *Cf.* Edward Warner, "The Chicago Air Conference," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1945.

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tween the points of view of the two countries in regard to the principles which shall govern commercial air transport, and there seem already to be varying interpretations of the plan by British and American spokesmen. These require immediate clarification, and may, indeed, presage serious new difficulties. Nonetheless, the Bermuda plan holds out the possibility of world-wide acceptance of uniform rules of air commerce.

To sketch in the general background of the old differences and the new understanding (even at the risk of oversimplification), it may be said that every international air agreement now in force, and every plan proposed, involves one or more of the following factors: *routes*, *privileges* (accorded to an air carrier of one nation in the airspace of a second), *rates*, *frequency of operation*, *capacity of aircraft*, and *degree of economic control accorded to an international authority*. The full list of privileges is called the five freedoms. The first and second freedoms are transit privileges — to operate non-stop through the airspace of a second nation, and to stop for non-traffic purposes; the third, fourth and fifth are commercial privileges — to discharge cargo from a first nation in the territory of a second, to pick up cargo in the second destined to the first, and to pick up or discharge cargo in the second nation destined to or coming from territory of a third.

By international law, each nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, and no foreign aircraft may enter its airspace or land in its territory for refueling or other non-traffic purposes, or to pick up and discharge passengers or cargo, except as authorized. For example, in the late fall of 1945, before the Bermuda Agreement was signed, Great Britain advised the United States that it would permit United States commercial air services to discharge and pick up transatlantic traffic, but not in excess of 14 times a week, nor with total seat capacity of more than 500 per week, and with a passenger rate of not less than $375.[2]

The Bermuda plan is a result of the acceptance by Great Britain and the United States of the so-called Transit Agreement drafted at the Chicago Conference covering the first and second freedoms, plus the principles incorporated in the Final Act of the Bermuda Conference, the bilateral agreement signed at Bermuda, and the detailed annex to this latter agreement.

[2] On two flights per week no rate control was in effect, as Pan American Airways still held a prewar British permit for that number.

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The general effect of the plan may be summarized as follows. Each nation grants to the air carriers of the other nation transit privileges (freedoms one and two) to operate through the airspace of the other and to land for non-traffic purposes on routes anywhere in the world subject to the provisions of the Chicago Transit Agreement, including the right of the nation flown over to designate the transit route to be followed within its territory and the airports to be used. Each nation also grants to the other commercial privileges of entry and departure to discharge and pick up traffic (freedoms three, four and five); but these commercial privileges are valid, in contrast to the transit privileges, only at airports named in the agreement and on routes generally indicated, and in accord with certain general traffic principles and limitations. Rates to be charged between points in the territory of the two nations are to be subject to approval of the governments within their respective powers. As to frequencies and capacities, each nation, or its designated air carrier, is free at the outset to determine for itself the traffic offered to the public on the designated commercial routes, but the operations must be related to traffic demands and conducted according to the agreed principles affecting frequency and capacity.[3]

In case of a dispute not settled by consultation, each nation has the right to insist on an advisory opinion of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization and, in the case of rates, each nation will use its best efforts within its powers to make the rate recommended by PICAO effective. As the advisory opinion of PICAO can cover any dispute, it apparently follows that PICAO can be asked for an opinion as to whether either party to the agreement is violating the principles applicable to traffic frequency and capacity and the special limitations as to fifth freedom traffic. But nothing in the agreement provides for the enforcement of a decision.

In the absence of general agreement at Chicago as to economic control of international air transport, the United States supported the Air Transit Agreement and the Air Transport Agreement which the Conference offered for signature. The Transit Agreement covered the transit privileges of freedoms one and two; the Transport Agreement embraced these transit privileges plus

[3] The delegates to the Conference also initialed "Heads of Agreement" relating to the proposed future civil use of the air bases constructed by the United States on leased British territory. Since it is not a necessary part of the "Bermuda plan" it will not be discussed here.

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the commercial privileges of freedoms three, four and five. Great Britain and many other states refused to accept the Transport Agreement, but together with certain others advised that it would accept the Air Transit Agreement. Under the latter agreement, Great Britain could have organized an air service through the United States or through Alaska and across the Pacific, using such United States airports as the latter might assign for that purpose; but the British planes could not have picked up and discharged passengers in the United States. Similarly, the United States could have authorized services to continental Europe through England, but with no right to pick up or discharge traffic in England (except under the special conditions mentioned earlier).

Between the close of the Chicago Conference and the meeting at Bermuda, the United States concluded bilateral agreements with Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, each providing for reciprocal transatlantic services with no limitation on rates, frequency or capacity of transatlantic service. In addition, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United States had signed the Air Transport Agreement. Under that agreement the parties accorded each other the five freedoms, but the commercial rights are to be available only on routes constituting "a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland." It contained no provision for the regulation of rates, and only a very vague provision for possible limitation of frequency or capacity.

II. ROUTES AND PRIVILEGES

The advantages and difficulties of the Bermuda plan can best be understood by comparing it with other agreements and plans for economic control. The general interchange of the transit privileges (freedoms one and two), with the right to specify the route and airports reserved for security purposes to the nation flown over, is gaining approval as time goes on. To that extent the Bermuda plan is already widely accepted. However, Ireland, France and Portugal (among other important gateway nations) have not yet accepted the Transit Agreement, and apparently intend to insist that the exchange of transit privileges be limited to special bilateral agreements.

The Bermuda plan contrasts sharply with the arrangements governing commercial privileges in force under the Transport Agreement. Under the Bermuda plan, as stated above, definite

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routes and airports for commercial traffic are named, and the traffic is to be governed (as will be discussed later under frequencies and capacities) in accord with agreed principles. Under the Transport Agreement, which controls transatlantic service between the United States and the Netherlands, the commercial privileges are available on generally direct routes out from the homeland and back, the nation flown over fixing only the airports and routes to be used in its territory. In fact, the Transport Agreement is so vague in this respect that serious questions had already appeared as to how the agreement should be applied between the United States and certain Latin American countries which had accepted it, particularly as to the number of carriers to be received and the number of ports of entry to be named. The plan proposed at Montreal by PICAO was even more vague in that it authorized unnamed routes constituting "reasonably direct lines out from and back to the territory of the contracting state whose nationality the aircraft possesses."

For the first time in our history, foreign air carriers are granted fixed routes across the United States. This possibility was inherent in the Transport Agreement, but never became definite. Among the routes named for use by Great Britain are those under which British air carriers can fly from London to New York, then to San Francisco, and then via Honolulu, Midway, Wake, Guam or Manila to Singapore or Hong Kong. Routes are also specified along which a British carrier may fly from London or Scotland to New York, and then either to New Orleans and on to Mexico City, or to Cuba and thence via Jamaica or Panama to Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Reciprocally, the United States carriers can fly transatlantic services to London or Scotland, and thence to Holland, Germany, Scandinavia and Russia, or to Belgium, central Europe, the Near East and on to India; also across the Pacific via Honolulu to Hong Kong, China and India, or to Singapore and then to the Netherlands East Indies. At each named point in United States territory, British air carriers can pick up or discharge traffic from or to its own territory or third countries; and reciprocally, at each named point in British territory, American carriers can discharge or pick up international traffic. A British carrier can pick up transpacific traffic in New York, and returning, can pick up transatlantic traffic at San Francisco or New York. On other routes a British carrier at New York can pick up traffic for Cuba and South America or

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for Mexico via New Orleans. Foreign air carriers will compete indirectly with internal American transport operations; and so, of course, will American carriers compete with British carriers on British routes from England to and from Europe and other points. In other words, air transport is now a business in which a foreign commodity is sold in the local market in competition with domestic sellers and without the protection of a tariff. This may be the case under any multilateral convention. Under the proposed Montreal Agreement, as under the Chicago Transport Agreement, the competitive traffic points and the particular routes themselves are not fixed.

Certain further differences as to fifth freedom traffic between the Bermuda plan and the Transport Agreement must be noted. In the latter, any contracting state could, on six months' notice, withdraw itself from fifth freedom rights and obligations. Under the Bermuda Agreement, fifth freedom privileges cannot be separated from the rest of the plan. In the Transport Agreement, fifth freedom privileges extended only to traffic to or from other nations parties to the agreement. For example, the United States air carrier on the route from the United States to Sweden via Great Britain and the Netherlands could pick up international traffic in the Netherlands for Sweden, because both of those countries and the United States are parties to the Transport Agreement. On the return journey, however, traffic could not be picked up under the Transport Agreement in the Netherlands for Great Britain because the latter was not a party to the agreement. Under the Bermuda plan, the United States can pick up and discharge at London traffic to or from any country on the route. Under the Transport Agreement, the nation flown over fixed the port of entry, and it was not clear whether the same port of entry had to be made available for traffic from all nations parties to the agreement. Under the Bermuda plan, ports of entry are named and cannot be changed except by agreement. The route through third countries can be changed by the nation doing the flying, but the other nation may ask PICAO to determine by advisory opinion whether such changes are prejudicial.

III. RATES

Rates to be charged by the air carriers of each party operating between points in British and United States territory "shall be subject to the approval of the Contracting Parties within their

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respective constitutional powers and obligations." In signing such an agreement the United States has passed a milestone in diplomatic and legal international transport history. It is the first time, so far as the writer is aware, that the United States has made an international agreement for the control of transport rates. At the present time the Civil Aeronautics Board has no legal authority to fix rates of American air carriers in foreign commerce, such as it has in interstate operation. The Board does have authority, however, to approve rate agreements in which American carriers participate. Accordingly, the Board announced that it would approve for a period of one year the traffic conference rate-making machinery of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), an operators' organization of which American international operators are members. Thus the Board would have an opportunity to approve or disapprove international rates when submitted by the operators. The United States Government has also applied to Congress for extension of the powers of the Civil Aeronautics Board so as to give that Board authority directly to fix international rates. If the two countries are unable through IATA or otherwise to agree on rates, the Bermuda Agreement makes provision for handling the rate problem.

Before the Civil Aeronautics Board has power to fix rates and compel its carriers to charge a rate agreed between the two governments, either government objecting to a rate "may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of." After the Civil Aeronautics Board acquires rate-fixing powers, if the two countries cannot agree on a proposed rate, the dispute will be referred to PICAO for an advisory opinion. Each country agrees to use its best efforts to put into effect the rate recommended by PICAO. Obviously, this means that if the Civil Aeronautics Board receives power to fix international rates, the advisory opinion of PICAO will actually determine the question in case of disagreement between the two countries. At Bermuda the United States has gone further than it was apparently willing to go at the outset of the Chicago Conference, by granting that economic power may be given to an international authority to fix rates where the governments concerned could not agree.

In his White House statement referred to earlier, President Truman said: "In the Bermuda Agreement the Executive

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branch of the United States Government has concurred in the plan for the setting-up of machinery which should protect against the type of rate war feared by so many of the countries through whose air space we desire that our airlines have the right to fly. Part of the plan for future rate control will be dependent on the granting of additional powers by Congress to the Civil Aeronautics Board." It is obvious from this statement that the United States has accepted international rate regulation as part of its civil air policy. This brings into sharp relief the fact that in none of the bilateral agreements for transatlantic service in force prior to the Bermuda Agreement, nor in the Transport Agreement, is there any provision for rate regulation. The United States must now agree on rates with England, France and Belgium, but has no method of government control of rates that may be charged by Scandinavian or Dutch operators in the North Atlantic area. Unless the terms of the Bermuda compromise are generally adopted, a most confusing situation will arise.

IV. FREQUENCY AND CAPACITY

The question of the control of the frequency and capacity of the services offered by international air lines, was, of course, the stumbling block for the Chicago Conference. If, under the Bermuda plan, the United States on the one side and Great Britain, France and Belgium on the other are now actually in agreement, great progress has been made.

In the Final Act of Bermuda the parties agreed on principles which are so important that they must be set out in full:

(3) That the air transport facilities available to the travelling public should bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such transport.

(4) That there shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the carriers of the two nations to operate on any route between their respective territories (as defined in the Agreement) covered by the Agreement and its Annex.

(5) That in the operation by the air carriers of either Government of the trunk services described in the Annex to the Agreement, the interest of the air carriers of the other Government shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes.

(6) That it is the understanding of both Governments that services provided by a designated air carrier under the Agreement and its Annex shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which such air carrier is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or

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disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in the Annex to the agreement shall be applied in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both Governments subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related: (a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of destination; (b) to the requirements of through airline operation, and (c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

(7) That insofar as the air carrier or carriers of one Government may be temporarily prevented through difficulties arising from the War from taking immediate advantage of the opportunity referred to in sub-paragraph (4) above, the situation shall be reviewed between the Governments with the object of facilitating the necessary development, as soon as the air carrier or carriers of the first Government is or are in a position increasingly to make their proper contribution to the service.

The Annex to the Bermuda Agreement provides that the rights accorded of commercial entry and departure to discharge and pick up international traffic shall be in full accord and compliance with the principles set out in the Final Act (including, of course, those just quoted). Also, under the agreement, any dispute between the parties not settled by consultation can be referred to PICAO for an advisory report, but nothing is said as to the enforcement of the report. It appears to follow, therefore, that the transport operations of either nation which the other considers inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Final Act as quoted above may become the subject of an advisory opinion of PICAO. Thus PICAO is given jurisdiction to consider whether the principles applicable to traffic frequencies and capacities are complied with by both nations.

It is apparently the view of both parties, as evidenced by the statement jointly issued by the two delegations at the close of the Bermuda Conference,[4] that the plan contemplates "freedom by each country to determine the frequency of operations of its airlines," and "freedom to carry fifth freedom traffic in accordance with defined principles subject to adjustment in particular cases where such adjustment may be found necessary in the light of experience." The same joint statement referring to the principles for fair and equal opportunity for the air carriers of the two nations says that this "does not imply the allocation of frequencies by agreement but only the right of each nation to

[4] "Joint Statement by the United Kingdom and United States Delegations." *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, No. 347, February 24, 1946, p. 302–306.

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offer the services it believes justified under the principles agreed to." In a further comment the delegates state that "the Conference has placed no specific limitation on frequencies. Each nation operating under the principles agreed to is to be free to determine for itself the number of frequencies which are justified; services being related to traffic demands."

Apparently, therefore, under the Bermuda plan frequencies are not to be allocated in advance; but each nation has promised that its own air carriers do not offer frequencies or capacities or indulge in competitive practices not authorized under the quoted principles. The procedure for a review by an advisory opinion by PICAO is not an idle gesture and must be accepted as part of the agreed plan.

It is not entirely certain that the United States and British Governments are in full accord on this matter. In the House of Lords on February 12, 1946, the Minister of Civil Aviation, Lord Winster, stated:

> As regards the control of capacity operated on the routes, it has been recognized that pre-determination on the basis of estimated traffic potentials is beset with practical difficulties and instead, it has been agreed that the principle for which we stand, namely, the maintenance of a close relationship between capacity operated on the various routes of mutual interest and traffic offering, can best be put into practical effect by providing for an *ex post facto* review on the basis of this principle. Machinery for close and continuing collaboration between the two Governments will be established to this end.[5]

There can be no doubt that Lord Winster was referring to the general principles of traffic offering and not to the added special limitations of fifth freedom traffic which he quoted later.

In the general debate of February 28 on the Bermuda Agreement in the House of Lords, Lord Swinton asked very pointed questions as to how the principles of the Final Act would work in practice, and particularly as to what would happen under the equal opportunity principles when Great Britain was fully prepared to fly. He said:

> The Agreement, as I understand it, that there shall be a fair chance for both, means that each will be able, or ought to be in a position to put on enough planes, on this load factor principle, to carry half the traffic. That must mean, if it is to be carried out, that the United States will reduce their number of aircraft as we increase our number of aircraft. If not, we can get our share of the traffic only by putting on a large number of planes, while the United

[5]Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Lords, v. 139, no. 53, p. 367–368.

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States' number of planes remains unreduced. In that event, it means that there would be, in fact, more planes operating than the traffic would justify, and that completely knocks the bottom out of the earlier provision that the amount of capacity shall be related to the amount of traffic.[6]

In reply, the official British Government spokesman stated, referring to Lord Swinton's remarks:

As he said, quite correctly, so far as that is concerned the United States have a great start over ourselves, but I think that Paragraphs (4) and (5) to which he referred quite fairly cover the point. It is perfectly evident that as things develop in the course of time, the tribunal which will be set up to consider disputes or questions will be able to adjudicate on the difficulties as they arise.[7]

Then, referring to Paragraph 7 of the principles, which describe the situation in which the air carriers of one government are temporarily prevented by war from proceeding immediately with development of traffic, he added: "That is clearly designed in order to meet the kind of development to which the noble Viscount has referred." Without question the view of the British Government appears to be that frequency and capacity questions, as well as others under the agreed principles, are subject to review by PICAO in case of disagreement. On the other hand, President Truman in his statement of February 26 made no mention of these principles of the Final Act nor of the provision for review, stating simply:

Under the Bermuda Agreement there will be no control of frequencies, and no control of so-called Fifth Freedom rights on trunk routes operated primarily for through service. It gives to the airline operators the great opportunity of using their initiative and enterprise in developing air transportation over great areas of the world's surface.

If differences do exist in the interpretation of the Bermuda plan, they must be clarified. The plan cannot be used as the basis for a world wide scheme for economic control of international air transport unless those most directly concerned fully agree on its meaning. On the face of the documents, it seems very clear to this writer that PICAO can give an advisory opinion, in case of complaint, and can find that one or the other nation is operating more frequencies or capacities than it is entitled to under the principles of the Final Act. No machinery except the force of public opinion is provided to police such a finding. However,

[6] Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Lords, v. 139, no. 62, p. 988.
[7] Ibid. p. 1007.

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subsequent uncorrected operations after such a finding might create a most unpleasant diplomatic situation. It may well be, therefore, that in actual practice the Bermuda plan will result in a certain amount of control of frequencies and capacities, as Lord Winster stated, by "*ex post facto* review."

The proposed Montreal agreement favors local operators by requiring the foreign operator of fifth freedom traffic to charge higher fares than the local operator for the same service. For example, a United States air carrier's rate from London to Amsterdam on the through route from New York to Amsterdam would be higher by a fixed percentage than the rate for competitive local British or Dutch services. Such a formula appears exceedingly difficult to administer, and not fair to the traveling public. The Montreal agreement also proposes giving to the international authority definite power to determine whether a nation is operating general (or fifth freedom) traffic frequency or capacity in violation of principles similar to those outlined under the Bermuda plan, and to order corrective action. In other words, the Montreal plan would provide for control by review, as in the Bermuda plan, but would vest actual police power in the international organization. This raises a fundamental question. Should this problem of economic control be met by asking the nations of the world to yield part of their sovereign power over their own national transport — a thing never done in merchant shipping? Or is it better to reach a definite treaty agreement, as in the Bermuda plan, and leave to each nation the responsibility for carrying out its air transport obligations, exactly as every country is expected to abide by other international obligations and to control its own citizens accordingly? That is the question running through all the great decisions of our time.

The Bermuda Agreement is under certain legal clouds in the United States. Both it and the Chicago Transport Agreement were put into effect as executive agreements. Both have been vigorously attacked on the ground that their subject matter should have been included in treaties and submitted to the Senate for ratification. Much testimony has been taken. On April 19, 1946, the Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate filed with the Senate a report on "International Civil Aviation" with a copy of a Resolution from the Committee indicating its view that the agreements are ineffective and illegal unless and until they are ratified as treaties. The executive de-

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partments of the government have insisted on the propriety of the procedure followed. On June 18, 1946, the Attorney General in a letter to the Secretary of State expressed a very definite view that the President has the right to enter into executive agreements of this general character. The withdrawal of the Transport Agreement by the State Department now settles part of the practical problem. But the principle involved should be definitely determined. It involves complex legal questions which need not be discussed in an article intended only to consider whether the Bermuda plan is suitable for incorporation in a widely-accepted multilateral convention.

The reader will have seen that, in the author's opinion, the answer to this is yes. If there is accord as to the construction of the principles of the Bermuda Final Act and Agreement, the plan could easily become the basis of a general international air transport convention. Such a convention would provide for general exchange of transit privileges between the parties, giving the nation flown over the right of fixing airports and transit routes in its territory. The convention would not fix commercial routes or grant commercial privileges, but would include the commercial operations and traffic principles of the Bermuda plan and provide that when two or more nations, parties to the agreement, should determine to exchange commercial privileges and agree on commercial routes, the operations would always be conducted according to the principles of the plan. Such an agreement would bring about international commercial uniformity but would leave to the nations concerned the right to determine with what nations and over what routes they might wish to trade. A further provision might be included giving to any nation, when accepting the agreement, the right then and there to name ports of entry and airways open for international commercial traffic when operated in accord with the principles of the plan, thus obviating the need for subsequent special agreements as to ports of entry and routes. Some nations might prefer this means of inviting world traffic to their territories. If such a general and permanent convention were adopted it certainly would be submitted for ratification as a treaty, as were the Havana Convention of 1928 and the permanent International Civil Aviation Convention signed at Chicago.

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TWO CURRENTS IN WORLD LABOR

By E. H. Carr

THE foundation last autumn of the World Federation of Trade Unions — into which, not without some dying convulsions, the old International Federation of Trade Unions has been quietly merged — marked a stage, though not necessarily a final one, in the rivalry of the past 25 years between two different currents in the world labor movement. The cleavage was and is apparent, but is not easy to define, since many streams have gone to make up each broad current. It is not identical with the cleavage between the Second and Third Internationals; for although the older trade unions were associated with the Second International and suffered badly in prestige from its decline in the period between the two wars, many of the forces which went to build up the new World Federation would at no time have had any truck with the Comintern. It would be equally inappropriate to describe it as a clash between "reformist" and "revolutionary" trade unionism. The unions imbued with the new trends are on the whole more radical than the older unions. But no unions of any importance can now be said to pursue their aims by revolutionary methods; one and all, broadly speaking, are striving to harness the state to their purposes, not to destroy it.

One clue to the difference is perhaps the evolution from the older craft union to the modern industrial union — the historical divergence which in the United States lies at the root of the divisions between A.F. of L. and C.I.O. Thus the A.F. of L. with its rooted predilection for the craft basis stands at one end of the scale; at the other end are the Soviet trade unions organized exclusively on the principle that all workers in the same concern, whatever their trade, belong to one union. The British trade unions are intermediate in this respect, but are passing over gradually from a preponderantly craft to a preponderantly industrial basis.

A more important clue may be found in the attitude of the trade unions to politics. Since the rise of the Labor Party to an influential position in Great Britain, the British trade unions have been active in the political field; and today the A.F. of L. — opposed in this also to the C.I.O. — upholds almost alone the tradition established by Samuel Gompers of abstention from any

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direct concern in politics. The Soviet trade unions have from the first been based on the assumption that economics cannot be divorced from politics or economic ends pursued without political action. Two-thirds of the program of the World Federation of Trade Unions is avowedly political.

The International Federation of Trade Unions (I.F.T.U.) came into being in 1903 under the name of International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers. It was powerfully assisted by the Second International, although from the outset there was recognition that on the international as on the national scale trade union organization must be autonomous and distinct from political party groupings. In 1909 it was joined by the A.F. of L. This not only raised the membership of the Secretariat considerably, but also gave it an intercontinental scope. By 1913 the I.F.T.U. claimed a membership of almost 8,000,000 in 16 European countries and the United States, out of a total world trade union membership of upward of 16,000,000 in 30 countries.

The I.F.T.U. had undoubtedly at this time the chance of becoming an all-embracing Trade Union International. Though closely allied to the Second International, it contained representatives of "neutral" trade unions like the A.F. of L., while the French C.G.T. was at the time largely syndicalist in outlook. But the principle of admitting only one trade union center from each country weakened its inclusive character and led to many grievances. Under this rule, the Czech trade unions in Austria before 1914 were excluded, as were also the Industrial Workers of the World, and later the C.I.O., in the United States.

Before World War I the I.F.T.U. was mainly a contact-making and information center. But immediately after the war it entered upon a short period of many-sided activity. It was an important influence in the establishment of the I.L.O.; it organized a boycott of Hungarian goods during the White terror, gave aid to Vienna in 1919–20, and took action against the transport of munitions to Poland to be used against Soviet Russia. In 1919–20 it reached its peak membership with 22–23 million members.

Already by 1921, however, the reverberations of the split between social democracy and Communism, between the Second and Third Internationals, had reached the trade union movement; and this year witnessed the formation of a separate Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern), with Moscow as its headquarters. As an international organization it could never rival

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the I.F.T.U., and after holding one or two congresses it was allowed to fade out of the picture. But the real conflict in world labor between the wars arose on the issue of the admission of the powerful All-Russian (later All-Union) Central Council of Trade Unions to I.F.T.U.; and this was reflected in the struggle of Communist minorities in the national trade unions for leadership and the recognition of the Communist concepts of the function and tactics of trade unionism, both national and international. These issues raised certain questions of principle.

II

It is admitted on all hands that the character and status of the Soviet trade unions must differ — in theory and, to some extent, in practice — from those of trade unions in capitalist countries. In the words of a resolution passed by the Communist Party Congress of 1920:

> Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the trade unions are transformed from organs of the struggle of the sellers of labor power against the ruling capitalist class into an apparatus of the ruling workers' class. The tasks of the trade unions lie mainly in the sphere of the organization of economic life and of education.

Does this mean, as the opponents of the admission of Russian trade unions to the I.F.T.U. repeatedly maintained, and the A.F. of L. continues to assert, that under the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or "Socialism" trade unions cease to be independent organizations?

Soviet trade unionists would answer this question by an emphatic negative. They would say that the Soviet trade unions remain autonomous; that they elect their own officers by democratic methods; that membership is voluntary; and that only a small minority of members are members of the Communist Party. They would add that at the crucial Party Congress of March 1921 Lenin resisted and defeated both the Trotskyists, who wanted to take over the unions lock, stock and barrel and organize the workers in "labor battalions," and the so-called "workers' opposition," which wanted to entrust the whole organization of the Soviet economy to the trade unions, thereby making them in fact the economic organs of the state. Absolute independence for the trade unions is no doubt a myth in the Soviet Union. But the principle of an independent organization

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was affirmed by the highest Party organ in 1921 and has been maintained ever since. Anyone who today challenged it would be dubbed a Trotskyist.

It would hardly be denied, of course, that the leadership of the Communist Party both in the trade unions and in the Soviet administration constitutes an organic link which is likely to forge public policy and trade union policy into a coherent unity. But such a link is no longer a unique characteristic of Soviet trade unions. Even in the capitalist world, the day is long past when labor leaders were treated as "untouchables" and trade unions as enemies of society. The Second World War made trade unions everywhere an integral part of the machinery of national defense, and thus completed a tie-up between unions and public authority which was already on the way. In Great Britain the Coalition Government of 1940 appointed as Minister of Labor a great union leader who had never even sat in Parliament — a rare departure from constitutional practice. The present Minister of Labor is a former president of the T.U.C. Indeed it may fairly be said that, since 1940, the Ministry of Labor and trade union headquarters at Transport House have been different branches of a single department concerned to carry out a single policy. In the United States, the Administration constantly confers with trade union leaders; and more difficulties and embarrassments have probably been caused by dissensions between rival trade unions than by those between the unions and the Administration.

Much the same is true of the theoretical differences of function between trade unions under capitalism and under Socialism. Under capitalism trade unions are concerned to secure the enjoyment by the worker — whether in the form of higher wages, shorter hours or improved material conditions — of as large a proportion as possible of the product of his labor. Under Socialism the worker *ex hypothesi* receives the whole product of his labor, less appropriate deductions for amortization and for various social or public services. In these conditions trade unions which defend the worker's interest will no longer need to concern themselves in the distribution of the product; the interest of the worker is now to increase the size of the product. Hence the task of the trade unions under Socialism is to increase the productivity of labor. The All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions at its first session announced as its chief function "to organize production and to restore the shattered production forces of the country."

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Such a doctrine seems no doubt anathema to the older trade unions of the western world, imbued with the demand of the workers for a larger share in the surplus profits of capitalism. But everywhere in Europe, and in many countries outside Europe, that demand today lacks all reality. The wheels of capitalism have run down. The surplus profits are no longer there. Today the workers' only hope of raising, or even perhaps maintaining, their standard of living lies not in getting a larger slice of the existing cake, but in increasing the size of the cake. Whatever the economic system, the real business of the trade unions almost everywhere today, whether they recognize it or not, is to increase production. Even the conservative British T.U.C. admitted in a recent report on postwar reconstruction that the trade union movement in Britain is concerned, among other things, "with increasing the size of the real national income."

It does not, therefore, seem to be arguable that Soviet trade unions are so different either in their relation to the state or in the nature of their functions as to rule out international coöperation between them and the trade unions of other countries. The divergencies are at any rate far less substantial today than they were 20 years ago. The history of the period between the two world wars shows that the obstacles were in fact of a different order.

Throughout the period between the two wars intermittent negotiations occurred between the I.F.T.U. on one side and Profintern, or the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, on the other. Both professed an eager desire to achieve the international unity of the trade union movement; and the curious may read in Lozovsky's "Handbook of the Soviet Trade Unions" and John Price's "International Labour Movement" the laborious attempts of each side to place the blame for failure on the other. Generally speaking, the overtures came from the Soviet side. A Russian trade union delegation attended the Hague congress of the I.F.T.U. in 1922 and proposed setting up a joint committee of representatives of all workers' internationals so as to carry on the struggle against the danger of war and establish trade union unity. The I.F.T.U. rejected the proposal and saw no reason why the Russian trade unions should not join the I.F.T.U. unconditionally and submit to its regulations.

At this time the British trade unions, under pressure of the rank and file, were continually pressing for international solidarity with the Russian trade unions. They raised the issue at the

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Vienna congress of the I.F.T.U. in 1924 and, when it was once more shelved, they embarked on the curious and instructive episode of the Anglo-Russian Joint Advisory Council. This body was set up by a conference of British and Russian trade unions in 1925. Both parties recorded their desire to create "a united industrial international organization capable of efficiently representing the international interests of the workers;" and the Council at its first meeting pledged itself to work for "one all-inclusive world federation of trade unions." It was just 20 years before this wish was gratified — and then less than completely.

The collapse of Anglo-Russian trade union amity came abruptly after the British general strike in 1926. The Soviet trade unions raised a levy on their members to provide funds to assist the striking British miners — a step so successfully exploited in the propaganda of the employers as to be a serious embarrassment to patriotic British trade unionists; and after the failure of the general strike they sent a telegram fiercely attacking the pusillanimity of the British trade union leaders. This was bitterly resented as an unwarranted intrusion in British domestic affairs, and at once brought to light a fundamental divergence between the two points of view. The British regarded trade union movements as essentially national, even though they had friendly relations for the exchange of information and ideas with other national unions. The Russians regarded their trade unions, though national in form, as international in spirit and purpose and designed to support the interests of the workers of the world everywhere, as they understood them, with particular emphasis on the class struggle and the emancipation of the workers from the capitalist yoke. It is a matter of legitimate speculation how far this distinction is still valid 20 years later.

In proposing to the General Council of the British T.U.C. the resolution which dissolved the Anglo-Russian Joint Advisory Council, Sir Walter Citrine observed that whereas the British desire had always been to bring the Russian trade unions into the I.F.T.U., the Russian plan had been to make the Anglo-Russian Council the nucleus of a new trade union international. It was the same difference which had been apparent ever since 1921 about the terms in which unity could be effected; and it continued to stand in the way of unity right down to 1939. The "popular front" period of the middle 1930s led to new efforts to bring the rival unions together on the basis of resistance to

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Fascism and support for sanctions under the League of Nations. The entry of the Soviet Union into the League automatically carried with it Soviet membership of the I.L.O. An institution based on the notion of class collaboration and not of class struggle, and giving to capitalist governments and capitalist employers a two-to-one voting majority over proletarian workers, was difficult to reconcile with Marxist doctrine. Nevertheless the Soviet Union for three years made gestures of coöperation with the I.L.O., and in 1937 actually sent a full "tripartite" delegation to the annual conference.

Nor were all the approaches from one side. In 1937 Walter Schevenels, the secretary of the I.F.T.U., actually went on a pilgrimage to Moscow. But the *amour propre* of the rivals, if not the underlying difference of principles between them, made all these approaches barren; and after Munich contacts between the Soviet Union and the west were progressively diminished. Then came World War II, when Hitler's campaigns of 1940 swept the once proud I.F.T.U. from the continent of Europe and confined it to a few rooms in Transport House, London, where it became the embarrassed and unimpressive guest of the British T.U.C.

III

The renewed drive for unity which led to the creation of the W.F.T.U. came from the tremendous impact of the war. In all the countries of the United Nations the workers had ranged themselves solidly behind the national war effort. The trade unions came to occupy, especially in Great Britain, a pivotal place in the organization of production and the mobilization of labor. The feats of endurance shown, not only by the Soviet armies in the field, but by the workers in Soviet factories, some of them moved half way across a continent in face of the German invader, created a deep impression on the trade union movements of other countries, making the case for unity all the more imperative.

Within a few months of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union the General Council of the British T.U.C. had moved for the creation of a joint Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, though memories of the past inspired a cautious rider providing for non-intervention "on questions of internal policy and organization." The entry of the United States into the war at the end of the same year further widened the outlook, though the attitude of the A.F. of L., which still refused all contact with the Soviet trade

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unions, slowed down progress. According to one of Sidney Hillman's last speeches it was the C.I.O. which in 1942 first mooted the idea of a new World Federation of Trade Unions. But it was not till 1944 that the formal step was taken of establishing a preparatory committee of delegates of the British, Soviet and American trade unions. Two members of the C.I.O. represented the United States; two places were offered to the A.F. of L. and one to the Railway Brotherhoods, but these remained unfilled.

After a general conference in London in February, the World Federation of Trade Unions was formally constituted by a congress in Paris in October 1945. It claimed to represent a world trade union membership of 66,750,000, of which the Soviet unions accounted for 30,000,000. The danger that the whole organization would be dominated by the weight of numbers of the largest units was obviated by a graded scale of voting rights. Thus the Soviet unions have 208 votes for their 30,000,000 members; the British, with 7,000,000 members, have 120 votes; the C.I.O. with 6,000,000 members has 110 votes. In the Executive Committee of 22 members, of which Sir Walter Citrine was the first chairman, the Soviet unions and the C.I.O. have three delegates each, the British and French two each. Hitherto no serious clashes of opinion have occurred; differences have been resolved by compromise, and voting rights have been of little practical importance.

IV

The differences between the young W.F.T.U. and the old and now defunct I.F.T.U. are symbolical of the conflict of the past 25 years between the two currents in world labor and of the victory of the more radical trend.

In the first place, the W.F.T.U. is far more comprehensive, not only in numbers but in scope, than the I.F.T.U. even at the height of its power. The vast total of trade union membership which it represents is perhaps less impressive than the fact that that membership is spread over 56 countries. Moving with the times, it includes trade unions not only in advanced industrial countries but among colonial and semi-colonial peoples freshly embarked on the process of industrialization. These new recruits have stimulated a new point of view and a new interest in colonial problems absent in the I.F.T.U. In the United States it is the claim of the C.I.O. to have brought together white and Negro

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workers and to have established for the first time that the common interest of the worker transcends the color bar.

Secondly, the shift from the craft to the industrial basis means that, unlike the I.F.T.U., the W.F.T.U. is concerned not so much with the interest of particular trades as in the social and economic progress of the working class as a whole. In this sense the W.F.T.U. has responded to the strengthened class consciousness of the workers, and stands nearer to Marxist conceptions than the I.F.T.U. did. It is also more likely to concern itself with general policies to raise the standards of living of workers, including measures to increase production; and it will tend to treat wage levels, hours of work and other conditions of labor as issues to be negotiated on a national scale with governments, rather than sectionally with employers. This at once gives a certain political slant to the W.F.T.U. It recognizes political action as a necessary part of trade union functions, though it leaves open the choice between different means of action.

The interest of the W.F.T.U. extends, however, from national to international politics. This emphasis was dictated by the circumstances in which the new organization came into being at the conclusion of the Second World War. Two of its main objects as announced in its constitution are "to carry on the struggle for the extermination of all Fascist forms of government and every manifestation of Fascism" and "to combat war and the causes of war and work for a stable and enduring peace." Thus it does not transgress the terms of its constitution when it favors withdrawal of recognition from Franco or demands self-determination for Indo-China, Indonesia and Puerto Rico. The tendency to make political pronouncements is encouraged by the fact that, with the Second International moribund and the Third International dead and buried, the W.F.T.U. remains the only international organization to voice specifically labor opinion.

It is nevertheless these political preoccupations of the W.F.T.U. which have made it suspect both among some of the more conservative unions and in non-union circles, especially in the United States. Not only is trade union intervention in politics disliked as such, but the W.F.T.U. is feared as a potential instrument of Soviet influence in world affairs — a new attempt at Soviet "infiltration." Soviet voting power, though stronger in the W.F.T.U. than elsewhere, it not great enough to determine its attitude; but it is not to be denied that Soviet policies command

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wider sympathy in the W.F.T.U. than in other international organizations. The development of the W.F.T.U. as a political force might also tend to eclipse the importance of the I.L.O. as representing a more conservative outlook on labor questions.

These suspicions and these fears were increased by the vigorous way in which the Soviet and Ukrainian delegations at the first UN Assembly pressed the demand of the W.F.T.U. to participate in a consultative capacity in the Assembly, and in the Social and Economic Council with a right to vote. The demand of a non-governmental organ for voting rights in the Social and Economic Council was not easy to sustain. In the end, after a vote in which the Soviet Union, White Russia, Ukraine, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 'Iraq, Jugoslavia, Bolivia, Chile and Colombia constituted the minority, it was decided to admit three organizations to the proceedings of the Social and Economic Council in a consultative capacity — the W.F.T.U., the International Coöperative Alliance and the A.F. of L. The claim of the A.F. of L. was not particularly cogent (though Article 71 of the United Nations Charter permits consultative arrangements with national as well as with international bodies). But it was supported by those who felt that a counterbalance was required to the supposed Russophil proclivities of the W.F.T.U.

The future course of the W.F.T.U. would be a hazardous subject for prophecy. Beyond doubt the change from I.F.T.U. to W.F.T.U. means a more radical orientation of the world labor movement — a shift in the balance of power from the old craft union to the modern mass-production union; and this change, corresponding as it does both to technological developments and to the growth of political consciousness among the masses, is not likely to be reversed. The clock will not be set back. Whether, however, the W.F.T.U. will remain a united world organization, though with some important dissentient unions remaining outside it, or whether the rifts of the inter-war period will reappear in its structure, is anyone's guess. For the present it certainly exhibits a higher degree of unity and more of the spirit of international collaboration and mutual accommodation than any major inter-governmental organ of comparable scope. But the prospect depends at least as much on political developments outside the W.F.T.U. as on the trend of opinion within its own ranks.

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THE END OF ARABIAN ISOLATION

By Gerald de Gaury

TWO THOUSAND years ago, Arab control of the overland route for caravans up the Arabian peninsula, which linked India with the west, brought great wealth to south Arabia. But after the Romans learned of the sea route to India, the old caravan road came to be used only by pilgrims on their way to Mecca; and the slackening of the western demand for the goods in which Arabia had specialized, such as frankincense from the Hadhramaut, further impoverished the country. Arabia was to give to the world the prophet Mohammed, founder of the third great monotheistic religion, and to supply the troops for the conquests of the Islamic Empire; and she has always retained her unique significance as a sanctuary for the Moslems. But her long night of material decline had begun.

It now seems, dramatically and suddenly, about to end, and with the likelihood of improved economic conditions comes the threat of changes in a way of life that has been essentially the same since time immemorial. The foundation for economic betterment was laid by Ibn Saud, when in 1901 he recaptured the ancestral kingdom from which his father had been cast out, consolidated his position until his realm reached its present wide frontiers in 1934, and brought stability to the peninsula.

King Ibn Saud's only income in the early years was from the *Zakat*, or poll tax on increase of flocks, crops and so on, plus a modest subsidy from Great Britain during the 1914–18 war. In January 1926, however, he was proclaimed King of the Hejaz, which he captured from the Hashimite family (who had ruled it from the time of the prophet Mohammed), and thus obtained the profit accruing from the pilgrimage to Mecca. Statistics in Arabia are meager and often unreliable, and the close identification of the privy purse with the state's income does not add clarity to an understanding of economic affairs. Calculations are now made in the new Saudi riyal, a silver coin of 11.664 grams, 916.6 fine, equivalent to the Indian rupee, with which it was made exchangeable at 1s. 6d. to the riyal. According to one estimate believed to be approximately correct, the revenue which the pilgrims brought to the Saudi coffers averaged 18,000,000 riyals, and was by far the largest source of income. Customs dues prob-

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ably brought in another 2,000,000 riyals. The Government lived precariously on these revenues. It was seldom able to pay debts it had contracted — *e.g.*, for arms from India, for wireless and telegraph installations, and through Dutch and other loans.

By 1932 the total obligations of the Saudi Government had, according to one calculation, become at least £219,000 (gold). In this situation Ibn Saud, lord of a hitherto "forbidden" land, master and guardian of Mecca for the Moslem world, took in 1933 a decision of the highest importance. In May of that year he granted the Arabian American Oil Company (formerly known as the California Arabian Oil Company) of Delaware, a concession valid for 60 years covering 250,000 square miles in the eastern part of the kingdom. The area was subsequently expanded north and south. The Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation jointly own all the shares in this company in equal proportion. The royalty is at the rate of 4s. (gold) per ton of oil produced, and production is now at the level of 600,000 tons a year in spite of setbacks during the early war years. The main strike in what promises to be a most prolific field was near the east coast, opposite Bahrein Island. A refinery with a capacity of 2,500,000 tons a year has been constructed five miles from the port of Ras Tanura. Some of the crude oil produced is treated at a local topping plant with a capacity of 120,000 tons a year, while the remainder is taken to Bahrein for processing in the refinery of the Bahrein Petroleum Company. An increase of at least ten times the present production is expected, and the construction of a 1,200-mile pipe line to the Mediterranean at a cost of $165,000,000 has been under consideration by the United States Government, the Arabian American Oil Company, the Gulf Exploration Company and the Governments of the countries concerned. This vast project would hardly be commercially sound unless a minimum of some 6,000,000 tons of oil per year were expected.

Needless to say, many changes followed this startling development in the life of Arabia. The company used aircraft in its survey work, and thus planes repeatedly flew over tribesmen who had never before seen even a motorcar. The company has opened up desert tracks, bored water wells in mid-desert, occupied temporary camps in the remoter recesses of the desert, and employed on machinery men who had never previously handled anything more mobile than a camel. It has started schools for its Arab employees, introduced modern medical treatment, encouraged

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by example new building and western standards of living, culture and dress, brought into being flourishing new subsidiary businesses and changed the tempo and objective of the life of many Arabs. An actual physical change can be seen in many of the younger employees of the company, men used to the lean diet of the Bedouin camps and unaccustomed to daily muscular exercise. After six months on the rigs, with a regular meat diet, they now have an altogether different appearance.



The central Arabians were already one of the fittest people in the world, survivors where only the fittest could survive, able to march in the blazing midday sun barefoot over stony wilderness, with only a handful of dates and small draughts from their leather water bag to sustain them, able to ride their lurching camels if need be 90 miles at a stretch, to wear winter and summer the same single ragged shirt, to go without food or water all the daylight hours in the fasting month of Ramadhan, even when it falls in August. These men, finest of the Caucasian type, and of quick intelligence, now given advantages in medical treatment and a

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more liberal diet, with opportunities for western education, may have descendants to startle the western world.

In December 1934, Ibn Saud granted a concession to the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate (registered in the Bahamas) to explore for all minerals, other than oil, within limited areas. This company has leased an area at Mahad al Dhahab, approximately 250 miles north of Jiddah, the port for Mecca on the Red Sea. There it first exploited the tailings of an ancient mine containing some 250,000 tons of ore, and later began to exploit new underground ore estimated at not less than 420,000 tons, assaying 10 cwt. per ton, the concentrate being shipped to the United States for smelting. Production on the tailings averaged 33,000 ounces of gold per year, and it is proposed to increase the output of ore to 350 tons per day. Silver, copper, lead and zinc have been found, in addition to gold. There may be other concessions. Ancient mines are numerous in northern, central and southwestern Saudi Arabia. Sir Richard Burton, Eduard Glaser, J. Halévy and Charles Doughty, writers and travellers in the past century, have all recorded the presence of mines, and Bedouins point out others.

In the train of these developments came others. The planes of B.O.A.C. land regularly at Jiddah, and aircraft have brought distinguished visitors to Riyadh, Ibn Saud's capital in central Arabia. Such an event would have seemed unthinkable only ten years ago when the Wahhabis, puritan followers of the precepts of 'Abdul Wahhab, still regarded everything not mentioned in the Koran as forbidden and hateful. Ibn Saud had at one time encouraged such religious fervor, but he found that it tended to get out of his control. Now fanaticism is retreating before reason, and the twentieth century is moving into the seventh; proud aloofness and prejudice are submitting to necessity. As early as 1933 Ibn Saud had been able to establish a health service under Levantine doctors, bring into being a small regular army (now trained by British and American officers), start schools and otherwise begin to modernize the administration.

Departure from the old standards and old ways of life entails the use of quantities of western goods; in particular, Arabia quickly showed herself to be avid for modern arms, aircraft and transportation. When war came in Europe in 1939, oil royalties, and advances against them, were improving Saudi Arabia's ability to pay for western products. But her revenue was not yet large enough for her requirements, and by 1940 the country was again

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in a precarious financial condition. In the budget of 1941, debts totalled £1,150,000 in spite of outside assistance, and a deficit of more than £3,000,000 was expected for 1942.

Wartime conditions caused reduction in revenue from pilgrimage, and also diminished royalties from oil and gold. The currency situation remained extremely complicated owing to Arab hoarding, and to smuggling out of the country. For political and religious reasons, certain remedies, such as adoption of a paper currency, were not feasible. In response to Ibn Saud's appeal, Great Britain helped with goods, food and clothing; and more and more assistance in kind had to be given through the Anglo-American Middle East Supply Center in Egypt.

A mission headed by the Saudi Arabian Finance Minister Abdullah al Sulayman went to Washington in the summer of 1946 to negotiate the terms of a credit from the Export-Import Bank. Formalities had not been completed at the time of writing, though the Bank had announced its approval of a credit of $10,000,000. The money will be used to speed up the modernization of transport and agriculture.

In the spring of 1942 a United States Agricultural Mission, led by the consulting engineer of the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate, toured Saudi Arabia and produced an optimistic report for the Saudi Government. It showed that Arabia is less handicapped agriculturally than is often supposed. There are chains of oases, many wadis containing agricultural settlements, and even some tree-clad mountain sides. Rotation in grazing areas and afforestation of a simple kind are already practised. The report suggested that the country could be nearly self-sufficient in wheat and rice, and could increase its export of fruit, wool, sheep and camel's hair. It was estimated that agricultural production could be at least doubled within the period of about ten years which would be required for sinking artesian wells, constructing dams, eradicating insect pests, improving soils, introducing better variation of crops and better strains of livestock, importing bees for pollination and honey, and setting up pumping machinery. The mission noted the abundant supply of edible fish in Saudi waters, never subjected to exploitation.

Saudi Arabia imports some 50,000 tons of cereals annually from India and Egypt, as she probably has done for centuries. The mission, whose tour was not exhaustive, showed that something like 50,000 acres could be added to the areas at present

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cultivated, to achieve self-sufficiency. The most promising agricultural districts are at al Hofuf, not far from the oil-producing area, in the province of al Hasa on the eastern coast, and at al Kharj, in Nejd, the central province, where the water held in limestone beds is being used for an irrigation scheme undertaken by the Saudi Government. The southwestern province of 'Asir is already comparatively rich in fruit-growing, and further agricultural development is possible there.

II

What is likely to be the course of events within Saudi Arabia now that her isolation is coming to a close? There are interesting and unprecedented factors in the situation. Never before has a "forbidden" land, populated by a virile, intelligent, religious and determinedly independent people, suddenly opened its doors to the full flood of western progress and, let it be added, of western materialism. The nearby countries offer no guide to the future of Arabia. Egypt has long been an international meeting place. The Levant has always been in the closest possible contact with Europe. 'Iraq has had constant commercial and cultural exchanges with Persia, India and with the western world.

Arabia, which has changed so little since the days of Mohammed, is moving abruptly from the seventh century to the twentieth. The King has completed the first installment of the task he set for himself: the restoration of his dynasty, the revival of Islamic teaching, and the establishment of internal security. Now he must meet economic changes, and direct the adjustment of a people to an entirely new way of life, based on new standards. Islam has a rigid code and it may not be easy for its devotees to adhere to it and yet follow the industrialized pattern of the west. With industrialization go new ambitions, new work, a new way of living, a conception of security on fixed wages — indeed, a new philosophy of life. With that change there may go boredom or disgust, and nostalgia for the olden days, when, so it seemed, there was adventure for the body and the soul. Those who were successful in the old life can hardly be successful in the new one; inevitably men of another stamp will rise to prominence. The change has not gone very far in Arabia, but already many men have a new outlook. They are thirsting for fast transportation, for fortunes, for western solutions to problems.

The nation is greatly handicapped in its new course by the

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lack of education among its citizens. Experts who will direct the process of industrial and agricultural development are greatly needed. To entrust planning of this kind to foreign missions is likely to cause friction, particularly in Arabia where the way of life of the people, and the autocratic habits of officials, would be very hard indeed for western experts to understand.

Few young Arabs from Saudi Arabia have gone to Europe and America for higher education and technical training, since there are few who have had sufficient preliminary education. Statistics about education are as meager as they are in other fields. An attempt has been made in the Hejaz to raise the standard of education — of the teaching of languages in particular — but even so there are probably not more than one or two boys a year who can benefit by technical courses abroad. The total population of Saudi Arabia is variously estimated to be between 3,000,000 and 7,000,000. Possibly the proper total is about 5,000,000, of which 2,000,000 are Bedouins. There are not nearly enough teachers to extend education to a populace of this size. It may be a long time before the schools can meet the demand of the oil companies for educated boys, and can supply trained administrative officials. The Government may, however, bridge the gap somewhat by employing schoolmasters from neighboring Arab countries. Female education on a wide scale is hardly practicable at this stage.

The relations of Saudi Arabia with her neighbors on the north are cool but correct. The frontier between 'Iraq and Saudi Arabia has been delimited, and that with Trans-Jordan defined (in the 1927 treaty with Britain), although Ibn Saud reserved decision on the question of the frontier near Aqaba.

A subdued note of antagonism runs through the relations of Saudi Arabia with both these states, however, owing to the rivalry of the two ruling families: the Saudi clan and the Hashimite family, which ruled Mecca from ancient days and counts its descent from Hashim, grandfather of the prophet Mohammed. Saudi Arabia recently gave sanctuary to Rashid Ali (al Qilani) of Baghdad, leader of a revolt in 1941 against the ruling family of 'Iraq and the Allies, and the act has done nothing to improve relations with 'Iraq. Ibn Saud maintains that ancient Bedouin laws of sanctuary justify his action. There are other incidents which rankle, on either side, among them the fact that it was men from Trans-Jordan who endeavored to raise a revolt against Ibn Saud before the late war.

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Relations with Kuweit in the northeast have been improved since a Bon Voisinage and Trading and Customs Agreement was signed in March 1940. The southwestern frontier with the Yemen was defined at the conclusion of the Saudi-Yemen War in 1934 and relations are now satisfactory. The southern and southeastern open desert frontiers of Saudi Arabia remain undefined, a matter of little consequence unless in relation to oil development.

Relations with the United States and with Great Britain are on the whole cordial, though they are from time to time adversely affected by the actions of those countries in regard to Palestine. Most Saudi Arabians were hardly aware that there was a Palestine question until just before the Second World War. Now, as a result of the constant attention being drawn to that country by the Jewish refugee problem and Zionist aspirations, they have become highly conscious of it. The radio is much used in Nejd, and a great deal is said over the radio on this subject.

Saudi Arabians would undoubtedly march in support of any concerted Arab military action taken in Palestine, and relations with the concession companies would almost inevitably suffer seriously. Saudi Arabians have enlisted in the Trans-Jordan Arab Legion, units of which have been employed in Palestine, and through them first-hand news reaches even the remote oases of Nejd, where formerly politics were parochial.

Arabia, in short, is once more entering the concert of the nations, and her people look forward hopefully to greater prosperity. The adjustment which she must make to meet a more industrialized life is a difficult one. As we have seen, there is a head-on collision of civilizations, of philosophies, of ways of living. In a scientific age we rely upon facts and figures to give a clear understanding of human affairs; but affairs of the soul and the spirit of a people cannot be reduced to figures or measured in diagrams. Perhaps it is for the very reason that we overlook what cannot be readily expressed in officialese or by statistics, and dismiss as imponderable or as unscientific the secrets garnered in past generations, that we westerners sometimes find ourselves surprised and dismayed by the turn of events. The affairs of the spirit will play a large part in events to come in Saudi Arabia. But the strength of character of her people, and their realism, should enable them to face the future more confidently than would at first seem likely from the sharpness of the readjustment which faces them.

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FORCE UNDER A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS

By Philip C. Jessup

THERE is more agreement today than at any earlier period upon the need for some change in the traditional international system of a community of sovereign states. Unlimited sovereignty is no longer automatically accepted everywhere as the most prized possession or even as a desirable attribute of states. The revulsion against war and an international system in which war is not only possible but tolerated has been strengthened by our most recent frightful experience. The potentialities of atomic warfare further increase the demand for greater ingenuity, greater effectiveness, in the science of politics. Some naturally seek a complete and immediate change through the creation of a world government. Others would prefer to build more slowly through the medium of what is generally called international organization or administration, now typified by the United Nations. One point of agreement may be found in all plans and proposals, whether they come from statesmen or laymen, experts or novices. That common point is the necessity for an adequate international law. Under Article 13 of the Charter, the General Assembly is directed to encourage "the progressive development of international law and its codification" — a task which it will presumably undertake at its coming meeting.

No system of law springs into existence full-panoplied. All legal systems, from the most primitive to the most advanced, have their backgrounds and roots in the society which they govern. It is therefore not enough to say that we must have a rule governing the use of atomic bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. It is not enough merely to have a law making war illegal. Such rules, even if backed by an adequate form of international organization, would fail to create the well-ordered society which is a prerequisite to the successful functioning of any legal system. If there be no deeply-rooted body of law governing the solution of the conflicts which are inherent in any human relations, frictions and tensions will become so strong that rules about weapons and wars will be broken.

It is impossible to deal in this article with all the significant problems confronting any attempt to sketch the outlines of a

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modern law of nations.[1] The basic problem of controlling the use of force in international relations is the only topic considered here.

II

The dramatic weakness of traditional international law has been its admission that a state may use force to compel compliance with its will. This weakness has been the inevitable consequence of two factors — one, the concept of absolute sovereignty, and two, the lack of a well-developed international organization with competent powers. Both of these factors are losing their old significance.

It sometimes appears strange that traditional international law, while leaving untouched the right to resort to war, achieved some regulation of the use of force short of war. But this apparent paradox should not cause surprise; it illustrates the manner in which international law has developed over the centuries in a world of sovereign states. The regulation of the resort to war is the ultimate problem toward the solution of which the world has been groping. Along the way it has been possible to secure a measure of agreement upon lesser problems. The resort to war was difficult to control because, in modern times, states have not made war for frivolous reasons, but only when some large interest seemed to afford a justification. The interest might be and usually was selfish, but in the eyes of the war-maker it was not insignificant. If it was not sufficiently great to justify actual resort to war, then it was susceptible of legal regulation. For example, local feeling or general Pan American policy might induce the United States to avoid making war upon Nicaragua but would not deter the sending of a cruiser and the landing of marines.[2] National justifications for the lesser uses of force have generally been couched in legal terms — self-defense, defense of national lives and property, reprisals, retaliation — and customary international law developed tests of the propriety of such conduct. National justifications for war itself have more frequently been placed upon moral grounds, or couched in terms of high political aspirations and ideals; and the customary law has at best characterized war

[1] An attempt to deal with the most significant ones is being made by the writer in a book to be published during 1947 by the Macmillan Company.

[2] Now after several futile attempts, the American Republics have concluded a treaty banning intervention in the internal or external affairs of any other party. One of the first objectives of the General Assembly of the United Nations under Article 13 of the Charter might be to make this inter-American agreement general.

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as un-legal — neither legal nor illegal. Utilizing humanitarian sentiment and, more effectively, the notions of military utility and retaliation, international law developed such rules for the conduct of warfare as the prohibition of explosive bullets and the poisoning of wells, and the regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war. Because clashing interests needed to be reconciled, and because the power of neutrals and belligerents balanced each other, the law of neutral rights and duties grew into a body of highly developed jural doctrine, aided by the prize courts which built up a large body of case-law.

The Charter of the United Nations is the latest milestone on the road to the legal regulation of war, and of the use of force in international relations. According to the fourth paragraph, or "principle," of Article 2, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." This statement derives added significance from its context. The first principle stated in this same article is "the principle of the sovereign equality" of all the members of the organization which is "based" on that principle. From these two principles it is to be deduced that the regulation of the threat or use of force is not inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality. A resort to war can therefore no longer be justified by an invocation of the old concept of absolute sovereignty, which in the last analysis left every state the final judge in its own cause.

Moreover, the third principle is that "All Members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." The third and fourth principles require the conclusion that there are alternatives to war and that these alternatives are peaceful. The fifth principle states the obligation of all members to cooperate in measures taken by the United Nations to preserve the peace, measures already indicated in the purpose stated in Article 1. The significance of this principle is that the alternatives to war are not merely those pacific methods of a state's own choosing, but also the "police" action of the international community marshalled in the common interest to preserve the peace.

Of equal if not of greater importance are those provisions of the Charter designed to make effective the second and third purposes stated in Article I:

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2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international coöperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Obviously law must be developed for the regulation of human activities in all of these fields as a part of the process of establishing and maintaining peace, but such fields of legal regulation are beyond the scope of this article.

Article 2, paragraph 4, it will be noted, is not an absolute prohibition of the use of force. If force can be used in a manner which does not threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, it escapes the restriction of the first clause. But it must then be established that this use of force is not "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Obviously, the use of force under direction of the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, is not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Does there remain any other area in which the threat or use of force is legal? The answer to that question may be sought through a reëxamination of the traditional practices of forceful action as they are listed in nearly every treatise on international law.

III

International law recognizes the right of a state to resort to force in self-defense. Where the use of force has this justification, the incidental or consequent infringement of the rights of another state is excused, although the other state may be legally privileged to resist. Though a forcible act of self-defense may amount to war, it may frequently be only a single incident of short duration — especially when the two states involved are of unequal strength. Self-defense has been commonly invoked as a moral justification for resort to war.

When, in 1928, states renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed that they would not seek to settle their disputes by other than peaceful means, the right of self-defense was expressly reserved. Thus the United States note of June 23, 1928, declared that the proposed treaty did not in any

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way restrict or impair the right of self-defense: "That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

Such a statement suggests that the right of self-defense by its very nature must escape legal regulation. In one sense this is true. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in the course of discussions with the British Government concerning the celebrated affair of the *Caroline* — a vessel supplying Canadian insurrectionists which the British seized when moored on the American side of the Niagara River — stated in 1842 that action in self-defense was justified only when the necessity for action is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." This definition is obviously drawn from consideration of the right of self-defense in domestic law; the cases are rare indeed in which it would precisely fit an international situation. It is an accurate definition for international law, however, in the sense that the exceptional right of self-defense can be exercised only if the end cannot be otherwise obtained. In 1926, when the League of Nations experts were studying the problems which would result from the application of sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant, M. de Brouckère of Belgium noted that "Legitimate defense implies the adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by the imminence of the danger." When an individual is set upon by an armed thug who threatens his life, instantaneous action is clearly requisite and it can be said that there is "no moment for deliberation." When a state expects an injury from another state or from a lawless band, there is usually opportunity for deliberation in a chancellery or war office; an officer on the spot usually does not act until he has received instructions.

Granted the necessary degree of immediacy and urgency, it is of course true, as Lauterpacht has pointed out, that every state must be the judge in its own cause. It would be impossible to await the decision of an international authority; and if such decision were obtained, the act of the state would constitute the execution of the decision rather than an act of self-defense[3]. The

[3] Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Function of Law in the International Community." Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p. 179.

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provisions of the Charter of the United Nations are in accord with this reasoning. Article 51 states:

> Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The two sentences bring out the point at which the law regulates the act of self-defense. The nation invokes the right at its peril, and its conduct is subject to review. Should the Security Council decide that the act was not justified, it might impose its measures of forcible restraint upon the state which had claimed to act in self-defense, instead of upon the state alleged to be the aggressor. The reference in Article 51 to "collective self-defense" was designed to safeguard the inter-American system of mutual defense as outlined in the Declaration of Lima of 1938, the Act of Havana of 1940 and the Act of Chapultepec of 1945. Such regional collective measures are also subordinated to the world authority vested in the Security Council. The United Nations thus possesses the mechanics for international review of any use of force in alleged self-defense. The lack of such machinery was the chief weakness of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. It was indeed the weakness of the entire international policy of the United States throughout the League of Nations period.[4]

Article 51 of the Charter suggests a further limitation upon the right of self-defense; the right may be exercised only "if an armed attack occurs." The classical case of the seizure of the Danish fleet in Copenhagen by the British in 1807 because of fear that the Danes would be coerced into surrendering the fleet to the French would not be justified by Article 51. Neither would the Amelia Island case of 1817, when President Monroe ordered a United States vessel of war to wipe out a nest of marauders established on that island, which was then in Spanish territory. The seizure of the *Caroline* and the pursuit of Villa by United States Army forces in 1916 might come within the category of

[4] The weakness of the Charter, with its sanctification of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, is another story. This article deals in general with the existing system under the Charter.

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permitted cases. It would seem, however, that Article 51 has rather in mind such a position as China's, when Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931: Japan's claim to be acting in self-defense was not valid under traditional law and could not have been supported under Article 51. This restriction in Article 51 very definitely narrows the freedom of action which states had under traditional law. A case could be made out for self-defense under the traditional law when there was a threat of injury, even if no attack had yet taken place. Under the Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself to be threatened.

Article 51 does not seek to lay down a general principle; it refers only to "an armed attack . . . against a Member of the United Nations." A non-member state would accordingly still look for a definition of its right of self-defense to general international law. It is not to be assumed, however, that the United Nations, particularly as it approaches universality, would tolerate a resort to force in self-defense by a non-member against a member, or by one non-member against another, under circumstances which would make the act a violation of Article 51 of the Charter if performed by a member. Any such use of force is in one sense a "breach of the peace" within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter, even where it is a justifiable breach. The language used throughout Chapter VII indicates an assertion of the right of the Security Council to take or require action even against a non-member; such steps would be in accord with the sixth principle stated in Article 2 that "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." Under traditional international law, such treaty provisions do not bind a third state; but a third state would be politically alive to the possible consequences of action in defiance of the United Nations.

IV

A modern law of nations should be based on the acceptance of the principle of community interest which justifies the community as such to take cognizance of breaches of the peace. The difference is between the private law notions of tort as distinguished from crime. If the suggested principle were universally

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adopted, the practical and the formally legal points of view would be united and the rule of self-defense under the Charter would be expanded into a rule of universal application.

An armed attack upon a state which would justify the latter in using force in self-defense would clearly itself be an illegal act. A modern law of nations must also reject the traditional notion that international law is law only between and among states; it must accept the principle that international law directly binds the individual.[5] Under this principle, the individual or individuals responsible for an attack which justified counteraction in self-defense would themselves be liable to punishment under international law. Thus if such acts as the pursuit of Villa and the destruction of the *Caroline* were justifiable acts of self-defense, Villa, and the American sympathizers with the Canadian insurgents, would themselves be liable to such trial and punishment. This conclusion leaves open the answer to the procedural question whether such offenders should be tried in a national or international court. In such cases as these, it may be suggested that international law should recognize the competence of the jurisdiction of any state, as in trials for piracy today. If an International Criminal Court were established, that court might have jurisdiction, and procedures akin to extradition might be established to bring about the delivery of the offenders to its custody. A state which failed to use the means at its disposal to check the individual outbreak of violence might also be held legally responsible as under traditional international law.

Traditional international law has recognized the right of a state to employ its armed forces to protect the lives and property of its nationals abroad when the state in which they are residing is unable or unwilling to do so, because of revolutionary disturbances or otherwise. Such action by a protecting state is not properly classified as self-defense, and it may fall short of intervention, as that term is narrowly defined. The United States has taken such protective action on a large number of occasions.

Since such use of force for the protection of nationals may be free of an attempt to impair the political independence or territorial integrity of another state, it may escape the prohibition of the first clause of Article 2 of the Charter. Is it, however,

[5] No attempt is made here to continue the argument whether international law today does in any case apply directly to the individual. The acceptance of the principle for the future is taken by way of hypothesis as a point of departure.

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"inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations?" The answer must be yes. The first purpose of the organization as stated in Article 1 is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." The landing of armed forces of one state in another state is a "breach of the peace" even though under traditional international law it is a lawful breach of the peace. It is a measure of forcible self-help, legalized by international law because there has been no international organization competent to act in an emergency. The defect has now been at least partially remedied through the adoption of the Charter, and a modernized law of nations should insist that the collective measures envisaged by Article I of the Charter should supplant the individual measures approved by the traditional international law.

For example, in 1900 there occurred the incidents of the Boxer Rebellion in China which led to the joint use of armed forces by a group of states whose diplomatic representatives were threatened by the siege of the Legation Quarter in Peking. This was a case of "collective" measures undertaken before the existence of a competent international organization. Under comparable circumstances today, the necessary action should be undertaken by the direction of the Security Council utilizing the national contingents which are to be placed at its disposal.

In 1926–1927 there was civil war in Nicaragua. United States armed forces were landed. "As a means of insuring the maintenance of communications between the Legation and the Legation guard at Managua and the seacoast, United States naval forces declared neutral the zone along the Pacific Railway, including the cities through which the railway passed, and prohibited fighting in that zone. By March 15 a total of 2,000 naval and military forces had been landed in Nicaragua to maintain the neutral zones and protect American and other foreign lives and property."[6] Under comparable circumstances today, any necessary action should be undertaken by the direction of the Security Council,

[6] "The United States and Nicaragua: A Survey of the Relations from 1909 to 1932." Department of State, Latin American Series No. 6, p. 71–72.

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and not on the unilateral decision of any one member of the Organization.

It would seem that the only reasonable argument against the substitution of collective measures under the Security Council for measures by a single state would be one based on the inability of the international organization to act with the necessary speed. It may take some time before the Military Staff Committee and the pledged national contingents of the Security Council are in a state of readiness to act, but the Charter contemplates that international action shall be timely as well as powerful. Air-force contingents are specially provided for in Article 45 of the Charter.

It might be argued that the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," were drafted with an eye to cases in which it was necessary to apply collective measures of force against a state which had begun or was about to begin a forcible attack upon another state's territory, and that they are not applicable to a situation such as the Nicaraguan incident of 1926 where the territorial safety of the United States was never endangered. But the language of the articles in Chapter VII is not so limited, and significance may be attached to the use of the terms "threats to the peace" and "breaches of the peace" in addition to the term "acts of aggression." Peace may be threatened by the need of a state to protect its nationals in another country, as well as by aggression. To assert that "peace" is used in the Charter only as the antonym of "war," and that therefore peace is not threatened or breached unless war is in the offing or has broken out, would be a narrow and stultifying interpretation.

It should not be expected, therefore, that a Committee of Jurists appointed by the Security Council of the United Nations would need to be evasive, as was the committee appointed by the League Council to report on the Corfu case in 1923. Reading the Charter as a whole, one finds it impossible to escape the conclusion that the organization is responsible for the substitution of collective measures for the individual measures of self-help which were legalized by international law before the world community was organized. The one exception is the question of self-defense which has already been discussed.

We may conclude that the Charter has already modernized international law relative to the use of armed forces by a state for the protection of its nationals abroad. The treaty rule em-

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bodied in the Charter cannot be made general, under traditional international legal concepts, until the organization approaches universality; but from the standpoint of community interest the Charter rule may be taken as the modern law of nations.

V

As already suggested, the term intervention may be used broadly to cover cases of the use of armed forces for the protection of nationals and other cases of self-help, as well as instances of actual interference with the political independence of another state. The last narrow use of the term is adopted here. Intervention as thus defined may or may not involve the use of force. It is frequently possible for a powerful state to impair the political independence of another weaker state without actually utilizing armed forces. This result may be accomplished by lending open approval — by the relaxation of an arms embargo, for example — to a revolutionary group headed by individuals ready to accept the political or economic dominance of the intervening state. It may be accomplished by the withholding of recognition of a new government, combined with various forms of economic and financial pressure. Many examples of such intervention may be found, particularly in the history — fortunately now ancient history — of the relations between the United States and the republics of the Caribbean area. Regardless of any justifications for intervention under traditional international law, and even though Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the Charter would not be violated if actual force were not employed, this form of international pressure should also be brought under legal control, as through the generalization of the inter-American convention.

International law has recognized the right of a state under certain circumstances to use other forms of forcible self-help. The terms reprisal, retaliation and retorsion have been used to describe situations in which a state resorts to force in reply to some hostile act of another state. The paradoxical label "pacific blockade" has been applied to cases in which states have used superior power to compel other states to comply with what are unilaterally asserted to be its legal obligations. Through the process described at the beginning of this article, international law has succeeded in regulating such uses of force short of war. The Porter Convention, inspired by the doctrine enunciated by the Argentine Foreign Minister Drago, and signed at the Second

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Hague Peace Conference of 1907, prohibited the use of force for the collection of contract debts. The Convention was so drafted as to leave a large loophole, but revision now would be unimportant. Such use of force, like the employment of reprisals or retaliation or retorsion or pacific blockade, now comes under the control of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter. Moreover, from a practical rather than a legal angle, there is considerable change in the old method of negotiating and extending foreign loans which were the "contract debts" Drago specifically had in mind.

VI

The acceptance of the hypothesis that individuals are subjects of international law and are bound directly by it necessitates the consideration of certain examples of the use of force by individuals. The matter of piracy is the one case in which it has been generally said that international law imposed duties directly upon individuals, but the actual legal situation has been also explained in terms of state rights by asserting that international law in regard to piracy removes usual limitations upon the jurisdiction of states and permits any state which apprehends a pirate to punish him. The hypothesis that the individual is a subject of international law makes such reconciliation with the traditional basis of international law no longer necessary. Accordingly, it may be stated that under a modernized law of nations, unauthorized acts of violence on the high seas committed by individuals are violations of international law. On the procedural side, practice already provides a solution, in that each state remains free to inflict such punishment as it may choose to provide by its local law. International law might itself assert the death penalty, or life imprisonment in states where capital punishment is forbidden.

The basic theoretical hurdle having been jumped, there would be no obstacle in the way of agreement upon other individual acts which should be assimilated to acts of piracy or treated in the same way. The Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments in 1922 proposed a convention which would have used this formula for sinking of merchant vessels by submarines, but the convention never entered into force. The problem of international law would be to catalog those acts of individuals which have sufficient international significance to warrant placing their punishment under international auspices. Some of these would involve the illegal use of force. Among them are terroristic ac-

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tivities, assassination of heads of states, plotting to overthrow a foreign government, counterfeiting of foreign currencies, the slave trade, traffic in narcotics and unauthorized manufacture of atomic or other weapons.

Anti-foreign sentiment has frequently inspired instances of mob-violence against particular alien groups. Some of the most lamentable cases have taken place in the United States, with Chinese and Italian nationals as the victims. Such cases have been considered in international law with reference to the responsibility of the state in whose territory the atrocity takes place. The state is considered responsible when it has failed to use the means at its disposal to prevent the outrage or to punish leaders of the mob. The question of state responsibility for injury to aliens will not be examined here. The procedure for the punishment of the individual leaders of the mob would not be different in principle from the procedure for punishing individuals for violations of other rules of international law.

Where mob violence is definitely inspired by hostility to persons of another nationality, international law should assert the liability of the individual for a breach of international law. The practical difficulty is that in such cases it is frequently impossible to identify the members of the mob or to find witnesses who are willing to testify. In most countries it may be assumed that if the guilty individuals can be identified, the injured person or his representative could institute a civil suit and might recover damages. The established procedure of holding the state responsible in such cases is probably the only way in which atonement could be made to the injured individuals or their families. From the point of view of a revised international law recognizing the position of the individual, the problem is rather one of the jurisdiction of the courts of other countries on the principle of universalism which is utilized in case of piracy, or of the establishment of international criminal courts. The general arguments in favor of the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction, such as the availability of witnesses, lose their force when it is apparent that an anti-foreign bias pervades a community and makes it impossible to find locally a jury which will convict or even a judge who will impartially preside and sentence in case of conviction. But given the difficulties of proof and natural reactions of judge or jury in the state of which the victims were nationals, it is by no means certain that a fair trial would be obtained in that state if the

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crime of mob violence were made an extraditable one. It is indeed the distrust of the impartiality of the courts of other states which frequently inspires the unwillingness of governments to remit their citizens to the judgment of foreign courts.

On the substantive side it is necessary to ask whether a modernized international law should content itself with cognizance of cases of violence inspired by an anti-foreign bias. The international repercussions of such cases give them a special character. History indicates that group violence instigated by anti-racial bias is likely to rouse international issues, aside from questions of nationality. This has been due in part to a general humanitarian sentiment which is shocked by such outrages, and in part to the distribution of members of racial groups through a number of countries. Thus the lynching of Negroes in the southern states of the United States may arouse a humanitarian revulsion in other countries as well as in the United States itself, but there are not large, organized, politically active groups of Negroes in other countries to take up cudgels on behalf of the fellow-members of their race. On the other hand, anti-Jewish pogroms in any part of the world stir other Jewish groups who are sufficiently well organized to make their voices heard. Aside from any racial bond, the religious factor may have the same consequences, as in the response of Christian groups in various countries to the historic massacres of Christian Armenians in Turkey.

If it is granted that individual rights are protected by international law,[7] all such cases must be considered matters of international concern, and those who use violence against national or racial or religious minorities considered "violators of the laws of nations," to use the old phrase of the famous Act of 7 Anne which in 1708 provided penalties for those who violated the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers.

VII

The problem of international legal regulation of civil war and revolution is a difficult one. As organized societies gain in stability, the suppression of forcible changes in government becomes a normal and natural task of the community. Thus in the United States, political leaders no longer repeat the words of Thomas Jefferson: "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good

[7] The question of an International Bill of Rights to be drafted by the United Nations Commission cannot be explored here.

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thing . . . God forbid that we should even be twenty years without such a rebellion." But the right of resistance against autocratic oppression is deeply ingrained in the human spirit and has had the blessing of great political theorists such as Grotius and Locke. Should it be an international crime, like piracy, for an individual to revolt against oppression? To answer this question in the affirmative is to assert that the international community should be based on the principle of mutual assistance to suppress internal disturbances of the magnitude of revolution or civil war. The Havana Convention of 1928 on Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife is a partial acceptance of that principle, although the treaty does not go so far as to provide for collective intervention.

After the establishment of a world state, it is sometimes said, all war would be civil war. The power of world government would be directed to the suppression of all resistance against its authority. The denial of the right of resistance must be predicated upon the same consideration which attends the outlawing of war in an international community of sovereign states, namely, provision of peaceful substitutes for war. A world government would have to assume the responsibility for remedying wrongs and providing justice for all people.

In today's world, although the sovereign state persists, each state is bound to the others through a still primitive form of international governmental organization, and in logic it must be held that the interest of the world community in peace is greater than the assertion of an individual, or group of individuals, that his or their rights are being disregarded. If the state has relinquished its right to resort to war, so the individual must relinquish any right to overthrow his own government by force. This in effect means merely that, to the usual risks of rebellion, he adds the risk of international aid to the government he attacks. In practice, such a conclusion would throw a heavy burden upon the United Nations. The international community would have to take cognizance of and remedy situations within states which were provocative of rebellion. It would have to be prepared, as is the federal government of the United States, to render armed assistance to any of its members whose local forces are inadequate to preserve domestic peace and tranquillity. But the history of the recognition policy of states, and particularly of modern trends toward collective refusal to recognize governments which take or

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hold power by violence, teaches that international interference in such matters may lead to undesirable domination of the affairs of a state and be productive of more international friction than it eliminates. The difficulty is one of organization and procedures; as these develop, desirable international results may be achieved through such collective interventions.

The United Nations as now organized is not capable of playing such a rôle. The recent debates concerning the Franco Government in Spain illustrate this weakness. Until international government is more mature, international law must avoid stretching its arm into a state in case of civil war. The situation may come under legal regulation, as in traditional international law, when a civil war projects its disturbing influence outside the boundaries of a single state. Such a situation may be said to exist where a territory is already under a form of delegated international control, *e.g.* the mandated territory of Palestine, or where it involves non-self-governing peoples to whom the obligations of Chapter XI or Chapter XII of the Charter apply. Even the rudimentary forms of world government, as that term is commonly used by its proponents, would necessarily leave to the subordinate political units a large measure of responsibility for the maintenance of local peace. In a political unit as large and complex as is this terrestrial globe, a local civil war might well be conceived to have only the magnitude of an individual murder in the United States today.

Law and governmental organization are interdependent. A modern law of nations cannot function without proper organization. Even world government cannot function without proper law.

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MANCHURIA: A KEY AREA

By H. Foster Bain

SCATTERED around the world are certain territories, some large, some small, that have been deeply significant in the world's history and have profoundly influenced the lives of its people. A happy combination of circumstances has in each case brought the right people at the right time to the right place to develop its natural resources and to exploit its geographic advantages. From the center of power thus created have spread waves of influence to affect the whole surrounding area and in some instances the entire world. The Nile Valley was in its time one such area, Greece was another, and Rome a third. In modern times, England has been such a center. Many and varied have been the forces responsible for the rise to power and significance of the various areas. Each, however, has been inhabited by a vigorous people, each has been situated favorably to enjoy wide contacts and each has been endowed with natural resources of the type esteemed at the time to be of supreme value to the world. In some instances, the people themselves seem to have been the most important factor, as in the case of the Greeks. In others, it was the resources, as in the Nile where a rich soil and an adequate water supply permitted the production of a large surplus food supply. In still others it was the geographic position of the country that permitted the inhabitants to act as middle men in world trade, as did Venice in the Middle Ages, and earlier, King Solomon who promoted trade and took a profit from his position on the isthmus between the mutually antagonistic Arabs, who on the one hand ranged both sea and land to the Far East, and the Mediterranean people whose small ships sailed to the west and north even to the Baltic. Solomon was a wise man, not because he collected a thousand wives and built a famous temple, but because he recognized and exploited the advantages of his geographic position.

A time factor also enters into the result. The Chilians were fortunate to have exploited their great nitrate deposits before the synthetic product claimed the market. The pitchblende of Bohemia led to no important results when discovered; but that of northern Canada and the great uranium deposits of Katanga are now of immense interest to the world.

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Time, place, people and resources all have a part in determining the significance of each country; and within each there are smaller key areas which have been of major importance. Pennsylvania in the United States, the Midlands in England, the Ruhr in Germany, the Donetz basin in Russia, New South Wales in Australia, Buenos Aires province in Argentina, stand out. In China — indeed in east Asia — Manchuria seems destined to play such a part.

Centuries ago the great central plain which constitutes the core of Manchuria was the breeding place of vast herds of hardy horses and the training ground of a fierce and tactically wise tribe of nomad warriors who in 1644 swept out and conquered the rich and highly civilized China of the Mings. The Manchus, in this effort, used to the full one of the resources of their country, its grass land, but they showed no appreciation of its other resources, even stopping the beginnings of coal mining and pottery making which the Koreans had tried to introduce. Their great effort of conquest seems to have exhausted their vigor and in China they became rich, corrupt and contented while their homeland relapsed into another long sleep. From this it was eventually poked into life again, first by the Russians, then the Japanese; and now new currents of life are reaching it from China and the west. When Manchuria awakened, it was into a new world. No longer were horsemen dominant. The superior advantages of mechanical power had already become appreciated and steam and hydro power had taken the place of horses and coolies. The twentieth century brought into Manchuria a new type of adventurer who searched out and brought into use resources and opportunities which had been passed over by the Manchus and which in fact would have meant nothing to them even if they had been recognized.

From the north came the Russians, seeking a modern route to a warm water port as outlet for their great and awakening empire. From the east came the Japanese, seeking room for expansion and raw materials for modern industry. The country was but sparsely inhabited, since the Manchus had preserved it for an imperial hunting ground and had fenced out their industrious and land-hungry Chinese subjects. The revolution of 1911 changed all this, and in the years since there has been a large movement of people into the area. The greater number have come from China, but Japan, Korea, Siberia and other countries have all

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contributed. At present, the population is estimated at 43,000,000.

The power, however, of a modern nation is measured neither by area nor by population, but by work output, and the latter is determined mainly by the fuel available and the extent and manner in which it is put to work. Each metric ton of coal properly burned affords applicable energy equal to 1,100 man-days labor, or nearly as much work as three and one-half men can do in a year. This additional work output can be realized without materially trenching on either the housing facilities or food supply of a country, and the output can, therefore, be easily transmuted into social benefits and higher standards of living. Realization of this fundamental factor in modern industrial economy, and doing something about it, is what has given power to England, the United States and Germany, and what is now raising Russia to front rank, and what is increasing the stature and position of other countries such as Canada, Australia and Czechoslovakia. It is in this potential for industrialization, rather than in their large population, that lies the hope of India and of China, of which latter Manchuria is a part.

Geographically, Manchuria is well positioned to play a leading part in the affairs of east Asia. It lies in the temperate zone where the climate favors plant and animal life and the recurrent change of seasons acts as a powerful stimulant to human activities. It is a natural meeting place of people. With the Chinese to the southwest, the Mongols to the west, Russians to the north, Koreans (and beyond them the Japanese) to the east, and with open ports to the south through which contacts may be easily maintained with the other peoples of the world, Manchuria is truly ordained to be one of the world's great crossroads. Up to now, this middle position has resulted in conflict rather than trade, so much so that Manchuria has come to be known as "Land of Conflict" rather than a center of peace and industry. Fortunately such a designation is not necessarily permanently to be deserved. Time was when our own Kentucky was known as "the dark and bloody land."

Our hurt and exasperation with the Japanese over the recent war not unnaturally disposes us to emphasize their undesirable characteristics and too often to forget the good that is in them. Among the powerful influences which built up the military party and in the end brought Japan to disaster was the so-called young officer group. It was most unfortunate that the movement which

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began in this group was early captured by the older followers of the military tradition—Araki, Doihara, Homma, Tanaka, Minami, Tojo, and the leaders of the Kwantung Army who came to dominate the Empire. The young officers began as reformers and with worthy ideals. They were farm boys, for the most part conscripted into the Army and receiving their education and training from it. In the Japanese Army, the Inspector General had charge of all training and instruction, and he was one of the three who dominated its policy at any time. The young officers, as they progressed upward in army ranks, carried with them vivid memories of the hardships endured by the common people from whom they came and especially of the farming classes. As for the first time they saw the wealth and luxury of life enjoyed by the few in the big cities they were filled with a deep resentment and developed a fierce zeal to bring about a better life for the underdog. While General Watanabe was Inspector General, there was some opportunity for growth and expression of such ideas, but after his assassination and Araki's succession to power such ideas were repressed. Force was deified and only the road to conquest was permitted to remain open.

There is (or was)at Hsinking an interesting expression of these early ideals of the young officers in an attractive painting placed at the turn of the stairs in the capitol building. This picture showed five little maidens, hand in hand, skipping joyfully down a broad path symbolizing opportunity. Each was dressed in a traditional national costume, one Manchu, one Mongolian, one Chinese, one Korean and one Japanese, all living happily together. It was for this ideal that many of the young men of Japan gave their lives. The wish to change Manchuria from a land of conflict into a land of peace and plenty was implicit in much that was done. The young men were not always happy in their manner of attempting this and they were all too often used rather than helped by older and more worldly-wise leaders; but their own good purpose deserves remembrance and their ideal is well worth working toward now and in the years to come.

Manchuria is a large country. With an area of 503,013 square miles, it is slightly smaller than Alaska but almost twice as big as Texas. Even Texans will admit that it is a considerable territory. More than its mere extent, too, gives it importance. Its heart is a great northeast-trending prairie plain, roughly 600 miles long and 200 to 400 miles wide, with a fertile soil and a climate

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favorable to grain-growing. Indeed, it is potentially another Manitoba-Dakota wheat area. Owing to the restrictions long imposed by the Manchus, its soil has not been exhausted, as it has been used only for grazing land through centuries. Even when the revolution opened it to settlement, the tough sod was too much for the man with a hoe and had to await the coming of tractors. It has not, therefore, been broken up into small fields and is still open in the main to modern methods of machine cultivation. Under the stimulus of changed conditions, and in particular the provision of increased railway and road mileage, it has already become a big producer and exporter of surplus foods, especially of soybeans. It was the soybean which first brought the Russians and Japanese into railway traffic agreements after their bitter war, and it was the same bean and its products which enabled the Japanese to buy from Germany the mining and other machinery brought in to exploit Manchuria's mineral resources. Incidentally, the residue of the bean, after its oil had been expressed, supplied much-needed fertilizer to Japan and was important among Manchurian exports. Potentially, this central plain is one of the great graneries of the world and much can be done to improve the agriculture by introducing new crops, by better seed selection, by pest control and other well-known modern methods. In Manchuria, as in China, entirely too much heartbreaking human labor has been expended to produce inferior results in quality and quantity of product. Here, however, because of the better opportunity for a fresh start with a relatively clean slate, a greater chance of quick progress exists than in the older parts of China.

This central plain narrows to the south where it reaches the Yellow Sea and again to the north where the bordering mountains close in around it. It is drained to the south by the Liao River and to the north by the Sungari, which breaks through to the Amur and so to the sea. Each of these rivers has numerous tributaries, of which the Nonni, flowing into the Sungari, is perhaps longest. Manchuria itself is largely bounded by rivers. The Yalu on the southeast separates it from Korea, and the Ussuri, Amur and Argun encircle it on the northeast, north and northwest and mark most of the boundary between it and Siberia. Between these rivers and the central plain is everywhere a mountain belt. To the northwest is the escarpment of the Mongolian plateau which rises in the Great Kingan range to a crest of some 6,000-foot altitude and which extends northward into the great

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bow of the Amur River. To the northeast is the Little Kingan range, and along the southeast the Changpai Mountains which are but the western extension of the Korean massif cut in two by the Yalu River. On the west and southwest, the Mongolian plateau slopes down to the gulf with a narrow gap between mountains and sea through which Manchuria is connected with northern China. Agriculture, commerce and manufacturing are centered on the plain, especially in the south. The mountain areas are given up to mining and forestry, the timber lands being among the more important in northeastern Asia and the proximate cause of the original war between Russia and Japan.

The important mineral resources of Manchuria are coal, iron, dolomite and magnesite, aluminous shale, oil shale, structural and chemical raw materials, gold and subordinate amounts of silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and less important metals. Coal and iron, the two minerals most fundamental to modern industry, have long been known to be present in quantity but the exact knowledge regarding individual deposits was generally lacking, and most of the iron ore has been believed to be of such low grade as to render it unavailable for use in modern plants. While the Japanese were in control of the country, they made extensive geological surveys, and by bold exploration and notable improvements in the technology materially improved the outlook. It is now clear that in Manchuria are to be found in quantity the principal minerals essential to a sound development of heavy industry which, as is well known, lies at the base of a modern economy.

The older rocks outcrop in the southern part of the country and the younger formations successively overlap them to the north. Important outliers of these younger formations are found even down to the Kwantung Peninsula and because of the severe and long periods of erosion which the country has endured the younger formations have been cut through in central and northern Manchuria and the older ones exposed at many points. Ores of iron and other metals especially characterize the older rocks and are accordingly most abundant in southern Manchuria. Gold deposits, in contrast, were formed at various periods in geological history. The most important deposits are those of the north, where they are genetically related to relatively young intrusive rocks and were concentrated into placers in Tertiary and Pleistocene times.

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Coal is found from north to south and in formations of Permocarboniferous, the Jurassic and the Eocene Ages. The largest fields are in the Jurassic, which is extensively developed in Central Manchuria; but the Permocarboniferous fields while less extensive are especially important since they include most of the high grade coal and in particular that which has strong coking properties. The Tertiary (Eocene) coals are, as generally throughout the world, of lower grade but the fields are characterized by unusually thick beds which makes for low cost of mining.

The largest and best known deposit is at Fushun, near Mukden, where a block of Eocene strata about ten miles long and two and a quarter miles wide has been faulted down below the surface of the older rocks and so preserved through succeeding long periods of erosion. Mining was begun here six or seven centuries ago but was stopped when the Manchus gained control. It was only resumed when the Russians came in the late nineties. They opened big mines there and the Japanese in turn developed them still further. Coal is now mined from two open pits and five shaft mines. The Kunchengzu pit is equipped to produce 15,000 tons per day alone but, owing to the severe winters, cannot be operated more than two-thirds of the year. The daily capacity of the underground mines varies from 3,000 tons at the older Oyama to 5,000 tons at the Lung Feng, the newest and most modern. Roughly, one-third of the annual output, which since 1938 has been above 10,000,000 tons, comes from the open pits and two-thirds from underground. When the recent war began, the mines were fully equipped in the most modern manner, and around them had clustered a number of varied plants making Fushun the largest industrial center in Manchuria. The main coal bed is notably thick, ranging from 130 feet at the east end where the quality is highest to 430 feet at the west. While there are numerous partings of shale and clay, W. H. Emmons, who made detailed measurements in 1921, determined that 73 percent of the 430 feet of thickness was coal. In the open pit, mining is done with steam shovels, six benches being operated. Above these, there are five working in oil shale and three for stripping off the barren green shale and surface sands. The stripping ratio is unusually low. While mining costs have not been released, they obviously are low also. Indeed, at one time coal was supplied free for a term of years as a means of inducing industries to locate near the mines. A large power house with a capacity of 250,000 kw. was built and current supplied to

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Mukden, Anshan and further south. Costs were reported to have been 55 sen per kw.h, equal at the then prevailing exchange to about 15 cents.

The coal is excellent for steaming purposes, about equal to that from good midwestern mines in the United States. It is only feebly coking, but it serves well in mixtures for by-product ovens all the more because of its high nitrogen content. At Anshan, it supplied 70 to 75 percent of the coke oven burden. Japanese engineers estimate that the original content of the Fushun field was approximately one billion tons and that not less than 90 percent remains to be mined.

A number of smaller coal mines have been opened in different parts of Manchuria by Chinese, Russian and Japanese companies. However, the most ambitious attempt yet made to rival Fushun was that of the Manchurian Coal Company, a subsidiary of the Manchuria Industrial Development Company at Fushin, not far from the border of Jehol and about 75 miles north of Chinchow (Chinhsien) on the Peking-Mukden Railway. In 1936, a railway line was built north from Chinchow to the coal field and on around to connect into Mukden. Work was promptly started to open the field and 1,850,000 tons were mined in 1938. Plans called for a production of 5,000,000 tons in 1941 and apparently this was accomplished. The coal is found in a belt of Jurassic strata let down into the older Taishan complex and so preserved from erosion as at Fushun. It is approximately 40 miles long and 9 to 12 miles wide. Systematic drilling was carried out over a considerable portion believed to be representative, and an ultimate recovery of a billion tons was estimated. The possible tonnage for the whole field was put at four times that amount.

The coal measures are 1,800 to 2,000 feet thick and in them are several coal beds as much as 90 feet thick. In one group, there is a total thickness aggregating 300 feet of coal in 400 feet of strata. A large part of the coal can be won by open pit mining with a stripping ratio of three and a half to one by volume. Dips are moderate and underground mining is easy and cheap. The coal is clean, bright and free burning but not itself generally coking. Individual beds show some coking power and in practice Fushin coal can be made into coke by using the proper proportion of coal from Penshihu or Pei Pao, which latter field is nearby. The Pei Pao field, which was opened by the Chinese, is not so large as the Fushin, the probable reserve being estimated at only 250,000,000

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tons; but it is believed that fully half this amount is of coking grade. It is slightly nearer the port of Hulutao with which it is connected by rail, and coal can be delivered very cheaply to the sea.

Numerous other coal mines have been opened in Manchuria and are now producing at rates of 100,000 to 2,000,000 tons per year. Each of them is backed by a suitable reserve. Only a few can be mentioned here. One of the most important is at Penshihu, on the railway line between Mukden and Antung; this is characterized by the high coking quality of the coal. Substantially all the coke made in Manchuria, which was but little less than one-third of the total available to the Japanese, was made in whole or in part from Penshihu coal. In the same Permocarboniferous coal district is the Yentai field, opened by the Russians and yielding about 500,000 tons per year of anthracitic coal, mainly for locomotive fuel. In central Manchuria there are a number of mines, including the Hsian, east of Ssupingkai, now putting out 2,000,000 tons per year, the Shulan, the Hueshihling, and others.

In northern Manchuria, the Russians opened the Muling field on the east and Chalinor on the west to supply fuel to the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese, through the National Geological Survey, called attention to the Holikwan field which, because of its extent and the high coking quality of its product, may prove to be one of the more important in Manchuria. It lies north of the Chinese Eastern Railway on the Sungari River. The Japanese opened it and connected the mines by direct railway line with the port of Rashin. They also opened what is practically a new field, the Mishan, near the Muling in eastern Manchuria, and extended the surveys and studies in the Chalinor in the far west. This latter field is large but its development imposes particular problems, since the coal is of lower quality than that found in the other areas discussed, resembling our North Dakota black lignite rather than standard bituminous. The Japanese experimented here with low temperature distillation, producing a char as a by-product. Owing to the eastern methods of house heating, char can be marketed there more easily than in Dakota; but Chalinor is in a very thinly populated area and a long distance from any considerable present market.

It remains to be mentioned that in eastern Manchuria there are numerous imperfectly explored coal fields both in Jurassic and Permocarboniferous strata and of both coking and non-cok-

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ing bituminous coal. These acquire a new importance because of discovery of the Tungpienta iron ore deposits along the Yalu. It appears reasonably probable that these fields are capable of affording sufficient fuel for working up these ores. Scattered throughout northern Manchuria, too, are areas of coal and lignite sufficient to supply the railways and fleets of gold dredges such as the Japanese were putting into the region.

Wide differences of opinion have existed as to the total probable coal reserve in Manchuria. Shortly before the Japanese overran the country, Hsieh, of the National Geological Survey of China, estimated the total at nearly three billion tons. The Lytton Commission considered the matter and raised the figure to just under four billion. Now, in the light of the extensive explorations and developments conducted by the Japanese, it seems safe to set the figure at nine billion. This places the Manchurian reserve above that of Japan proper and but little below that of Belgium. Manchurian coal beds are thicker, less broken and nearer the surface than in either of these countries, so the cost of mining should be less and the production potential correspondingly greater. While the Manchurian coal fields are by no means the largest in China, they rank high; and when account is taken of their accessibility and the character of the coal, they are without much doubt of the largest present importance and of great significance for the future. In wartime the production was built up to some 30,000,000 tons per year, more than the prewar output of all the rest of China together. A most significant fact, too, is that only a small portion of this coal, estimated at 1,300,000 tons, was exported, the great bulk being used within the country itself to support local industry. The considerable existing network of railways minimizes the problem of distribution which has so severely handicapped coal development elsewhere in China.

The second most important mineral in Manchuria is iron. Local iron ores are already responsible for the building up of two centers of iron production, one at Anshan and another at Penshihu, with a combined prewar pig iron output of about 1,500,000 tons and a steel ingot production of 500,000 to 600,000 tons. Both increased materially during the war years and the pig iron capacity has been estimated to have become as much as 3,000,000 tons, with a potential steel output, including that of small electric plants, of one-half that much. It is not believed that full capacity was realized. Again the most significant fact is that much of the larger part of

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the iron and steel was worked up locally. Manchuria has already ceased to be merely a producer of raw materials.

The iron ores occur in a range or series of low hills which extend across the southern part of the country from Lanchow in China to Mosan in Korea. The rocks are pre-Cambrian and similar to those in the older iron ore ranges of the Lake Superior country, but there has not been in Manchuria much of the enrichment of the iron ore formation which created the bonanza ore-bodies from which American furnaces have drawn the bulk of their supply. Tegengren, of the China Survey, credited this belt with a potential yield of three-quarters of a billion tons of ore. Unfortunately, the ore is mainly of low grade, being high in silica and containing but 30 to 40 percent of iron. Such material cannot be economically sent to the blast furnace direct and is not generally considered an ore. Relatively small deposits of richer ore have been found in bodies ranging in size from 5,000,000 to 25,000,000 tons. It was upon these that the iron industry of Manchuria was founded.

The Japanese have materially improved the situation, both by discovery of more direct furnace ore, and by the working out of the Showa process of beneficiation by which much of the iron in the low grade ores is made available for blast furnace use in the form of sinter. They have also adapted to local use the Krupp-Renn process and so found a way to use the 25 percent not amenable to the Showa process. The result is that a unit of iron in the form of sinter can be delivered to Manchurian furnaces at a cost considerably lower than the same amount can be supplied from Lake Superior to most American blast furnaces. In view of the increased vogue for sinter everywhere, this is a matter of large importance.

No adequate technical data are as yet available to permit us to estimate the effect of the additional overall recovery due to use of the Krupp-Renn furnaces. These various technical improvements, however, have changed the whole picture and assure a large supply of usable ore to Manchurian furnaces regardless of whether the discovery of bodies of natural ore of furnace grade continues.

The Japanese were fortunate, furthermore, in bringing to light not only additional bodies of rich ore in the original mining district, such as the Kungchangling, with an estimated reserve of 24,000,000 tons of high grade, but also ore in the Tungpienta

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region along the Yalu, a wholly new district in which hard red hematite ore of 63 percent iron content and low in silica, phosphorous and sulphur, is present in quantity. This ore is particularly desirable in Manchuria since the coke there available, like the ore previously employed, contains undesirable quantities of silica. The new ores and the new processes place Manchuria in a strong competitive position among world iron and steel producing centers. The abundant raw materials, if backed up with modern plant and effective administration, should permit production of both iron and steel at satisfactory prices. The situation of the country and its transportation facilities favor effective distribution as well as importation of any needed raw materials, such as manganese and chrome ores. Refractory materials are at hand not only in the form of widely distributed limestone and dolomite, but in the magnesite deposits of the Kwantung peninsula which are among the largest in the world and are of high grade. Excellent fire clays are also abundant.

Cement materials and most of the other valuable non-metallics are widely present. No sulphur has been found, but it can be easily imported from Japan which has a considerable surplus. Pyrites and sulphides of the common nonferrous metals, copper, lead and zinc have been found but are little mined. It is still open to question whether large deposits are present. Materials for the manufacture of light metals are present, though in the present state of technological development the aluminous shales could probably not stand the competition of imported bauxite. This same condition will probably be found to obtain as to derivation of petroleum from the oil shale or through synthetic processes from coal. Solar salt production is a growing industry on the Kwantung peninsula; and the Manchurian Chemical Company in the same neighborhood is a well-based, growing industry.

In résumé, it may be stated that Manchuria certainly has the makings of an iron and steel industry of more than local importance and will be able to fabricate the steel into a wide variety of manufactured products. It is in better position than any other district in east Asia; and it may well give stiff competition to the surviving Japanese and Korean furnaces and to any new plants that may be erected in China or eastern Siberia. The raw materials are available, the technology has been worked out. It is the problem of management that remains to challenge the Chinese who are now succeeding to control.

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TRUSTEESHIP ASPIRATIONS

By Sir Robert Holland

THE conception that more advanced Powers have a special duty for the welfare of backward peoples is very old. It has been evolving since the end of the fifteenth century, when Queen Isabella of Spain spoke out on behalf of exploited Indians in Central and South America. In 1783, Edmund Burke, shocked by tales of tyranny and corruption in India, defined the power which British traders had acquired there as a "trust," to be exercised for the welfare of the Indian people. During the past 150 years, that objective, sometimes obscured, has been often reaffirmed, and India is now at the threshold of nationhood.

Britain is supremely indebted to America for the painful lesson of the War of Independence which quickened to birth the new imperial doctrine of moral responsibility, stimulated the abolition of the slave trade, and roused men's consciences to the rights of colonial peoples. The United States again set the banner forward when, in 1900, the Philippine Islands were described as "an unsought trust which should be unselfishly discharged." The first phase of that great undertaking came to an end with the proclamation of the Philippines Republic and the inauguration of a partnership between the two countries, based on treaty.

The mandates system, set up by Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant after the First World War, for the first time imposed external limitation on the sovereign powers of national states holding responsibility for backward peoples under the League. Enthusiasm for the "self-determination" principle, embodied in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, undoubtedly gave much impulse to the establishment of the new system.

The mandates system was not a great success. Attacks were soon launched against the principles on which it was based, and in particular against the idea of self-determination. There were many, however, who held that the system did not go far enough; that noble aims and high ideals for the liberation of slave races had been frustrated at the council table; that the "race equality" principle, valiantly advocated by the Japanese, had been unwarrantably shelved for selfish reasons by the British and American delegates; and that Article 22 of the Covenant, while

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paying lip-service to the rights of colonial peoples, had in fact sanctified with the fiction of mandates an exploitation of those peoples which could only be based upon a theory of racial superiority. Specific charges were later brought against individual Mandatory Powers, alleging that they had improperly maintained or extended their domination and had hoodwinked the Mandates Commission. The Commission itself was assailed as a faulty and ineffective mechanism, designed to guard against relapse in the treatment of backward peoples rather than to stimulate advance, and failing both ways. Those who supported the system claimed, however, that it did in fact operate usefully as a brake on actions of the Mandatory Powers, because they sensed international cognizance of their policies and closer scrutiny of their behavior.

Now a new page has been turned with the organization of the United Nations. Chapter XI of the Charter enumerates the quasi-trustee obligations of member nations which administer non-self-governing territories. This is a momentous declaration of standards. Chapters XII and XIII make provision for the establishment of an international trusteeship system "for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements." The basic objective, in each case, is the promotion of the well-being of the inhabitants of the territories, in accord with the purposes of the United Nations, and, in particular, the furtherance of international peace and security.

A third kind of trusteeship obligation seems to be emerging as a consequence of what is called, in popular phraseology, the "conferring of independence" by a tutelary Power upon its dependency: *e.g.*, the relationship between the United States and the Philippines Republic, and between Britain and Egypt, 'Iraq, Trans-Jordan. It is to be hoped that, at no very distant date, India, Burma and Ceylon may be added to Britain's list. In such cases, the roots of two nations' lives have become intertwined in every field — trade, industry, political thought, culture, religion and general economy. The sponsor Power must accordingly continue to bear a measure of fiduciary responsibility for its former ward, but the "basic objective" applies also to this kind of relationship. The Charter provides remedies for its disregard by a member nation.

The provisions of Chapters XI–XIII of the Charter represent

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an attempt to amend and amplify the Covenant scheme in the light of fuller knowledge and painful experience, and to bring all non-self-governing territories under the aegis of its principles. Full emphasis is given to the doctrine that the obligations of administering Powers are a "sacred trust," a joint concern to all nations, to be discharged with scrupulous respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The wardship of backward peoples is no longer viewed through the rosy mists of imperialistic enterprise but has emerged as a clear-cut and vital responsibility for the Charter family of nations.

Nevertheless, there are snags ahead. Trust problems are sure to come up for scrutiny soon, because highly contentious issues have emerged since the chapters were framed. It may, therefore, be helpful to enumerate the important emendations made by the Charter in the Covenant scheme, and to evaluate the aspirations which underly them.

II

The first emendation is concerned with the ultimate political destiny of non-self-governing and trust territories. Article 22 of the Covenant was commonly interpreted as signifying that independence was the only legitimate goal for the peoples of mandated territories, in conformity with the self-determination idea.

Article 73 of the Charter, which sets up as a general objective "the progressive development of . . . free political institutions" in the case of non-self-governing territories, specifies that such development shall be in accord with "the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." The delegates of the United Nations at San Francisco, after animated discussion, seem to have expressly rejected any reference to "independence" in the Chapter XI declaration.

Article 76 in Chapter XII, dealing with the international trusteeship system, employs the guarded phrase "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement." The decision to eliminate or qualify the use of the word "independence" in Chapters XI–XIII is probably irreversible. It represents a defeat for the extreme pressure groups

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who are convinced that all peoples should have "freedom to be free," by which they seem to mean untrammelled political independence, manhood suffrage under a democratic constitution, and absolute civil and religious liberties.

When the self-determination idea was formulated by President Wilson, it was hailed as a just and wise principle of human action; and it is still widely, and rightly, venerated. But it soon became apparent that there were practical limitations to the application of the principle as a cure for world unrest. President Wilson perhaps thought that he was proposing for European and other countries a doctrine upon which his own country's constitution had been successfully established. Many critics, however, promptly voiced their conviction that his principle repudiated the fundamental concept of American federalism. They contended that, if nationalistic aspirations were thus sanctified, the forces of disintegration would be encouraged, political stability would be undermined, and the essential basis of law and order in a federal state — namely, the responsibility of the controlling power for the preservation of individual freedom — would be weakened. The feeling grew that undiluted self-determination would commit the world to a disastrous experiment, intensifying the nationalism of the nation-state, splintering cultural and linguistic affiliations, and overriding vital strategic and economic considerations. And it soon became clear that the division of territories into nation-states on lines clamored for by racial, political, cultural or other pressure groups would foster world insecurity.

The weakest point of the doctrine is its impracticability: the wine of independence is a heady draft for primitive peoples and unruly groups quite unfitted to posture as sovereign states; and it is as yet impossible to create a supra-national state for the maintenance of law and order. President Wilson himself seems to have recognized this in his later days, for he is reported as having said: "When I gave utterance to those words [that all nations had a right to self-determination], I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day." Fanatical self-determinationists seem to forget that the indispensable prerequisite for the stability of democratic institutions is supremacy of the rule of law; and that "interdependence," not "independence," must be the key to the prosperity and welfare of the world's peoples, until such time as a

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supra-national authority can be brought into being. The doctrine of unbridled self-determination has faded from Chapters XI–XIII of the Charter, but its adherents are not likely to acknowledge defeat, and they can point to the fact that it is still enshrined among the "Purposes of the United Nations" in Article 1, and in Article 55.

III

The second noteworthy emendation of the Covenant scheme is the new objective set for trust territories in Article 76c: "to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The objective finds place also among the "Purposes of the United Nations." The affirmation is, however, qualified in Article 76 by a reminder of the "interdependence" of the peoples of the world. It is also qualified by the dictum in Article 74 that United Nations policy in respect of non-self-governing territories "must be based on the general principle of goodneighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world," and by the security provisos in Articles 82–84 regarding trust territories.

Bitter controversy is sure to arise over the precise significance of the words "without distinction as to race," in the fundamental-freedoms directive. Supporters of out-and-out race equality, of whom there are many in the ranks of self-determinationists, fervently believe that racial intolerance — the instinctive antagonism which people of one group seem to exhibit for another group, or perhaps for any other group — is one of the world's most disruptive forces. They urge, therefore, that it should be banned by world ordinance, and that colonialism — the dominance by advanced peoples over alien backward races — should be eradicated, root and branch. They issue dire warnings that the age of the white man's dominance has passed; that all colored peoples are seething with anger on account of racial discrimination; and that from the ferment a new world war will be born in which the white minority must succumb. "Abdicate," they say, "before it is too late. Renounce racial supremacy and racial intolerance and practise brotherhood in sincerity and humility."

But the facts of the present world must be faced. The Charter's tolerant acknowledgement of the existence of non-self-governing and trust territories is in itself antithetic to the concept of race-

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equality. The age of the white man's ascendancy and his tutelage of colored peoples has not passed in many areas of the globe, and it is bound to continue for many years to come. Its abolition by decree is unimaginable. The chaotic result would tax the powers of a world government fortified with the atomic bomb. The racial involvements on the African continent vividly illustrate this premise. Mr. Cordell Hull, in a broadcast address dated July 23, 1942, stressed the opinion that advances in political freedom must be achieved by each nation primarily through its own effort, and that no nation or group of nations can prescribe the methods or provide the means by which any other nation can accomplish or maintain its own political and economic independence: the pledge of freedom in the Atlantic Charter implies an obligation for each nation to demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government.

Again, the late President Roosevelt, speaking on November 15, 1942, on the subject of a pattern for a global civilization regardless of differences of creed or race, said that it is essential to remember that such a pattern is based on two important factors. The first is that there shall be a period of preparation through the dissemination of education and the recognition and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs; the second is that there shall be a period of training for ultimate independence and sovereignty through the practice of more and more self-government in the various steps leading to complete statehood. Even when a dependency of colored peoples has achieved statehood, it must continue to lean upon some greater Power, probably of the white race, for support and guidance.

But granting that the white man's political dominance cannot, at the moment, be terminated in many countries, the zealot will ask whether the Charter's injunctions about its exercise could not now be supplemented with an ordinance banning race discrimination throughout the world. The answer is that there is not, and probably never will be, a world authority which could enforce such a ban. It is, of course, obvious that physical incongruities, incompatibilities of temperament, idiosyncrasies of speech, and diversities of habits and customs, which are frequently though by no means invariably traceable to racial discordancies, do grievously envenom relations between groups of peoples. This fact has to be taken into serious account in plans for achieving world security. But the diverse characteristics of the world's

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multitudinous races can never be obliterated. The differences among peoples of the earth arise from causes deep-rooted in the origin of mankind. The diverse races have conflicting customs, traditions and personal habits. They have different ideas of right and wrong, they think differently about religion, about women, about the family bond and many other things, and they have different economic standards. There need not be, and should not be, any implication of superiority or inferiority in these differences, but in fact there is, because each race and order of men cherishes an inner pride in the conviction that men of his own kind are endowed with virtues and qualities superior to those of other stocks.

Colored peoples have rivalries and incompatibilities of their own which make for cleavages and ostracism. The Hindu caste system in India is a negation of social equality; Moslems in various countries hold that the gulf between the infidel and the true believer can be bridged only by conversion. In Russia people of many races have considerable equality of cultural life and economic opportunity, yet political power is not vested in any constitutional body, and democratic liberty, even as we know it, is unborn. Dependent peoples, and particularly those who feel themselves treated as racial inferiors, are apt to regard the Soviet social system as an inspiring ideal. But there is small evidence as yet that colored peoples favor Communism as a political experiment. Only one Communist candidate secured election to the Indian Constituent Assembly, out of a total of 296 provincial seats.

Group intolerance is often a highly composite conceit, not rooted merely in pride of ancestry but in many extrinsic relationships. It is heightened by neighborhood conditions which regulate the cultural, religious and social development of a group, favor the growth of national solidarity, and foster a community of language and a special standard of living. All these factors eventually tend to stereotype the physical characteristics, the speech and habits, and even the thoughts of an aggregation of humanity.

Sheer racial or group assertiveness and intolerance, wherever manifested, is worthy of all condemnation, because it is unbrotherly, undemocratic and unchristian. It is unfortunately very prevalent in many countries; but it will not be cured by a commandment. No provision for the enforcement of race equality in every phase of human relations is likely to be written into the

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terms of any trusteeship agreement. The discriminatory legislation against Indians in South Africa, and the problem of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, will probably be brought before the General Assembly of the United Nations, but there is little hope that the Gordian knot will be cut in either case, though ventilation of the issues may help to awaken men's consciences.

It is futile to expect that pious references in the Charter to human rights, and to fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, will bring about any revolutionary change. At the moment, it can only be said that white peoples have got to join hands in earnest with colored peoples, and to cause them to join hands, if world peace and prosperity are to be assured. To that end, we must push forward the process, already begun in some countries (notably in Russia, India and the Philippines Republic) of proscribing by public law race discrimination in specific fields, and of discouraging by common sentiment exhibitions of racial and social intolerance in private life. Discriminatory legislation in the matter of immigration quotas and political and civic rights is particularly hurtful to the pride of colored peoples. They are justifiably convinced that national independence will alone ensure for them the "human rights" enjoyed by citizens of sovereign states. But before the race-equality principle can be elevated into an ordinance by United Nations authority, the public is entitled to demand that its precise meaning and significance shall be made clear, and that the sphere in which it is to operate shall be defined. The sentiment of universal human fellowship, a noble emotion, is in some danger of perversion into a creed which repudiates the order of values among men, a temper which hates hierarchies and distinctions of merit, breeding, rank or character; and which would bring about equality by levelling down. That paves the way for dictatorship.

IV

The third emendation of the Covenant scheme is dictated by the requirements of world security and introduces a change of great importance. Article 22 of the Covenant precluded the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases in mandated territories (Classes B and C), and also banned military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory. Article 84 of the Charter imposes upon the administering authority the duty of ensuring that the trust

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territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security; and authorizes it to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out its security obligations, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of local law and order. The objective, "to further international peace and security," is specifically enjoined as regards both "non-self-governing" and "trusteeship" territories (Articles 73c and 76a). The maintenance of security is stressed again and again as a primary obligation of the responsible Power or Powers in Article 73, Article 82 — which permits of the designation of the whole or any parts of a trust territory as a "strategic area," — and Article 83 — which prescribes that the Security Council shall exercise all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas.

Self-determinationists are likely to regard this change as particularly obnoxious, on the ground that it may postpone indefinitely the attainment of independence by unfree peoples; because the "have" Powers may be expected to interpret security requirements in each case to suit their own convenience and rapacity and race prejudice; and because it seems profoundly immoral to exalt force, instead of democratic consent, as the means of attaining security.

Their opponents will argue, on the other hand, that disturbances in one corner of the world may inflame great nations to war, and that aggression cannot be cured by exhortation, because nation groups are driven to expand by the subconscious instinct for survival — an elemental urge which pays no heed to moral precepts. They will note that the trust system has to be built by the United Nations, not on universal acknowledgment of abstract principles of justice, but on an unstable foundation of power politics, commercial rivalry and political immaturity. And they will point to the events of the past year as reinforcing their contention. Certain non-self-governing countries, notably India, Palestine, Java, Burma, Indo-China and others, in their advance toward nationhood, are experiencing internal troubles which are a potential threat to world security. This is a matter of grave concern, not merely to the individual guardian Powers, but to the United Nations.

Our primary need at present seems to be the maintenance of stable institutions during the painful progress toward world peace. That is why so much emphasis is laid on "security" in

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the trusteeship Chapters, and why, in particular, the proposed strategic areas are to be brought under the direct supervision of the Security Council (subject to the terms of Article 76 regarding "basic objectives"). Utopian visions of universal self-determination are a dangerous guide for students of world affairs, because they distract attention from the invidious but vital task of upholding law and order in lands where freedom and self-government are coming to birth.

V

The fourth emendation of the Covenant scheme concerns the classes of territories to which the trusteeship system may apply. Under Article 22, mandates were to be granted only for "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them." Under Article 77 of the Charter, there are to be three categories — namely, territories now held under mandate; territories detached from enemy states; and territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. But it is to be a "matter for subsequent agreement" which territories in the categories are brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms. It seems very doubtful whether any trusts will, in fact, be created in the third category. Chapter XI makes trust principles applicable to non-self-governing territories, and any change of status ought presumably to have the consent of the dependent people. They might be expected to object.[1]

The terms of trusteeship for each territory are to be agreed upon by "the states directly concerned," including the mandatory Power in cases where the Mandate is held by a member of the United Nations (Article 79), but the agreements have to be approved by the General Assembly (Article 85), except in the case of strategic areas, where approval is reserved to the Security Council (Article 83). There is room for much difference of opinion as to the proper interpretation of the phrase "the states directly concerned." Consider, for instance, the claim which Soviet Russia put forward, but ultimately withdrew, for individual trusteeship for Tripolitania.

There are a few other less important emendations. Under the

[1] *Cf.* K. H. Bailey, "Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An Australian View," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1946.

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Covenant system, members of the Mandates Commission were regarded, by a well-recognized convention, as individuals exercising an independent judgment. The Charter Trusteeship Council, which is to operate under the authority of the General Assembly (Article 85), is to be chosen in rather a complicated manner (Article 86) from among members of the United Nations, and their individual delegates are evidently to act as national representatives.

Article 22 prescribed "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League," in B and C Mandates, and the principle was apparently applied not only to tariffs and investment of private capital but also to immigration. Article 76d of the Charter, ensuring equal treatment for members of the United Nations and their nationals in commercial and other matters, contains qualifying words intended to protect the interests of the dependent peoples. This opens a door to controversy, and it is doubtful what the outcome will be.

The Council is to have two new powers which constitute a marked improvement over the Covenant system. It will have the right to "accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority" (Article 87b); that is to say, petitions need no longer be submitted through the Mandatory Power. And it will have the right of inspection through "periodic visits to the respective trust territories" (Article 87c).

In general, the emphasis placed on "voluntary agreement," as an integral feature of the trusteeship system, seems to reflect a special tenderness for the national sovereignty of the states concerned, and to discount the possibility of direct international administration. Article 81 does, however, contemplate that the organization itself, or a combination of member states, may be the administering authority. This alternative was apparently rejected in 1919, during discussions of the Covenant. A United States representative is reported to have said at the San Francisco Conference that "condominium [of bases conquered by America in the Pacific] can only mean pandemonium." America could not carry out her task of salvaging Japan if General MacArthur's administrative authority were subject to limitations and appeals. The British have learned by painful experience in India that a minority or regency administration in a semi-sovereign Indian state, though subject to general supervision by the paramount Power, must be allowed to function with as little

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interference as possible, if intrigue is to be discouraged and law and order maintained.

In various countries now enjoying sovereign status, and in others likely to achieve it soon, administrative stability and the orderly development of democratic institutions seem jeopardized by local dissensions and deep-seated antagonisms. It is perhaps permissible to speculate (*magnis componere parva*) whether a useful lesson might not be drawn from the method of city government adopted by a great American town, Cincinnati, in order to bar party rivalry from the administration. The nine elected members of the City Council hire, at a large salary, a City Manager who is selected for his administrative ability and his aloofness from politics, and it appears that he conducts the administration effectively and without any noteworthy political hindrance, in spite of the fact that one party organization has a majority in the Council.

The rival parties in an imperilled state might be constrained to decide, either by mutual agreement or under stimulus from the United Nations in the interest of general security, that "management" of the central administrative machine must be entrusted to expert personnel to be provided by a neutral state. The selection of the neutral state, and the terms of management, would be a matter for negotiation with the United Nations organization, which would also have to exercise general powers of supervision. The system would have to be so devised as to give the fullest possible play to democratic institutions, within the limits of managerial requirements.

The United Nations have yet to find the answers to some vital practical questions concerning non-self-governing and trust territories. Which territories, in addition to the old mandates, are to be the subject of trusteeship? How is the "administering authority" to be selected in each case? What are to be the individual terms of each trust agreement? Who is to identify the "states directly concerned," under Article 79? And lastly, how will discord be avoided in deciding the crucial problem whether a given "trust territory" shall be a "strategic area" or not?

Upon the answers to these questions depends the success or failure of the whole system.

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LIGHT ON NAZI FOREIGN POLICY

By DeWitt C. Poole

THIS is not history, but some of the raw material of history. It is the story of Nazi foreign relations as recounted by Germans who had direct parts, frequently principal parts, in the events related. These Germans were interrogated during August to November 1945 by a small group of American officials sent to Germany for the purpose. The present writer, who headed the mission, had served in Germany previously and knew personally in the pre-Nazi days some of those who could now tell parts of the Nazi story. Among the 50 or more interrogated some had been at the very top — Goering, Ribbentrop, von Papen, Schacht. A second and larger category were former officials of the German Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service. Thirdly, a number of military leaders — Keitel, Jodl and others — were questioned on the political and diplomatic aspects of their experiences.

The general disposition among them was to talk freely. Most had been prisoners for some time. Of course, each was making his own case in his own way, but if truth be relative to the individual and the circumstances, there was a rather surprising measure, one felt in the end, of truthful disclosure. When the stories were put together, a coherent tale emerged.

I. THE SPRINGS OF NAZI FOREIGN POLICY (1933–1935)

Impressive confirmation was obtained of the degree to which, in a nation of strong personalities, Hitler dominated every situation. The foreign policy of Germany in the Nazi period, as in other periods, was determined first of all, of course, by geographical position and history: but beyond that was influenced during this period, even more than in the time of Frederick the Great or Bismarck, by the personality of one man.

Every decision setting the course of German external relations from 1933 on was made by Hitler personally, and it was he who set the exact timing of every important action. Success in bringing the weakling Nazi group to power in the face of every obstacle and disappointment during the dozen years which preceded 1933 was apparently a source of unending wonderment to Hitler himself. And it filled him with enduring faith that, now possessed of sovereign power, he could be no less a moulder of fate. His mystic self-assurance gave his régime an arbitrary character probably unsurpassed in history.

Case-hardened Hjalmar Schacht, who helped pull Germany out of the 1923 inflation and continued for 15 years as Germany's financial strong man, testified that his contacts with the Nazi leaders began at the end of 1930. He met Goering at that time, but said he found him "not too impressive." It was during January 1931 that he first met Hitler, at a dinner. He felt at once his "dynamic force;" and he found Hitler's political program as then proclaimed to be "not unreasonable."

Hitler had promised, Schacht observed, to protect the church and to maintain private property. The one really disturbing point to be found in "Mein Kampf" was the insistence upon an aggressive policy toward the east (*Ostpolitik*), but that was conditioned, Schacht pointed out with rather obvious

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dialectic, upon obtaining the coöperation of Great Britain. Schacht and others felt that in view of this qualification what would otherwise be a deterrent to them in supporting Hitler could be disregarded. Hitler's reliance upon British concurrence provided "the greatest protection for the peace-loving." If he could not carry forward this potentially dangerous part of his program without Britain, then all was safe.

With reference to these early days, Schacht asseverated, with a note of defiance in his voice: "I stood for Hitler." By 1938 he was actively plotting against him, he claimed, and independent testimony exists to support the claim: though there was a suggestion that in this Schacht acted out of personal pique.

Joachim Ribbentrop, Hitler's once arrogant Ambassador and Foreign Minister, testified to Hitler's masterfulness as solemnly as if he were recounting a religious experience. We spoke together on the basis of earlier acquaintance. It was impossible to explain, he said, "how it had been with Hitler." Hitler told you what to do, and you did it. "I was not Hitler's Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was just Hitler's diplomat." Years earlier, at the height of Ribbentrop's power, before he had to make an *apologia*, he confessed to Richard Kuehlmann, an earlier Foreign Minister of Germany, that he was no more than "Hitler's loudspeaker."

Even the massive Goering spoke of Hitler's arbitrary decisions as if they were as unquestionable as a turn in the weather. We would talk one day about something, Goering related, and Hitler would agree with us; then suddenly a day or so later Hitler would announce that he had decided something altogether different.

Toward his first Foreign Minister, Constantin von Neurath, a veteran diplomat, Hitler showed some degree of circumspection. To other diplomats he simply issued orders, and Ribbentrop, after he became Foreign Minister, tried to imitate him in this regard. With the military leaders, on the other hand, Hitler felt the need to be persuasive. His method of persuasion, however, was didactic. General Guderian averred that Hitler harbored resentment against anyone whom he felt he had failed to persuade. Generals such as von Fritsch, who gave signs of independence, Hitler put out of the way. In the end he dominated the military hardly less thoroughly than the diplomatic branch. It would be sound, one was left convinced, to interpret Nazi foreign policy in terms of Hitler's personal traits — within, of course, the broader geographical and historical setting.

The climate of Hitler's thinking was military rather than political. This ensued from his life-history and comported in any case with the German tradition. Speaking to military leaders in the great Hall of the Berghof on August 22, 1939, preparatory to the Polish campaign, Hitler expressed squarely the aversion he felt to the bargaining and adjustment which is the heart of democratic politics. England was apparently interested, he observed with scorn, only in a series of "rotten compromises."

Secondly, there were of course marked geographical limitations on Hitler's thinking. "You must never forget," Goering admonished us, "that Hitler thought entirely in continental terms (*ganz Kontinental-orientiert war*)." From this it followed that Russia forced herself insistently into the forefront of his

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mind. The obsession appears throughout "Mein Kampf." It became the more marked as France slipped into ineffectualness. The great sea Power, Britain, was less perceptible to him, and it fitted the configuration of his thoughts that there should be no necessary conflict in that quarter. By the same token, America was remoter still.

Goering took pains to remind us that Hitler had never been out of Germany-Austria until his first official visit to Mussolini in June 1934. For this reason, Goering said, Hitler always had great difficulty in understanding foreign mentalities, the English in particular. The consequences were disastrous.

For example, Hitler seemed to have misapprehended a good deal that Lloyd George said to him during the latter's visit to Berchtesgaden in 1934. Otto Meissner,[1] who interpreted between the two, depicted the atmosphere of the meeting as very cordial. Hitler started off by remarking to Lloyd George how interested he was to meet the man who more than any other individual had defeated Germany in 1914–18. From Goering, who was not present and had his account from Hitler, we learned that Hitler was forever afterward impressed by something he understood Lloyd George to say — namely, that if Germany had only held on a little longer in 1918, Great Britain would have collapsed; also that the provisioning of American troops in France became so difficult that Lloyd George was on the point of recommending that they be shipped home again. Goering testified that these and similar remarks by Lloyd George — which would seem at the most to have been only sporting suggestions by a somewhat complacent victor — assumed an abiding importance in Hitler's mind. One result was to help convince him that the United States would not intervene seriously in any new war which might break out in Europe.

Hitler's wish for a working understanding with Great Britain stands out clearly enough in "Mein Kampf." Von Neurath, Ribbentrop, Goering, Meissner — all said again that such an understanding constituted item No. 1 in Hitler's program. And that was true as far as it went, but the understanding with Britain was to rest on a common enmity to Russia. Russia was at every turn the key to Hitler's thinking. Westward he felt a yokel's uncertainty, in the presence of the French with their culture and the English with their tradition of the gentleman. Eastward, he could see only *Untermenschen* and Bolsheviks and raw wealth to complement Germany's technical achievement. It was in the east that he could blot out the sense of inferiority left by World War I and unbridle the exuberant brutality of his followers.

Goering explained that the idea was to go along with England (*mit England zu gehen*) and to convince England that Russia, being obviously the enemy of Germany, was also the enemy of Great Britain. Goering recalled that during 1933–35 he was always seeing "British lords" and talking with them in this sense. It was Hitler's idea, as von Neurath put it, to trade supremacy for Britain on the seas against a free hand for Germany in the east.

Hitler even made an offer of armed help to Britain in case of need — a matter to which Ribbentrop and Goering as well as Neurath testified. Help against whom, it was asked? Yes, exactly whom? Neurath acknowledged with a smile. Goering said he told Hitler the offer would have more sense if the

[1] Chief of the Reichs Chancellery from Ebert to Hitler (1919–45), and especially close to von Hindenburg.

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British Empire were really threatened from some direction. Hitler retorted that the Empire *was* threatened; perhaps not Russia directly, but Communism, was threatening India.

Goering insisted that, in consultation with him, Hitler had clarified his basic position toward both Britain and France long before either Hitler or Goering even knew that Ribbentrop existed. However, when he came to power in 1933, Hitler, conscious of his own deficiencies westward, readily accepted Ribbentrop's help. Here was a man with excellent connections in both England and France apparently, with know-how regarding those countries, and he was not a professional diplomat. He seemed made to order. Indeed, Ribbentrop looked good at first to the whole Nazi crowd; they had yet to find out, Goering sneered, that he knew France only through champagne and England through whiskey. The Nazis esteemed the Naval Agreement which Ribbentrop signed with Great Britain in 1935 a splendid achievement, and Ribbentrop's reputation came to a high point. Goering said the Nazis would have settled for less than 35 percent; the important thing was that the shackles of Versailles had now been broken and the armament situation could be remade.

After 1935 the decline toward war set in. Ribbentrop made a mess of things in London, Goering went on, and Hitler himself remained unable to understand the English and their way of political thinking. He was tremendously surprised by the English reaction to the Rhineland occupation, which on the whole was severe, even though a few in England concurred in what Germany had done.

To the very end Hitler could never comprehend, it seemed, why a robber's pact could not be effected with the British. Ribbentrop understood. "The main reason why this friendship (between Germany and Great Britain) did not come about," he testified, "was the British idea of the balance of power." Ribbentrop explained that the Fuehrer thought the English theory of the balance of power was old-fashioned. Hitler kept pointing out that if Britain would only look to the east she would then for her own protection be glad to have "a solid Germany" — as Ribbentrop put it, a very much stronger Germany as a new balance of power in Europe.

It would seem especially desirable for the British, Ribbentrop proceeded, to have a Germany whose vital problems were solved and which was prepared to afford Britain security in all respects, territorial as well as in the field of armaments. The Naval Agreement had already been reached; there were other things which Germany could offer Britain — the integrity of the Low Countries and France, with the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine. Thirdly, Hitler was ready to offer Great Britain, as a further element in an alliance, coöperation by a considerable part of the German fleet in case the Empire had to defend itself. In the colonial field the Fuehrer was "absolutely willing" to renounce a colonial policy; he wanted only to have back one or two of the old German colonies for "raw material purposes."

Over against this, said Ribbentrop, was the British view of the balance of power. He wouldn't say all in Britain, but certainly a great number, felt that Nazi Germany, with Austria and the Sudetenland added, was getting too strong and possibly was endangering the old English theory of the balance of power. The English thought they must oppose this aggrandizement, while the Fuehrer felt that England must understand his point of view and act accord-

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ingly. "I, on the other hand (Ribbentrop asserted) always pointed out to the Fuehrer that the British would not tolerate such a strong Germany as the Fuehrer imagined, but would, at the moment when they thought the balance of power was shifting, go against Germany, and at the opportune moment even go as far as war." In this Ribbentrop lied, as will be recorded presently.

Though it ran quite counter to popular feeling in Germany, Hitler was from the beginning stirred by the idea of friendship and collaboration with Poland. Pilsudski's known anti-Russian sympathies beckoned on, and Hitler always felt relatively at ease in dealing with another dictator. Herbert von Dirksen, German Ambassador at Moscow from 1928 to 1933, told of an interview he had with Hitler in the spring of 1933, when he was home on leave. Hitler walked to the window of the *Reichskanzlei*, looked out and said more to himself than to Dirksen: "If only we could come to terms with Poland — it would be possible with Pilsudski." Dirksen said he answered: "*Mein Fuehrer*, the price of any lasting settlement with Poland would be Danzig and the Corridor, and German opinion would never put up with that."

It was Dirksen's understanding that Pilsudski's first impulse in 1933 was to crush National Socialism in the bud, if possible; but he could obtain no encouragement when he sounded out France on coöperative action. So Pilsudski said to himself that he would have to get on with National Socialism. That led to the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934.

When Goering talked with us about relations with Poland, he said that at the time of the signing of the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact he was directly charged (*beauftragt*) by Hitler to foster friendship with Poland; so he cultivated the Polish Ambassador, Lipski (legations having been reciprocally raised to embassies), and there were close contacts also with Pilsudski. When Pilsudski died, Goering himself represented Germany at the funeral. While Pilsudski lived, Goering talked with him about building an anti-Russian bloc, and later he talked in the same sense with Beck. Hitler had told Goering that he wanted a strong Poland, and Goering was convinced that Hitler meant this seriously.

There was a bit of a rift in 1936 when Poland, without success, invited France to take joint action with her against the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. But later Poland made no trouble about the Austrian *Anschluss*. Goering was in Poland during February 1938, and Beck took rather an amusing way of apprising him that Poland would keep hands off. As he and Goering walked arm in arm together after dinner, they came to a picture of the relief of Vienna by the Polish troops under Sobieski in 1683. Said Beck to Goering: "Don't worry — this incident will not recur."

The first really serious rift came with the Munich Conference. The Poles felt their prestige was damaged by not being included in the Conference, Goering alleged; and from then on things went badly.

Asked when Hitler made up his mind to deal with the Polish situation decisively, Goering said it was in April 1939, so far as he knew. Goering was just back from a trip to San Remo. Suddenly at the dinner table Hitler announced that he had made up his mind to settle the Danzig-Corridor business. He was determined to take military measures, if other means failed. Goering said he felt rather aghast, since he was convinced the western Powers would inter-

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vene. Hitler answered to his expostulations that he had prepared other situations skillfully and that he would do the same this time. Goering admonished him that he was moving too fast.

Now about German relations with Soviet Russia. Until 1932 or thereabouts relations had been excellent between the "two outcasts of Versailles." In the years following the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo there were detailed reports that the German and Russian military were secretly engaging, within Russia, in joint research and exercises in the military aviation and tank warfare which were forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. But the estrangement between Germany and the U.S.S.R. began to make itself felt in 1932, before the Nazis came to power, according to a former German diplomat who was close to the matter. This witness observed that the Soviets had about completed their armament program. They had become nationally self-conscious again, and were seeking to regain the territorial possessions and spheres of influence in the Baltic and the Balkans which had been lost by the Russian defeat in World War I. The "Russian problem" was felt to have become once more as overriding and menacing as it had been during Bismarck's chancellorship; but Bismarck's successors of 1933–45, it was observed, were not equal to the situation and brought to destruction the edifice which the Iron Chancellor had built up.

Japan, of course, plays a large part in the Russian story. Brockdorff-Rantzau had dominated German policy toward Russia, but in 1928 death removed this strong diplomatic personality from the embassy in Moscow. His successor was Herbert von Dirksen, already mentioned. Dirksen had been Director of the Eastern Department (*Ostabteilung*) in the Foreign Office and was later Ambassador in Tokyo and then in London. Dirksen was transferred from Moscow to Tokyo in October 1933 in the ordinary course of diplomatic shifts, and while in Berlin en route he spoke with both Hitler and Ribbentrop. Neither, he said, had any special observations to make on German policy toward Japan, but he talked also with the Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg, and Blomberg hinted that it was Hitler's intention to endeavor to find in Japan a substitute for Russia, especially in so far as military matters were concerned, since the German estrangement with Russia was developing faster and faster.

Upon Dirksen's official departure from Moscow the Russians had given him a big dinner. It was jovial, Dirksen told us. "We had plenty to drink," he said, "and I took the occasion to speak a word of friendly warning. I remarked as best I could in my rather inadequate Russian that to the extent Russian policy moved toward friendship and coöperation with Great Britain and France and the west generally, Moscow could be sure that German policy would move toward coöperation with Japan, and also with Poland. I do not know how much attention was paid to my remark. Litvinov was not there. He was away in Turkey. Some three months later I had a letter from him in which he spoke warmly about my service in Moscow as German Ambassador and my reliability and frankness."

Dirksen said that German-Japanese relations at the time of his arrival in Tokyo (1933) were friendly — not more. The first aim of Japanese policy toward Germany in this period was to bring Germany into closer contact with the newly-created empire of Manchukuo. The Foreign Minister promptly

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invited Dirksen to take a trip around Manchukuo, but the German Foreign Office (it is interesting to note in view of impending events) said no, desiring to avoid any reason for suspicion on China's part. However, not long afterward a German-Japanese and a German-Manchurian commercial agreement were signed and the effect was a very satisfactory triangular trade-balance among the three countries.

Meanwhile, reminiscent of speculative enterprises by a Russian Czarist clique in Manchuria and Korea on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, some Nazi leaders had organized the *Deutsch Manchurier Gesellschaft* and were seeking private gain in the new empire. Goering was a principal figure in this buccaneering enterprise, and another was Wilhelm Keppler, a strong Party man who had been introduced into the Economic Section of the Foreign Office. There was also a place for Goering's brother-in-law, Riegeler.

Progress in military relations between Germany and Japan was marked by the arrival of a secret German military mission in Japan during 1935. Dirksen explained that the German Navy desired to build an airplane carrier but lacked necessary technical information. The Germans could hardly turn to Great Britain or the United States for advice. So for the first time the Japanese Navy, which had always been pro-British in its leanings, in contrast to the pro-German trend of the Army, proved helpful to the Germans. The mission was allowed to go aboard a Japanese airplane carrier, to fly Japanese planes, and so on.

Dirksen said it was toward the end of 1935 that first feelers were put out toward the conclusion of a political pact between Germany and Japan. He was not sure whether the idea was broached initially by Hitler and Ribbentrop or by Oshima, the Military Attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. Anyhow, he said, a military pact pointed against the Soviet Union was quickly agreed upon. After quitting the League and invading Manchuria, Japan had become isolated, he observed, and relations with Russia were going from bad to worse, despite the agreement on Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway and the consequent halting of the Russian advances through Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. That Germany must welcome an ally on the other side of the Soviet Union, now that the "policy of Rapallo" had been replaced by an estrangement bordering on enmity, was to Dirksen self-evident.

The methods used by the Germans in negotiating what came to be known as the Anti-Comintern Pact illustrated brilliantly the new ways imparted to the conduct of German diplomacy following the advent of the Nazis. The negotiations were carried on in Berlin by the *Buero Ribbentrop* and were kept strictly secret from the Foreign Office. Dirksen said he was currently informed by his military attaché and subsequent successor in the Tokyo embassy, General Eugen Ott, who in turn had his information from the Japanese General Staff.

The actual negotiator on behalf of the *Buero Ribbentrop* was a certain von Raumer, a veteran of World War I, a familiar business figure in Berlin in the '20s, and of course a Party man. It was Raumer who invented the name "Anti-Comintern Pact." The matter of a name had proved difficult. To call the treaty a "non-aggression pact" was inappropriate in view of the wide geographical separation of the two countries. Raumer bethought himself of a declaration which had been made by the Soviet Foreign Office to Britain or France

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after a complaint alleging unlawful activities by the Comintern. The Russian note explained that the Comintern was an organization entirely independent of the Soviet Government, which could in no way assume any responsibility for its activities. Therefore, it was thought to forestall complaints on the part of Moscow by denominating the new treaty "ideological" and baptizing it "Anti-Comintern Pact."

Meanwhile the German Foreign Office and some of the military were pursuing a very positive policy of coöperation with China, and such a course was favored by public feeling in Germany. A German military mission, which had been invited to China by Chiang Kai-shek, was organizing and training a Chinese army. The outbreak of war between Japan and China in July 1937 "placed Germany in a very awkward situation," Dirksen said. Attempts at mediation failed and the war went on, with German officers taking a pretty active part on the Chinese side. It was not until April 1938 that Hitler ordered the recall of the German military mission from China.

The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed and all but its secret addendum published at the end of November 1936. Dirksen had come to Germany on leave in the middle of the year. Reporting at the Foreign Office, he found the Foreign Minister, Neurath, and the Secretary of State, von Buelow (who died a month later and was replaced by von Weizsaecker), "very skeptical and antagonistic" to a political liaison with Japan. They appeared to be in no way informed about the Ribbentrop-Oshima negotiations.

Dirksen called on Ribbentrop, then operating through the *Buero Ribbentrop*. Following some distrustful reticence at the start, Ribbentrop warmed up and talked about the pending pact. Dirksen said that details he did not hear from Ribbentrop he learned from the Japanese Ambassador, Mushakoji. Later on he returned to the Foreign Office and gave a full report. The information was gratefully received because it was all quite new to those formally charged with the conduct of Germany's foreign relations. In July Dirksen talked with Hitler and gained the impression that he attached great importance to the conclusion of the treaty with Japan.

Concurrently with the treaty, there was signed, on November 25, 1936, a secret addendum (*geheimes Zusatzabkommen*). It was an extraordinarily well kept secret. Hitler's interpreter, Paul Schmidt, told us he had never heard of it, and when the existence of a secret addendum was mentioned during our interrogation of Goering at Nuremberg, the latter started with unmistakably genuine surprise and annoyance. Just like that fellow Ribbentrop, he exclaimed, to hold out on me; he was always doing that. With rapt interest Goering listened while the substance of the secret addendum was recited to him.

Dirksen was among the few apprised, but he had heard only of one of the two stipulations — the only one which ever became operative. He was told simply that the two parties had promised to give notice reciprocally of all important pending measures in the foreign field. He recalled that, when the German-Soviet Treaty of August 23, 1939, was about to be concluded, Hitler and Ribbentrop failed, nonetheless, to give notice beforehand of their plans to Japan, and that the signing of that Treaty caught the Japanese Government wholly unprepared. The Japanese Government had become extremely excited about the matter and protested publicly that Germany had abandoned the

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pro-Japanese policy inaugurated by the Anti-Comintern Pact. Indeed, the cabinet resigned, and it was a long time before Japanese apprehensions could be alleviated and a full alliance concluded by the so-called Three Power Treaty (Germany-Japan-Italy) of September 27, 1940.

The obligation of the secret addendum was more precisely apt than Dirksen realized. It read, in translation from the German:

> During the continuation of this agreement the High Contracting States will not, without reciprocal concurrence, conclude any sort of political treaties with the U.S.S.R. which are not in keeping with the spirit of this agreement.

This writer interrogated Ribbentrop at Nuremberg and pressed him to admit — which he was unwilling to do — that the Anti-Comintern Pact was only ostensibly "ideological" and that in fact it was a political-military alliance, or something near to that, against Soviet Russia. Only later was there an opportunity to see at Marburg, in the captured archives of the German Foreign Office, the signed original of the secret addendum. In addition to the article just quoted, which was Article II, was this precedent article, Article I (translated from the German):

> Should either of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or an unprovoked threat of attack by the U.S.S.R., the other High Contracting State engages itself to enter upon no measures of a kind which would have the effect of relieving (*entlasten*) the position of the U.S.S.R.
>
> Should the case indicated in the foregoing paragraph arise, the High Contracting States will immediately consult on what measures to take for the safeguard of their common interests.

II. THE YEARS OF TRIUMPH: 1936–40

In 1935 Germany reintroduced conscription and Goering announced the formation of an air force. In response, the Pact of Mutual Consultation between France and the Soviet Union was stepped up to a Pact of Mutual Assistance, and the Soviet Union entered a similar pact with Czechoslovakia, which to the Germans seemed to bring the Russian air force within an hour of Berlin. In August 1936 the Soviets lowered their conscription age from 21 to 19 years. Germany countered by doubling its period of service. In September of the same year Germany announced the Four Year Plan, and Hitler in a public speech cast covetous eyes at the Ukraine. The professionals at the Foreign Office, we heard, saw in these events serious warning; but once more the Party leaders only stiffened their attitude and declared they were not to be intimidated. For the Nazis, these were the triumphant years. By the end of 1936 the Rhineland had been reoccupied, and under the guise of the Anti-Comintern Pact something approaching an alliance had been concluded with Japan, specifically against the Soviet Union. The Axis had been built with Fascist Italy; and German as well as Italian arms and men were tried out in Spain.

When we asked von Neurath when Hitler definitely decided on war, he answered simply, "1937." We were unsuccessful in obtaining any real enlargement of the answer. The old man, who seemed that day a bit senile but gave this answer very firmly, may have been enunciating a general or intuitive impression. Perhaps he remembered that in 1937 Hitler remarked to a high

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official in the Ministry of Agriculture (as we had already heard from others) that he would have to have "a little war in the west and a big war in the east." The prognostication of another two-front war, despite all that Hitler had written on the subject in "Mein Kampf," brought deep perturbation to the thoughtful.

Very likely Neurath also had in mind a meeting with the Fuehrer on November 5, 1937. Also in attendance had been von Blomberg, von Fritsch, Raeder and Goering. The Fuehrer had at that time offered as "his last will and testament" the idea that Germany must act to obtain "living space" not later than 1943–45. After that Germany would have lost much of its military advantage. Should France become immobilized by internal crisis or war with another state, Hitler laid it down that that would be the time for action against Czechoslovakia. Conquest of Czechoslovakia and of Austria was needed for the improvement of Germany's military-political position. Probably England and France had already written off Czechoslovakia, the Fuehrer thought. The dates for the German attacks on Czechoslovakia and Austria must depend on the date of the Italian-English-French conflict which appeared as a possibility for the summer of 1938. After listening to Hitler in this vein Goering opined that commitments must be reduced in Spain. Hitler agreed in principle. Von Fritsch was to continue during the winter a study of operations against Czechoslovakia, with special regard to military reduction of the Czechoslovak system of fortifications.

To understand the German national response to the Nazi aggression as it took definite form in this period, it is necessary to turn back and dissect the political Germany of 1932 into (a) the masses, from whom issued the political ground swell; and (b) two very small watches near the helm of the ship of state — the old watch and the new. For the emotional masses, Hitler was an emotional gratification which very soon produced excellent practical results as well. For the old watch — the more rational small circle who governed before Hitler took over — Hitler was a gamble.

One of the strongest impressions left by talking with a good number of those most directly responsible for the coup d'état — it was hardly less — of January 30, 1933, was this idea of Hitler as a gamble. Bruening, "the best of Germans," had failed, said Meissner, who played a decisive rôle. Why not take a chance on this astounding demagogue? The emotional masses were ready. The rank-and-file of the most numerous and highly organized Communist Party outside Russia clambered on to the Hitler band wagon without a quiver. It must have shocked the Comintern deeply.

No evidence has been accumulated to suggest that the masses experienced any doubt of the wisdom of their choice before the outbreak of war in September 1939; and Goebbels appears to have played to a responsive audience until almost the end. On the other hand, the more perceptive and rational élite began a good deal earlier, naturally, to wonder if they had not taken a pretty long shot. By 1938, some at least had been overtaken by disillusionment. At the most rational point of all, the Foreign Office, some skepticism had held up its head from the beginning.

The presence of disaffection and turmoil of spirit in the army was attested by the Blomberg and Fritsch scandals in 1938 and Hitler's assumption in this

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year of the supreme command for himself. Credible evidence was forthcoming of conspiracy against Hitler from 1938 on, as the imminence of another European war spread dismay and anger; but apparently resolution always fell short. There was always an "if." This or that always happened at the critical moment to forestall or excuse positive action. The swift train of Hitler's successes was overwhelming and rendered him unassailable. All was ready for putting him aside, we were informed, on the eve of the Munich Conference. The conspirators blamed Neville Chamberlain's appeasement for their failure.

Short of conspiracy, others of the more rational élite who had helped to place Hitler in power were increasingly frightened now by the speed with which Hitler plunged on. The unstable Ribbentrop replaced the seasoned Neurath at the Foreign Office. Following the successful achievement of *Anschluss*, Hans Dieckhoff, newly appointed Ambassador to the United States, observed to Ribbentrop (he related) that a man like Bismarck would wait many years to consolidate his position before taking further steps. Ribbentrop answered: "Then you have no conception of the dynamics of National Socialism."

On the plane of actual events, one bold adventure was seen to tread close upon another, with nothing becoming anywhere near certain until a moment before it actually happened. State action had become, in short, no more than uncontrolled individual action of an especially nervous and fitful sort. The only way to keep calm was to trust implicitly in Hitler, and that was a strain even for Goering, at least as Goering told his story in the Nuremberg prison.

At the period now in question the Nazis had three objectives, Goering said to us in retrospect: 1, Austria; 2, the Sudetenland; and 3, a solution of the Danzig-Corridor situation. Goering observed that the outcome might well have been different if Hitler could have been led to declare publicly and promptly, as Goering sought to have him do, that these were the essential requirements that Nazi Germany proposed to satisfy, and at the same time to make clear an intention to reach solutions, if possible, by traditional diplomatic methods. However, Goering continued in a tone of regret, it was Hitler's habit, ingrained by internal successes in revolutionary days, to concentrate upon one point at a time and to exclude all other matters from consideration or action, and this practice he carried over into the international field. Instead of the orderly development of a program, crisis followed crisis.

There was apparently little chance of Hitler and the British leaders understanding each other in any circumstance. When Lord Halifax met Hitler at Berchtesgaden shortly before the Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia, he spoke as a churchgoer — according to the interpreter, Paul Schmidt — and Hitler as a racial propagandist. The meeting broke up in a strained atmosphere. After Halifax returned to London, Goering was sent to him to ease the situation, if possible.

Chamberlain's meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden September 15, 1938, went badly for the same reasons, again according to the interpreter, Schmidt. It was Schmidt's observation that the old-line British conservative, lacking diplomatic skill, inevitably clashed with the National Socialist revolutionary, who at the other extreme had no experience with international problems. The Foreign Office had no advance knowledge of this meeting. The meeting

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at Godesberg, on September 22, was arranged through normal diplomatic channels. Ribbentrop was present. The interpreter Schmidt felt that it did not go any better.

A detailed account which Schmidt gave us of the Munich Conference confirmed likewise the absence of any real meeting of minds. That, however, was seen only in retrospect. At the time, Schmidt said, the German Foreign Office group rejoiced, feeling that they had made their contribution to the salvation of world peace. For Schmidt personally it was the happiest moment of his life. Next morning Chamberlain drove alone with Schmidt about the city of Munich. The demonstrations of respect and gratitude which the people paid to Chamberlain whenever he was recognized stirred resentment among the Nazi leaders. When they went to Hitler's apartment, Chamberlain produced his draft of a pledge — which he so prized on returning to England — of mutual consultation on problems disturbing the peace of Europe. Hitler signed the document without objection but without noticeable enthusiasm. He had no idea of keeping it.

Munich brought the long-developing tension in German-Russian relations to extreme crisis; but it was plain to officials in the German Foreign Office that deterioration had occurred simultaneously in relations between Moscow and London and Paris. The Foreign Office felt that the Kremlin was confronted with a problem. Were the western Powers ready and in a position to provide an effective counterbalance against the sharp increase of German power, especially after the absorption (March 1939) of Bohemia and Moravia? Might it not serve Soviet interests better if an understanding, even though only a temporary one, could be worked out with Germany?

After March 1939 it became ever clearer that Hitler intended to use force against Poland if necessary. This being so, it seemed to the German Foreign Office that the community of interest between Russia and Germany in the Polish question must be a more compelling consideration in Moscow than the prospect of having Russian forces move to the rescue of Poland, a neighbor for whom the Soviet leadership cherished, according to the Germans, the deepest political distrust. The Foreign Office believed, moreover, that Moscow had never given up the idea of recovering for Russia Poland's eastern reaches. Hitler on his side looked upon any solution of the Polish problem which operated against Russia as difficult and dangerous.

The earliest definite sign of a reconciliation between Germany and Soviet Russia, following the estrangement of 1932 and subsequently, occurred in the autumn of 1938, when the two Governments formally agreed to reduce to tolerable proportions the attacks against each current in the public press of the other. The Germans saw a second and clearer sign when, in the spring of 1939, Stalin in a public address asserted than even violent contradiction in outlook and governmental forms need not constitute an obstacle to practical coöperation between two states having common interests in concrete matters, and Moscow let Berlin know informally (the Germans said) that this utterance was spoken with Germany particularly in mind.

Early in May the Germans took heart also from the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov as Foreign Minister. The lack of results from British negotiations with Russia was noted. Word came from Russian friends of Stalin's distrust of

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British intentions and dislike of the hesitant manner in which the negotiations with Russia were being carried on by the western Powers.

Astachov, Russian representative in trade negotiations then in progress with Germany, was said to be doing his best to press toward political talks. Hitler, who had first given orders to avoid any such development, now grew fearful that the negotiations in Moscow with the British and French might reach a positive result and that Russia would in consequence come to the help of Poland in the case of a German attack. He quickly decided to forestall such a development by a very far-reaching offer to the Soviet Union. He would recognize Russian rights from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Neurath recalled that he met Hitler at Bayreuth early in August. What would he think, Hitler asked him suddenly, of coming to terms with Russia? Neurath answered that for years he had been advocating that very course. Hitler then shook his head and spoke of worry about the effect on the Party. Neurath replied that Hitler knew perfectly well that he could do what he pleased with the Party.

When, on Hitler's instructions, Ambassador Schulenburg proposed to Molotov that Ribbentrop should visit Moscow, Molotov hesitated (according to the German account) and spoke of the negotiations already in progress with the British and French. Hitler then sent a personal message to Stalin through Schulenburg. It contained his sweeping offer.

Goering recalled that they were all on tenterhooks at Berchtesgaden at this time. About three o'clock one morning he was aroused from sleep by the telephone beside his bed. It was Hitler, much worried because, though some days had gone by, there was still no answer from Stalin. It was going to be embarrassing, Hitler grumbled, if Stalin rebuffed them. He was disposed to blame Goering for having concurred in the initiative. Half an hour later, Goering was just slipping back to sleep. Again went the telephone, and at the end of the line a jubilant Hitler. Stalin's acceptance had just come in.

Ribbentrop and his staff landed at Moscow August 23, in a state of uneasiness. They did not know how they would be received or what specific demands the Russians might put forward. It was related that the official reception by Molotov's deputy, Potemkin, was formally correct but lacked all warmth. No guard of honor was in sight, though one was usual on such occasions.

Ribbentrop had been wondering if he would see Stalin at all. Protocol-wise it was not necessary, since Stalin was not at that time an official of the Soviet Union. At four that afternoon, upon Russian invitation, Ribbentrop and his staff went to the Kremlin. In Molotov's study Ribbentrop was elated to find himself face to face with Stalin. Stalin led the negotiations on the Russian side with Molotov assisting, according to the German story. Agreement was quickly reached. The papers were signed in the early morning of August 24, but were dated August 23.

On September 3 the British Embassy in Berlin phoned to the Foreign Office for an appointment. Ribbentrop, sensing something disagreeable, nominated Paul Schmidt to receive from Nevile Henderson what turned out to be the British ultimatum. Schmidt at once carried the note to Hitler and Ribbentrop. He translated the contents. Hitler's first words were a dismayed: "What are we going to do now?" Then he collected himself: "In that case I must talk to the

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military people." Schmidt was dismissed. Ribbentrop had said nothing. We heard that earlier that year he had threatened personally to shoot anyone in the Foreign Office who might suggest that the British would fight.

Poland having been disposed of in 18 days, Ribbentrop, rather reluctantly, feeling two visits in succession *infra dig*, again flew to Moscow. This time there was a guard of honor at the airport. The new frontier between Germany and Russia was drawn with a thick red pencil — partly by Stalin himself — on a map which was then signed by him and Ribbentrop. The treaty included a mutual obligation to give advance notice of any important action in the foreign field. This was soon to be a basis of complaint.

For the present, however, good relations between the two countries were felt by the Germans to be dimmed only by Russia's war on Finland. Sentiment in Germany was favorable to the Finns, and the Russians were ready to believe that the Germans were helping the Finns with arms.

During the winter of 1939–40 trade exchanges between Germany and Russia were negotiated in Moscow, with Karl Ritter, long in charge of trade treaties at the German Foreign Office, leading for the Germans. The course of these negotiations, Ritter recounted, made it seem unlikely to him that Hitler could have made up his mind to fight Russia as early as the summer of 1940 (as we heard from the military). Stalin for his part contemplated coöperation with Germany for an indefinite time, Ritter believed. In support of his views Ritter told how Hitler personally approved deliveries to Russia during the first half of 1940 of heavy machine tools, airplanes, coast guns, battleship turrets, a Krupp process for hardening metals, and even a battery of the best German flak artillery.

Ritter felt that he got on well with Stalin. One day, he told us, the usually reticent Russian opened up with a general exposé of his country's economic position. In the course of this, the Russian leader said, according to Ritter's report: We no longer need help from you or America in this field or that (mentioning specifically heavy industry, medium and small electrical manufacture, certain branches of chemicals, and so on). We do, however, still require technical help in battleship construction. The Tsar's admirals were no good. *My* admirals have slept *entirely*. We also need heavy machine tools and mining equipment, big electrical assemblies, synthetic processes, etc. Stalin concluded with what Ritter deemed a significant statement: If we — Russia and Germany — continue to work together like this for four or five years, we (Russia) will be able to produce enough raw materials to supply two Germanys.

General Warlimont related that concrete plans for offensive war on France began to be made only after Poland had been overrun. The Army leaders, estimating the French defenses formidable and the state of German preparation not too good, stalled Hitler when he pushed for a winter campaign. The attack which was finally delivered May 10, and the strategy of that attack (weight on the center instead of on the right flank), ensued from Hitler's personal decisions in the face of not a little military opposition. At Compiègne, as a result, Hitler emerged triumphant not only over Germany's hereditary foe but hardly less so over his own generals.

Even so, Hitler appears to have been unable to overcome the hesitancy which beset him when problems involved the British or the French. Later on,

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according to Warlimont, conversations in military circles in Germany frequently turned to the question of the cross-Channel invasion. Why did Hitler not press on against Britain? It was Warlimont's answer that at the time of the French capitulation Hitler was completely dominated by the idea of an early peace with Britain. He was willing, therefore, to approve only such long-term military preparations as could be undertaken without attracting too much attention. It was generally believed in military quarters, according to Warlimont, that shortly before Hitler's Reichstag speech of July 19 the British were approached on the subject of peace and returned a decided negative; this influenced the tone of Hitler's public offer.

It appears also that Hitler found himself unprepared in mind to press the victory over France through to its full consequences. General Guderian told us that he for one was convinced that the creation of an unoccupied zone in southern France was a serious mistake. In his judgment, the only proper course would have been to continue to the Mediterranean and from there move immediately upon French North Africa, at the same time inducing the Italians to advance upon Egypt. If this course had been pursued, General Guderian thought that the British might have considered a reasonable peace proposal. Hitler's offer of peace through a Reichstag speech seemed to him most inept.

When we talked to Goering he was still bubbling with his own ideas about the strategy which ought to have been followed in this fateful summer of 1940. With France defeated, the next step plainly was to put out England. Goering urged Hitler to move against Gibraltar. With its tiny airfield, Gibraltar was highly vulnerable. With Gibraltar in hand, Suez could have been taken more or less at leisure. Meanwhile the Germans would strike quickly south and take Dakar. From there, the Mediterranean being closed, they could strangle shipping coming around the Cape. If the United States showed readiness to act, Germany would at once move into the Azores, said Goering.

Hitler's unreadiness to accept this plan left Goering still, after five years, almost childishly rueful. That and Hitler's wrong-headed determination to attack Russia had ended him and the others up in Nuremberg. Apparently Hitler toyed with Goering's plan and adumbrated it to Franco when the two met at Hendaye in October 1940. Hitler told Goering afterwards that he desisted, however, as soon as Franco intimated that his price for a German march across Spain would be French Morocco. Just previously, at Montoire, Hitler had assured Pétain and Laval that the French colonial empire would be kept intact.

Hitler's mind was on Russia. He was thinking of his "big war in the east." Generals Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont concurred in testifying to a meeting at the Berghof July 29, 1940, at which Hitler announced his intention to turn his arms against Russia now. He was disturbed by intelligence reports of concentrations of Russian troops on Germany's eastern frontier. The Russian front had been nearly denuded during the French campaign — only five to eight German divisions there. It was felt that Stalin had been frightened by Hitler's swift victory in France. Hitler said flatly, according to Jodl, that an eventual showdown with Russia was inevitable and that probably it would be wisest to include it in the present war.

When Jodl conveyed this information to his colleagues on the General

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Staff, there was open consternation. Keitel succeeded in persuading Hitler that a German offensive against Russia during 1940 was simply impossible. The weeks went by, the Russian offensive which Hitler feared against Germany did not occur, and Hitler quieted down; but he continued to brood on the matter and the unfavorable temper of talks with Molotov in November persuaded him to action.

Goering said he remembered very precisely that Hitler said to him in August 1939: "I am determined to work with Russia for a long time." When we asked Goering what had changed Hitler's mind within so short a period, he answered that first of all there was Finland. The Russian attack on Finland had certainly had a very marked psychological effect upon the course of Hitler's policy. Then came the Russian troop concentrations along the German border after the collapse of France.

Goering claimed that all along he counseled Hitler to patience. He alleged that his information persuaded him that Stalin could not and would not attack Germany before 1943. "Let us keep the peace as long as possible," Goering said he told Hitler; and to this Hitler answered: "The Soviet Union will keep the peace only so long as it chooses to do so. If our position in the west becomes difficult, we shall have to count on a Soviet attack. I hope to preclude that possibility. My Army is free now. Only the Navy and the Air Forces are engaged with England. It is necessary to strike while it is possible to do so. I want to destroy the Russian armed forces before they become dangerous."

"Believe it or not," said Goering, "for three full hours Hitler listened to me quietly while I argued against a war on Russia. I implored him to hold to the principle enunciated in 'Mein Kampf' that Germany should never again fight a two-front war. How was I going to turn my air force around from west to east? I, too, had no doubt that we could destroy the Russian armies in the field, but what then? There were the endless Russian spaces. You got to the Volga, then there were the Urals; you got to the Urals, then there were the endless reaches of Siberia."

Hitler's definitive order to prepare the attack on Russia was conveyed to the General Staff December 18, 1940. Goering, who frequently had trouble with his chronology when talking with us, said he could remember that date. It was burned into his soul.

III. THE DESCENT: 1941–1945

Germany was finally borne down to destruction by the combined weight of Britain, Russia and the United States, the three coming into action against her in that order. The Nazis had genuinely endeavored to reach an accommodation with the British — but strictly on Nazi terms, of course. They actually achieved adjustment with the Russians for a time. With the problem of the United States, Hitler in particular, and Ribbentrop too, never came to grips. It was too remote for Hitler's "*ganz Kontinental-orientierte*" mind. He just shoved the United States off into a limbo of wishful thinking.

About the British the Nazis were to the end haunted by a sincere puzzlement. Ribbentrop, who really did know a good deal about the world and the British in particular, glimpsed the truth in terms of the balance of power, as related above, but he did not see the issue in its ultimate terms of freedom.

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Hitler appeared never to have found it possible to understand why the elephant, Germany, and the whale, England, should not develop their respective realms in mutual understanding and peace. He came back to that idea in the confusion of the very end.

Hans Dieckhoff, who long had a leading part in German-American affairs, testified — and others corroborated him — that neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop had any real understanding of the situation in the United States. Still under the influence of his talks with Lloyd George, Hitler counted the bad experience of the Americans in the First World War a sure hindrance to any new American intervention in Europe.

Hitler was further fortified in this comfortable expectation by the American neutrality legislation of 1935 and 1937. In the view of the German Foreign Office, this legislation had a damaging influence such as could not be overestimated. The Nazi leaders read the law to mean that the United States considered itself absolutely out of European affairs and that Germany might follow a continental policy without danger of interference, so long as it did not violate the Monroe Doctrine.

Dieckhoff, who was Counselor of the German Embassy in Washington 1922–26, in charge of American Affairs at the Foreign Office 1930–36, and Ambassador to the United States 1937–38, insisted to us that he had emphasized at all times his conviction that if it came to war with England, not only would the United States enter on the side of England, but also that the American factor would be decisive in the outcome. General von Boetticher, who had an American mother and served as German Military Attaché in Washington from 1933 to 1941, testified to us that his reports were in this same general tenor. However, Boetticher was lying. From Dieckhoff and others we learned that Boetticher's reports to Berlin played down the American potential, which he described as hampered by bottlenecks in industry, by strikes, and by the difficulty of conversion to war production on a large scale. Besides there were always the isolationists.

Karl Ritter told us of Ribbentrop's stupid and stubborn refusal to accept the factual reports which he and others submitted on the American potential. Ribbentrop asked Ritter for comment on President Roosevelt's message to Congress enumerating what had been achieved and was soon to be achieved in the production of planes and tanks and the like. Ritter said that before he had even begun his answer, Ribbentrop announced his own conclusion that the President's speech was mostly bluff. "The Fuehrer," said Ribbentrop, "is the world's greatest armaments expert, and he has spoken." ("*Der Fuehrer ist der erste Waffenfachmann der Welt und er hat es gesagt.*")

According to Goering, the final weight in Hitler's negative estimate of the American factor was Japan. Hitler was confident that America would not wish to be involved in a war in Europe while Japan was threatening her other flank. Had the Nazis any exact prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor? The general answer was, no. Dieckhoff, however, intimated that the Germans were aware in a general way of what was coming without having been apprised of a date. In any case the news of the American defeat at Pearl Harbor was received by Hitler with jubilation, we heard. He ordered champagne to be served and drank several glasses himself, which was most unusual. General Warlimont,

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who had traveled in the United States for a year, told us that he, for his part, was deeply depressed. He remained in his quarters and declined to join the celebration.

We found the most baffling question in the whole Nazi story to be the prompt German declaration of war on the United States. Prior to December 7 the leaders in Berlin clearly perceived the repeated challenges of Roosevelt's policy and they deliberately refused to accept those challenges. This seemed to men in the Foreign Office excellent diplomacy on Germany's part. Why then did Germany declare war on the United States immediately after the Japanese attack? It was hardly necessary to enlarge upon the cross-workings which might have become violent in the United States if Germany had not thus forthwith resolved the dilemma.

In Dieckhoff's view there must have been some secret agreement with Japan, but it was impossible to obtain from him any substantiation. The answer uniformly obtained from the others interrogated, including the former Ambassador von Prittwitz, was that Hitler had acted from the motive of prestige. He felt, it was supposed, that the logic of events would now inevitably constrain the United States into belligerency against Germany. It would not befit the Master Race to sit and wait supinely. The Master Race must demonstrate its vigor and courage by acting first and without the least delay.

The core of the story of the Nazi descent from triumph to defeat is a Russian story, and it begins with the visit to Berlin of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, November 12–14, 1940. The astute von Papen said it was at this meeting that Germany lost the war. Just five weeks later Hitler issued his fateful order of December 18.

There was no diplomatic preparation for the November meeting. Foreign Office officials reiterated the view that Stalin had been unpleasantly surprised by the swiftness of the German victory over France, and that the strengthening of German influence in Rumania, where Marshal Antonescu had taken power in the autumn of 1940, appeared to threaten Russia's interests in the Balkans. The Foreign Office was convinced that after the summer of 1940 Russia did not consider Germany any longer a partner with whom to coöperate, but a serious competitor.

Molotov came to Berlin in November 1940 partly as a courtesy, since Ribbentrop had been twice to Moscow, and partly to discuss the consultation clause in the Treaty of September 28, 1939. When Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, Moscow had been notified, and when Russia occupied the Baltic and Rumanian territories, there was notice to Berlin, but in all cases the notice arrived hardly before the event itself and the idea of consultation was derisory. The German Government apprised the Soviet Union of the Vienna Award of August 1940 only a few hours before the signatures were attached. When the Russians complained, the Germans said there must have been some misunderstanding and it would be best if Molotov should come for diplomatic parleys. This is the German story.

A talk between Molotov and Ribbentrop the morning of November 12 was superseded by a talk that afternoon between Molotov and Hitler, since Hitler in his own way covered the same ground as Ribbentrop. At the afternoon session, the usual opening courtesies having been exchanged, Hitler declared (we

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were told by one of the Germans present) that in his opinion the war against England had already been decided in favor of Germany. It only remained to await the moment when England would recognize her complete defeat, and it was already time, in view of the friendly relations existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, to arrive at a clear conception regarding the disposition of the *Erbmasse* — the body of the estate, or heritage. Plainly the Soviet Union's prime interest was to have an outlet to the warm sea and there was only one such outlet, namely, via Iran to the Persian Gulf. Neither the Baltic nor the Mediterranean offered a way. In general, Hitler thought, Russia ought to find her sphere of interest in the east. Germany intended to indemnify herself for her war efforts in the west.

Molotov replied, according to this German version, that in his view the moment for such far-reaching agreements had not yet arrived. The Soviet Government would be prepared to discuss these questions in due time. At the present juncture it was more important to create clarity in the relations between Germany and Russia on the basis of existing agreements. Apparently, for reasons unknown to the Soviet Government, these agreements had ceased to appeal to the German Government. The Soviet Government had commissioned him, Molotov added, to put some concrete questions.

First, there was Finland, which belonged in the Soviet sphere of interest. The Soviet Government would be grateful to receive a declaration from the German Government that the German troops remaining in Finland would be presently withdrawn.

To this Hitler answered, it was said, that he had no political interests in Finland, only economic. These related mainly to deliveries of nickel from Petsamo. The German troops would be withdrawn when his need in this regard ended. He, Hitler, was mainly concerned with keeping war away from the Baltic area. Unsatisfied apparently, Molotov was said to have replied simply that he took note of Hitler's answer and would inform his Government accordingly.

Goering did not participate in the negotiations with Molotov, but he offered us a gloss based on ensuing talks with Hitler and with Ribbentrop. Goering's relation of Molotov's demands was lurid. Russia was to attack Finland again and incorporate it in the Soviet Union. That, said Goering, was very disturbing. Hitler told him: I can't let Russia attack Finland anew and square it with the German people. If Russia has all of Finland, we shall be outflanked on the north, Hitler proceeded; Russia will be dangerously near the Swedish iron ore, which is vital to us; and the first thing we know she'll be in Narvik.

According to the German report, Molotov went on to raise for discussion with Hitler the situation in the Balkans. The failure of the German Government to invite Russia to participate in the Vienna arbitration award of August 30, 1940, and to inform the Soviet Government regarding this award, was contrary to the spirit of the consultation treaty, to which the Soviet Government had, so far, strictly adhered. The Soviet Government also could not but ask against whom the frontier guarantee given by Germany to Rumania was directed. Of this guarantee too, the Soviet Government had learned only as an accomplished fact.

Hitler replied that in Vienna he had been mainly concerned with the threat

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of war between Rumania and Hungary. A war in the Balkans would compromise German military-economic interests, especially in the matter of oil. Hitler could not conceive what special interest the Soviet Union had in the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict. He could say the same about Germany's guarantee to Rumania. This guarantee was certainly not directed against Soviet Russia, which had already settled accounts with Rumania.

According to the German account, Molotov did not conceal his inability to follow Hitler's argument. He asked what the German Government would say if the Soviet Government developed special relations with Bulgaria as the natural zone of Russian security near the Dardanelles. Russia could not expose herself to any surprises in that quarter.

Hitler replied that before answering Molotov on this he would first have to ascertain what the Bulgarian Government itself thought of these Soviet intentions. He would also have to talk with his ally, Mussolini. Molotov thereupon manifested plain dissatisfaction, according to the German report, and insisted that he would have to take back with him to Moscow a clear definition of the German attitude on this Bulgarian question as he had presented it to Hitler.

Hitler, who at the outset of the negotiations had been calm and conciliatory, was described as visibly irritated by Molotov's insistence. Goering said that Hitler, in revealing his disturbance, stressed to him subsequently his fear that, if Russia moved to the Dardanelles, the Russian pressure might not continue southward but turn westward into Jugoslavia. Germany would then be outflanked on the south. Not only Rumanian oil came into jeopardy, but the chrome of Turkey and the chrome and bauxite elsewhere in the Balkans. Hitler said to Goering, according to the latter's story, that Molotov had promised to let these supplies keep flowing toward Germany, but that he simply did not believe the promise would be kept.

Molotov was reported finally to have raised the direct issue of the Dardanelles. In the course of its history Russia had several times been attacked from that direction. The Soviet Union, therefore, attached definite value to concrete guarantees (*reale garantien*). Paper guarantees would not suffice. Hitler, beginning to show signs of fatigue, declared he could not look upon this matter as urgent. In due time, he said, he would be prepared to discuss this issue too with the Soviets.

On the evening of November 13 Ribbentrop tendered Molotov a dinner. While it was in progress British bombers arrived, and Ribbentrop and Molotov spent time together in a shelter. Some of the matters raised in previous discussions were again gone through. Ribbentrop once more pointed to the Persian Gulf as the natural outlet for Russia. He said the Baltic would not serve, since the Skagerrak and the Kattegat were closed. Molotov was said to have thereupon declared that the Soviet Government was interested in the opening of these Straits. Ribbentrop told Goering about this, observing that plainly Denmark was in peril. He said he told Molotov that "we wouldn't even talk about that — for Germany it would be intolerable."

Talking with Goering the next day, Hitler declared that the Russian demands would have to be refused. He regarded it all as the preparation of a Russian attack on Germany. Finland worried him particularly, for "psycho-

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logical reasons" and because "we must maintain the *status quo* in the north." The intervention of England there would be unfavorable to Germany. Russian terms in the south were also not acceptable.

After this Goering told us he had his say. Hitler was of course right, as always; still it might not be so bad if Russia attacked Finland. One would naturally feel sorry for the Finns, but with Russia striking northward and at about the same time southward toward the Dardanelles, England was pretty sure to do something against Russia. With England going against Russia, there could be no Russian attack on Germany. Goering advised Hitler to concede everything to Russia except the Baltic. The Dardanelles were indifferent to Germany, he argued. No, Hitler retorted, there would be severe complications if Russia were allowed to advance into the Aegean.

The real point, however, said Goering to us — the *Hauptsache* — was that Hitler was convinced that what Russia was up to was the preparation of an attack on Germany. This was in direct conflict, we heard, with opinion at the German Foreign Office, where the conviction reigned that Stalin did not want a military conflict with Germany; he was on the contrary trying to avoid it.

After the Molotov visit there were no outward signs, we heard, that relations between Russia and Germany were worsening. Press and radio remained friendly, though perhaps somewhat less decidedly so than in 1939–40. However, in the spring of 1941 (the German story went on) the Soviets did demonstrate against the further extension of German influence in the Balkans.

It will be remembered that in Jugoslavia the Government of Prince Paul, for some time under strong pressure, finally adhered to the Axis on March 25. Two days later a coup d'état led by General Simovitch replaced Paul's regency with a government of national union under young King Peter. Hitler, who nurtured an Austrian dislike of Serbs, held both Russia and England responsible; the Foreign Office was not so sure. In support of Hitler's position it was pointed out that Russia at once signed a non-aggression pact with the new régime. However, when the German armies overran Jugoslavia, Moscow apparently repented of its action, the Germans observed. The Jugoslav Legation in Moscow was closed and the Soviets accepted the German view that the Jugoslav Government no longer existed.

Germans we talked with stressed that events in Jugoslavia contributed decisively to the German defeat. The order to prepare an offensive against Russia, which Hitler communicated to the General Staff December 18, envisaged May 15 as the date for the opening attack. The coup d'état in Jugoslavia, and the consequent need to conquer that country, delayed the beginning of the German campaign eastward until June 22. Karl Ritter, who for some time represented the Foreign Office with the General Staff, told us with sober mien that the delay cost the Germans the winter battle before Moscow, and it was there the war was lost.

The Foreign Office, as well as part of the Army Command, it was said, deplored the Russian war from the start. To the very end, the Foreign Office was left uninformed of Hitler's intentions. Neither Count von der Schulenberg, the German Ambassador in Russia, nor the Director of the U.S.S.R. Division in the Foreign Office had any official notice of the plans which had been

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in the making since December 18, 1940, and even earlier. It was only from personal sources that they obtained some idea of what was brewing.

One of our informants proffered information respecting Russian determination to avoid hostilities in the spring and summer of 1941, if at all possible. Serving at the time on the eastern front in a military capacity, he noticed that, while the Soviet troops constructed field fortifications on their side of the border, the Germans, planning to advance, constructed none. German planes flew over the border, he continued, to photograph the Soviet fortifications. Whereas Soviet troops in the Far East would fire at once against Japanese frontier-violations of this sort, against the German violations they merely lodged protests. Soviet planes were not seen to fly over German territory. On June 22 German artillery opened fire on the Russian fortifications around Lemberg (Lwów). To the astonishment of the German officers, the Soviet artillery did not reply until the German infantry attacked. The Soviet Commander, having been taken prisoner, explained that he thought the German artillery was practising and was shooting over the frontier by mistake. He had strict orders to avoid frontier incidents, and he did not return the fire until the advance of the German infantry made it clear that war had broken out.

It was a highly dynamic situation, the Germans pointed out, into which the German armies advanced in the summer of 1941. In the western Ukraine especially, the spirit of Ukrainian nationalism was running counter to Moscow. More lively still, they maintained, was a spirit of active rebellion against Moscow among the broad masses of the peasants, resulting from the forcible collectivization of agriculture, the low price of agricultural products and the dearth of consumers' goods. During the opening weeks of the campaign, according to these Germans, soldiers deserted from the Soviet armies by the hundreds of thousands. It was said that the German staff desired to treat these prisoners in accordance with established international practice, having in mind that they might eventually be used to stir up civil strife in Russia. Clausewitz had written that Russia could be defeated only by internal division. However (the story went), Hitler's view was different. No prisoners were to be brought to Germany. Instead, on Hitler's personal order, they were run into stockades in Poland and left to starve to death, quite literally.

Hitler was proceeding on the assumption that it would be possible to break the military power of the Soviet Union before the onset of winter by means of a *Blitzkrieg* similar to that in France, it was explained. He did not feel the need for any adventitious help and rejected all plans for drawing the peoples of the Soviet territories into the struggle, on the ground that when a political settlement came at the end of the war, these helpers might put forward inconvenient demands; if meanwhile any critical situation should arise for Germany, they would likely stab Germany in the back.

As the armies moved forward, Erich Koch was named Reichskommissar for the East. He was an outspoken opponent of any sort of concessions to nationalist Ukraine. The Ukrainians were for him no better than slaves who should receive only the subsistence absolutely necessary for the upkeep of their working strength. A good many Ukrainians had at first shown a friendly readiness to volunteer for labor in Germany, our informants averred. Koch and Sauckel

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did not care to fulfill their requirements on this basis. Volunteering among the Ukrainians for labor in Germany was alleged to have run as high as 80 percent. Sauckel's methods soon put an end to that. Volunteers and all were shipped off to Germany crowded into freight cars, unfed, uncared for.

Our Foreign Office informants said that the results of these revolting practices and ineptitudes soon began to be felt. The resistance of the Russian forces stiffened, and partisan fighters sprang up in the rear of the German lines. In their view the opportunity had been lost to turn the war against the Soviets into a civil war.

What the Nazis perpetrated in the regions of the Ukraine may have been peculiarly inhuman and inept, but it seems to have been no more than an aggravated demonstration of their political failure everywhere outside of Germany. The story was not different essentially in Poland (about which we heard from General Blaskowitz) or in Czechoslovakia. Former German diplomats told us that in Czechoslovakia the SS and Gestapo soon took over from the relatively equitable German military government and subjected the Czechs to indignities and suffering which drove them into an unyielding enmity. After the Czechs had been definitely robbed of their independence (March 15, 1939), it was doubtful that they and the Germans could have lived together in friendly fashion, but it would have been possible, the Foreign Office thought, to have worked out a satisfactory *modus* with the Hacha Government on a basis of a formal independence. When Ribbentrop carried to Hitler a proposal in this sense Hitler promptly turned it down on the ground that the Czechs could not be trusted.

It appeared that Ribbentrop was for a time favorably disposed toward attempting some permanent adjustment with France also. The need for this as the basis of any new Europe such as the Nazis might hope to bring into being under German leadership was keenly discussed at the Foreign Office. The relatively friendly atmosphere of the early post-armistice conversations between the German and French leaders was thought to open the way. Abetz, former member of the *Buero Ribbentrop* and now German Ambassador in Paris, stemmed from Baden and had married a French girl, and he pressed the idea with both Ribbentrop and Hitler, maybe a little too persistently. Ribbentrop's early flush of responsiveness cooled off as quickly as he perceived the inhospitality of Hitler's mind to any such opportunity for statesmanship.

Paul Schmidt told us that somewhat later on Laval put the whole matter of the new Europe to Hitler squarely in a French epigram.

"*Vous voulez gagner la guerre*," Laval apostrophized the momentary Caesar, "*pour faire l'Europe; faites donc l'Europe pour gagner la guerre.*"

But Hitler never evinced any creative genius in this regard. His henchman Ribbentrop testified: "The Fuehrer had no absolute program of what was going to be about Europe [*sic*], about how it was going to be reconstructed, and so on, absolutely no program . . . I have tried five or six times during the war to induce the Fuehrer to get various European countries at a general European meeting. The Fuehrer always refused."

A cardinal point recurrently made by not a few members of the Foreign Office and military was that successful measures to organize Europe outside of Germany would have involved a denial by the Nazis of their own character

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and a negation of their principles. The Nazis succeeded in Germany by building Germanism into an exclusive cult. Not only were they themselves provincial but they exalted provincialism into a transcendent virtue. They achieved power by sharp focus and intensity. They could exert that power abroad in crass military forms and temporarily; but, having won in Germany on exclusively German terms, they could not generate outside of Germany the underlying political support which could alone hold up their conquests.

Military events during 1942–43 brought to an end any practical opportunity for Nazi Germany to organize Europe. Soon Hitler was marked as a military as well as a political failure. In the course of a paper which, with the aid of the historian, Percy Schramm (who kept the German War Diary), Otto Meissner wrote for us on "Hitler as Supreme War Lord, 1939–45," Meissner described the broad consequences of the loss of Stalingrad. "It became known now in wide circles," he set down, "that Hitler's personal leadership (in the military sphere) was dillettantish and wrong-headed; that he was filled with an exaggerated belief in his own military qualifications; that he was disposed to undervalue the achievements of others; and that he was unjust and severe in punishing those who, according to his personal view, had failed. He was subjected now to lively criticism; this had never happened before. The loss of confidence . . . grew continuously and could not be put at rest by Goebbels' propaganda."

There ensued the conspiracy of July 20, 1944. Opposition to Hitler in higher military circles had begun as early as the end of 1941, Meissner said. It was now determined that the removal of Hitler was the only possible escape for Germany. Hitler on his side, Meissner went on, was never able to understand the reasons which led to the conspiracy. He saw in it only treason and disloyalty on the part of his generals, enmity against National Socialism, and reaction. He remarked that Lenin and Stalin had been right in annihilating the whole of the ruling groups; it was his mistake not to have done the same in Germany.

Meissner had certainly done much to persuade the old Reichs President von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933. We asked him when he began to repent. Misgivings which had long been brewing in his mind, he answered, took definite form about a year and a half before the end. Close to the end he saw that Hitler was insane. He related that during the last year and a half Hitler came more and more under the influence of Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann. Goering had slipped from the inner circle after the failure of the German air defense. Ribbentrop, who was never in the inner circle, now lost favor too. Hitler kept him on as Foreign Minister, because he was committed to him and in dismissing him would have had to admit his own miscalculations in the foreign field. Asked about Rosenberg, Meissner replied that Rosenberg had never commanded Hitler's full respect. He said he once heard Hitler remark that had it not been for the Catholic Church putting Rosenberg's "Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts" on the index, the book never would have been read nor would Rosenberg have gained such wide attention.

Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann were the three, Meissner said, who helped the ever more crazy Hitler lead Germany to doom. When exactly did Hitler become crazy? Meissner could not say. He saw little of him, he claimed, in

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the final period. Substantial work had passed from his hands into the hands of Hans-Heinrich Lammers, Chief of the Reichs Chancellery, and particularly into those of Bormann, "a wicked man," who succeeded Hess as Secretary of the Party. However, on March 13, 1945, Meissner was received by Hitler in order to be congratulated on his 65th birthday. He found Hitler in a state of almost complete disarray, he informed us. Hitler's eyes were bloodshot. He paced the room. His voice was out of control. He shouted and cried; he spoke without coherence; he exclaimed repeatedly: "*Ich capituliere nie.*"

Meissner attributed Hitler's collapse in part to events and in part to a drastic course of treatment which he had been receiving for some years from Dr. Morell. Meissner said that Morell had developed a therapy which in numerous cases seemed to repair the vitality of aging men who had spent their strength too freely. It was Morell's practice to examine bodily secretions and prepare an injection which, in particular, according to Meissner, would keep the flora of the intestines in balance. Hitler was always in poor health, suffering from lack of sleep and consequent fatigue. His apparent benefit from Morell's injections was very noticeable. The treatment went through an increasing cycle. Meissner was certain that it contributed much to Hitler's final breakdown.

Others testified to Hitler's unmistakable disintegration toward the end. Guderian, who averred he found in Hitler a man of undoubtedly great capabilities, said also that he was convinced that Hitler was suffering from some form of insanity for several years before the final collapse. After the July 20th attempt on his life, Hitler, Guderian related, developed a marked palsy of the left hand and left foot, and had great difficulty in controlling these members even on the most embarrassing occasions. He would brace his foot against some firm object and hold his left hand with his right. When he released his hand after such an effort it would describe an arc of about nine inches.

Even so, Hitler did not surrender faith in his destiny, or he solaced himself by pretending not to do so. Despite all, he was going to succeed, as Frederick the Great had succeeded. He was sure that some divine event would in the end determine everything in his favor. He took the death of President Roosevelt as a first glimmering, at last, of the new dawn.

Russian artillery was then closing in on him and blowing to bits what remained of Berlin. In this situation Hitler's mind went back to the pristine idea of a working friendship with England. It was on April 22 or 23, Ribbentrop testified, that he saw Hitler for the last time. Ribbentrop asserted that "he again pointed out to me the necessity of Anglo-German friendship." "We still then thought," Ribbentrop continued, "there might be possibilities of some negotiations, or some meetings of the statesmen, or something, some sort of message which I should give to them when I saw them." However, Hitler now admitted to Ribbentrop that the war was lost. Ribbentrop said he had never done that before.

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A TEST OF SOCIALISM IN NEW ZEALAND

By Marc T. Greene

NEW ZEALAND'S Labor Government faces its third and severest test in the December elections. Labor was chosen in 1935, for the first time in the Dominion's history, largely as a result of the inability of the conservative Coalition Government to solve the problem of the depression. It has since been returned twice, though each time by a decreased majority. It continues to enjoy the almost unanimous support of New Zealand labor, but this year it is opposed by a strong combination calling itself the Nationalist Party — a coalition of all conservative elements, including most of the primary producers and backed by practically the entire press.

The contest is sure to be close, with very small odds favoring the present régime. Labor has alienated many supporters by continuing the rigid import restrictions that for nearly ten years have kept Dominion markets short of many things New Zealanders once had in plenty, by an admitted inability to reduce taxes since the end of the war, by a refusal to terminate rationing of food and apparel, and by a recent realignment of electoral districts somewhat in the fashion known in America as gerrymandering. The opposition has made the most of all this, though the Government does not lack facts and figures in defense.

Conservative interests likewise bitterly opposed the recent taking over of the Bank of New Zealand, an institution almost as old as the country, whose shares the Government bought up at its own price. The Government denied that this was merely a Socialist gesture and a preliminary move toward the nationalization of large industry, and insisted that control of the principal banks was the basis of its highly successful housing scheme through which more than 20,000 new homes for low-income groups have been built in a decade, 14,000 of them during the war years, despite the dearth of materials and labor.

This is a point of general interest, since there is a possibility that the British Labor Government may proceed along similar lines. The New Zealand plan embraced the borrowing from the Reserve Bank — established by the Coalition Government in 1934 and taken over by the incumbent régime several years ago — of the money with which to build the houses, at 1 percent interest. The cost was upward of $100,000,000, a large sum for a population of less than 1,700,000. The rental for the houses is hardly more than nominal, yet it meets the low interest charge on the borrowed money. The houses are built in accord with the highest modern standards of construction and lack nothing except central heating, which the New Zealanders do not like and which they say is unnecessary in a climate that has no extremes. They are available to all classes of the community with no discrimination, income bar or means test.

Despite this construction, the housing problem is acute, as elsewhere, and the Labor Government promises to accelerate its building program. It can take the money necessary to do it from the two government-controlled banks.

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Commenting on the housing scheme, Finance Minister and Deputy-Prime Minister Walter Nash says, "Probably no single activity in which the New Zealand Government has engaged during its ten years in office has brought more joy and brightness into the lives of thousands of its citizens. We look forward to a tremendous extension of this activity, not only in our country but in *every* country that has pledged its effort and resources to the task of making the postwar world a better place in which to live for ordinary men and women."

Next to the housing achievement, the Government takes pride in the Social Security Act, which was passed by Parliament in 1938. Although this was a marked advance on previous legislation, it was not an innovation by the Labor Government. New Zealand, in 1898, was the first country in the world to introduce old-age pensions. A conservative government established widows' pensions in 1911 and family allowances in 1926. In the two-score years before the present government took office, health and hospital facilities, infant and maternity welfare services, free school dental care, and certain other public services were giving the vigorous little Dominion — the "Brighter Britain of the South," as its people like to call it — a reputation for advanced social legislation.

The 1938 Social Security Act consolidated all measures listed above and added other benefits to safeguard the people of New Zealand against disability arising from old age, invalidism, widowhood, orphanhood, unemployment, sickness and occupational disease. Medical, hospital and maternity benefits were expanded. And, out of the abundant supply usually at hand in this country, free and unlimited fresh milk was made available to all children of the low-income classes.

There is no "means test" for health benefits of any kind. Every person upon reaching 65 qualifies automatically for the old-age pension, without income or property restrictions. A postwar increase has brought this payment to the sum of two pounds a week. This is about $6.50 in U. S. currency, and while it is admittedly inadequate, it is nonetheless the equivalent of about $12 a week in the United States, taking into account the great difference in living costs, especially in the cost of food. A recipient may have an additional pound from any source, or an interest in a mortgage, annuity or life-insurance policy; and, in addition, he may possess up to £500 in cash or in any form of security without affecting the benefit.

The social security scheme is expensive, and a tax of a shilling in the pound of every salary or wage, however low, is required to maintain it, in addition to all other taxation. This is undoubtedly a burden in some cases. Taxation generally is high. On an income of £400, the income tax is £58½; on £1,000 it is £263½; and the recipient of an income of £10,000 pays the government the sum of £7,587 and 18 shillings. Few New Zealand incomes reach this figure, for New Zealand is a country without either extreme poverty or much large wealth.

There has been much protest at these taxes, especially since the war, when the Government has failed to commit itself to tax reduction. Labor's opponents argue that New Zealand, which depends mainly on primary production and is consequently endangered economically if foreign markets fall off, as in the early thirties, cannot afford such expensive housing schemes, nor such far-

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reaching social benefits. It is charged, for example, that the free-medicine plan which permits anybody to go to a doctor and have his fee paid by the state tends to make doctors richer — especially those with lower-paid practices — and the state poorer, inasmuch as it tempts people to seek medical advice for trifles. It is also charged that much of the social legislation is in reality class legislation, in that it eases the burden of the poor by taking from the wealthy. Indeed, there is no doubt that it does just that, and is intended to, for the Government takes the categorical position that "the first charge on a nation's wealth should be the care of the old because they have worked in their earlier and fruitful years for us to enjoy the standards we enjoy today; of the young because unless we care for them the future will not be provided for; of the ailing because they cannot care for themselves." And Mr. Nash adds, "New Zealand has become an enterprising democracy which, though young, is advanced in social legislation, in labor laws and economic policies designed to give the fullest possible freedom under a collective and coöperative organization for production and distribution."

Defending drastic import restrictions, the Labor Government points to a sterling reserve against emergencies of £85,000,000 in London. In the same period deposits in New Zealand trading banks rose from £66,000,000 to £118,000,000, and Post Office Savings Bank deposits increased to £40,000,000 in five years. The ratio of bank advances to deposits fell a third in this period, and net retail sales taxes expanded from £3,480,000 in 1937 to more than £4,500,000 — the total at present — despite shortages in many consumer lines.

American consumers will be interested to hear that butter in New Zealand — rationed, but not severely, and always obtainable — costs 22 cents a pound, leg of mutton 14 cents, roast of beef 15 to 25, cheese 15, a two-pound loaf of bread 8, milk 8 cents a quart, oatmeal 26 cents for five pounds, and flour 68 cents for 25 pounds. Meat is rationed but is always obtainable in all grades.

The average New Zealand wage runs about to the equivalent of $20 to $25 a week. Waterside workers, known in New Zealand as "wharfies," are the best paid of manual laborers and with overtime often make twice the foregoing sum, for considerable periods. Yet they are the most troublesome of all workers, striking on trivial pretexts, causing delays in the loading of perishable goods, and sometimes tying up essential food shipments to the mother country. The Government is accused of failing to adopt firm measures with them, or with the coal miners who are likewise troublesome, out of a fear of losing political support needed in the forthcoming election. Beyond doubt there is some ground for these charges, and it is permissible to suggest that the situation holds danger of the development of a disastrous class-consciousness. But if the election returns the present Government to office, there is every likelihood of legislation looking to a firmer handling of industrial disputes.

What is the effect of this advanced social and economic legislation upon the national economy as a whole? The workers suffered in New Zealand during the depression of the thirties, and it was obvious to any objective observer that the Government of that period was lacking in social consciousness. The workers certainly had a case. They submitted their case to the final court of appeal — the people of a country that was, and is, as truly democratic as any in the world — and it was approved. But the point is that all the people who did the

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approving were by no means workers, and they are as much entitled to consideration as is any other class.

That is the crux of the present position. And because it is, because a government of the workers must finally be judged, not alone by what it does to benefit the working class but by what it does to benefit the whole country, liberals everywhere have been watching New Zealand's Labor Government closely. The question is whether, by turning to distinct class legislation and thereby engendering an aggressive class-consciousness that can in the end ruin any country, it will bring labor into general disrepute as a political force. The opposition in New Zealand, of course, charges that the Dominion's Labor Government has already fostered such class-consciousness. So far the charge is not well-grounded; but the danger that such predictions may prove valid is nonetheless apparent.

The coming elections have evoked a world-wide interest, for they constitute one of the most significant tests of the Socialist cause that it has yet faced. The New Zealand Government makes little use of the term "Socialism" and has never really issued a specific challenge to free-enterprise capitalism. Nevertheless, it is in fact and in effect Socialistic, and the result of the voting in December will be either a definite encouragement to Socialism throughout the world or a clear setback.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

PROPHETS AND PEOPLES. By HANS KOHN. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 213 p. $2.50.

The development of nationalism in Britain, Italy, Germany and Russia during the nineteenth century as exemplified by five representative thinkers and writers: J. S. Mill, Michelet, Mazzini, Treitschke and Dostoyevsky. This volume is an extension, with copious notes, of lectures delivered by Professor Kohn at Northwestern University and complements his masterly work on "The Idea of Nationalism."

HISTORICAL CHANGE. By LEWIS EINSTEIN. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1946, 132 p. $1.25.

A stimulating essay on the means by which the principle of constant change has made itself manifest in the history of the western world.

SUITORS AND SUPPLIANTS. By STEPHEN BONSAL. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946, 301 p. $3.50.

In his "Unfinished Business" Colonel Bonsal gave us portions from his diary concerning the policies of the Big Powers at and immediately after the Paris Peace Conference. The present volume relates his experiences, as a deputy to Colonel House, in dealing with the representatives of the smaller Powers and struggling nationalities of Europe and Asia who came to Paris in pursuit of "self-determination."

LA FAILLITE DE LA PAIX (1918–1939). By MAURICE BAUMONT. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1945, 817 p. Fr. 400.

This is the concluding volume in the notable series "Peuples et Civilisations" edited by Halphen and Sagnac, initiated shortly after World War I.

VALUES FOR SURVIVAL. By LEWIS MUMFORD. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 314 p. $3.00.

This is a collection of "essays, addresses and letters on politics and education," some of them dating from the prewar era. Mr. Mumford is critical of a great many things and makes it clear that we have only ourselves to thank for letting the world get into its present sorry state. He is particularly severe with his own kind — the "liberals."

A YEAR OF HUMAN EVENTS. VOLUME I. EDITED BY FRANK C. HANIGHEN AND FELIX MORLEY. Washington: Human Events, 1945, 168 p. $2.50.

Human Events was started in 1944 as an unorthodox weekly newsletter in which the editors named above, together with William Henry Chamberlin and occasional other contributors, gave their attention to matters on the international scene that seemed to them neglected by the press at large. This little volume contains the issues which appeared in 1944. As one would expect from such editorial sponsorship, the general tone is a mixture of idealism, muckraking and isolationism.

THE WAY TO PEACE. By LIONEL CURTIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 98 p. 50 cents.

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Mr. Curtis presents the case for a sort of "Union Now" comprising the democratic nations, of which the core would be the British Commonwealth, the United States and the states of western Europe.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLICE AND WORLD SECURITY. By Victor Altman. London: Alliance Press, 1945, 105 p. 7/6.

A former Austrian functionary outlines a plan for setting up regions in western and central Europe supported by an international police force.

IF MEN WANT PEACE. Edited by Joseph B. Harrison and Others. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 292 p. $2.50.

Contributions by members of the faculty of the University of Washington.

THE TRAGEDY OF EMPIRE. By Scott Nearing. New York: Island Press, 1945, 168 p. $2.50.

A review of the last 2,500 years of history in the western world clearly shows, Mr. Nearing holds, that empire-building is a futile business and that now is the time to replace it with a world federation.

CONCORD AND LIBERTY. By José Ortega y Gasset. New York: Norton, 1946, 182 p. $2.75.

Four essays, one on political freedom, by the noted Spanish philosopher, author of "The Revolt of the Masses."

EL PODER POLÍTICO Y LA SOCIEDAD. By Salvador Lissarrague. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1944, 313 p. Ptas. 30.

A conservative, traditionalist analysis of certain recent ideas and literature.

THE NATIONALITIES OF EUROPE AND THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES. By H. Munro Chadwick. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1945, 209 p. $4.00.

The author has gone deep into Europe's past in search of the origin of those linguistic, historical and other differences on which the contemporary nationalities are based.

THE NEW EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Walter Fitzgerald. New York: Harper, 1946, 298 p. $2.75.

An analysis, region by region, of the geographical facts that must be taken into account in shaping the "new Europe." The author is professor of geography at the University of Manchester.

THE EDUCATION OF A CORRESPONDENT. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 550 p. $4.00.

Mr. Matthews has passed much of his life working for the *New York Times*, and the last ten years of it reporting from abroad. During this decade he covered the Ethiopian War on the Italian side and the Spanish Civil War on the Loyalist side; then, after an interlude in India, he reported the recent war in southern Europe. Some of this he has already told about in his previous books. The present volume is devoted rather to an examination of how these stirring events contributed to his political sophistication.

THE ABSOLUTE WEAPON. Edited by Bernard Brodie. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 214 p. $2.00.

This is a coöperative work by members of the staff of Yale's Institute of International Studies. They view atomic power in its strategic and political implications, particularly for American foreign policy and the future of the United Nations. Other contributors are Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, William T. R. Fox and Frederick S. Dunn.

ALMIGHTY ATOM. By John J. O'Neill. New York: Ives Washburn, 1945, 94 p. $1.00.

The science editor of the *New York Herald Tribune* chronicles the steps by which man attained control of atomic energy and (within the limitations of security regulations) discusses its military use.

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ATOMIC ENERGY IN WAR AND PEACE. By Gessner G. Hawley and Sigmund W. Leifson. New York: Reinhold, 1945, 212 p. $2.50.

A popular treatment of the technical problems involved, and a temperate analysis of what atomic power portends for the future.

ARMS AND POLICY: 1939–1944. By Hoffman Nickerson. New York: Putnam, 1945, 356 p. $3.50.

Despite his pronounced social prejudices and his romantic longing for the good old days of feudal chivalry, Major Nickerson makes a number of interesting points in this analysis of the military lessons of World War II.

AIR POWER IN WAR. By A. H. Narracott. London: Muller, 1945, 168 p. 8/6.

After describing the evolution of the strategic conceptions of the principal Powers, the author appraises the way they worked out during the recent war.

WATCHWORDS. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. London: Skeffington, 1945, 142 p. 12/6.

Fifty brief essays on a wide array of military problems, incidents and figures — past and present — by a British writer. Most of the book consists of articles that originally appeared in various magazines.

General: Economic and Social

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF BACKWARD AREAS. By K. Mandelbaum and J. R. L. Schneider. Oxford: Blackwell, 1945, 111 p. 10/6.

The authors analyze the theoretical implications involved in the attempt to industrialize areas with a surplus of rural population. They present a scheme for industrializing several countries in southeastern Europe.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL CARTELS. By Charles R. Whittlesey. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 172 p. $2.50.

The writer of this rather inconclusive monograph has set himself the difficult task of clarifying the controversial issues of international cartels. His "on-the-other-hand" attitude will probably provide protagonists of international cartels with more ammunition for attack than occasion for retreat.

THE CAPITAL LEVY. By Shun-hsin Chou. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1945, 142 p. $2.25.

A technical analysis of the operation of this drastic form of taxation.

GETTING INTO FOREIGN TRADE. By Eugene Van Cleef. New York: Ronald, 1946, 133 p. $2.50.

A simple, practical guide for people who wish to enter into foreign trade either in a private capacity or in government service. It reads rapidly and contains useful source information on export-import practice for the uninitiated.

LE MÉCANISME DES PRIX ET LA STRUCTURE DE L'ÉCONOMIE. By Jean Marchal. Paris: Médicis, 1946, 250 p. Fr. 240.

A technical study, by a professor at the University of Nancy.

MANIFESTO FOR THE ATOMIC AGE. By Virgil Jordan. New Brunswick (N. J.): Rutgers University Press, 1946, 70 p. $1.50.

The President of the National Industrial Conference Board is pessimistic about the future of western man in a highly technical age.

PEACE, PROSPERITY, INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By Robert Federn. London: Williams and Norgate, 1945, 167 p. 12/6.

Rather individual slants on several political and economic problems of world import.

SCIENCE, LIBERTY AND PEACE. By Aldous Huxley. New York: Harper, 1946, 86 p. $1.00.

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A British scientist analyzes the function of science and its practitioners in the modern world of rapid social change and political upheaval.

THE CLOCK OF HISTORY. By Alvin Johnson. New York: Norton, 1946, 253 p. $3.00.

These stimulating essays by the recently retired head of the New School for Social Research were written at various times and deal with many social and political subjects.

THE CHASM. By H. A. Morrice. London: Alliance Press, 1945, 121 p. 7/6.

A British engineer seeks to close "the chasm" between the thinking of practical technicians and the somewhat less practical theorists.

WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY. By Mary R. Beard. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 369 p. $3.50.

Mrs. Beard tries, with rather dubious success, to discredit the notion that women have played a mere "supporting rôle" in world history.

A CATHOLIC LOOKS AT THE WORLD. By Francis E. McMahon. New York: Vanguard, 1945, 334 p. $2.75.

A liberal Catholic philosopher, who forsook Notre Dame University for the more congenial atmosphere of Chicago University, gives his interpretation of contemporary affairs, worldly and spiritual, domestic and international. In the latter field he registers his opposition to all Fascists, including Franco.

ONE DESTINY: AN ESPISTLE TO THE CHRISTIANS. By Sholem Asch. New York: Putnam, 1945, 88 p. $1.50.

A gifted Jewish writer seeks the reasons for what he regards as the blood-guilt of Christians toward his people through the ages, and especially today. He is impressed with Christian kindness but has only the deepest scorn for all Moslems.

THE PEACE THAT IS LEFT. By Emile Cammaerts. New York: Harper, 1945, 150 p. $2.00.

Reflections on the nature of a Christian peace, by a noted Belgian poet.

JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By Emil Brunner. New York: Harper, 1945, 304 p. $3.00.

The translation of a fundamental treatise by a Protestant theologian, who holds to a middle path between the extremes of individualism and collectivism.

NO DREAMERS WEAK. By Michael de la Bedoyere. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945, 168 p. $2.00.

"A study of Christian realism as against visionary Utopianism in avoiding another great war and making a real peace."

THE SOCIALIST TRADITION. By Alexander Gray. New York: Longmans, 1946, 523 p. $7.50.

A scholarly treatise on the development of Socialist thought, broadly interpreted, from classical times down to Lenin.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY VERSUS COMMUNISM. By Karl Kautsky. New York: Rand School Press, 1946, 142 p. $2.00.

These ten selected translations from the voluminous writings of the German Socialist leader were originally published between 1932 and 1937.

The Second World War

ROUTE TO POTSDAM. By B. G. Ivanyi and Alan Bell. London: Wingate, 1945, 112 p. 9/.

A careful, concise record of the metamorphosis of the announced peace aims of the Allies from the outbreak of the war to 1945.

SUB ROSA: THE O.S.S. AND AMERICAN ESPIONAGE. By Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden. New York: Reynal, 1946, 237 p. $2.50.

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Fascinating stories about some of the persons — American and foreign — connected with the Office of Strategic Services whose activities carried them into enemy territory and into contact with local resistance movements.

BATTLE REPORT. VOLUME II. THE ATLANTIC WAR. Edited by Commander Walter Karig and Others. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1946, 558 p. $3.50.

This is an account of the Navy's sea and amphibious operations, told with a wealth of interesting detail and backed up by access to the official sources. Its principal shortcoming is its lack of critical perspective.

THE LAST PHASE. By Walter Millis. Boston: Houghton, 1946, 130 p. $2.50.

This illustrated story of the Allied drive from Normandy to Berlin was prepared for distribution to Germans. Its balance and good sense will make it useful to American readers, who do not find those qualities in some of the books which are now telling them how it all happened.

EUROPEAN VICTORY. By John D'Arcy-Dawson. London: Macdonald, 1946, 299 p. 10/6.

A British correspondent reports on his experiences with the Second Army in Normandy and after, and gives some dicta on the strategy and staff work involved.

FROM MOSCOW TO THE PRUSSIAN FRONTIER. By Evgeny Krieger. London: Hutchinson, 1945, 136 p. 12/6.

Selections from the dispatches sent by a Soviet war correspondent from various sectors of the Russian front during the recent conflict.

LOOK TO NORWAY. By William Warbey. London: Secker and Warburg, 1945, 242 p. 12/6.

The story of Norway's conquest by the Nazis, of the underground resistance and of final liberation.

WARS I HAVE SEEN. By Gertrude Stein. London: Batsford, 1946, 191 p. 15/.

When you pick up a book by Gertrude Stein you never know what you are going to find in it except a lot of Gertrude Stein, and this book is no exception though she does mention several wars, including the Boer War and the recent war, but of course we must remember that Miss Stein was actually in France when the Nazis were there.

COASTAL COMMAND LEADS THE INVASION. By Squadron-Leader Michael Wilson and Flight-Lieutenant A. S. L. Robinson. London: Jarrolds, 1945, 160 p. 16/.

The story of how the Coastal Command of the R.A.F. operated in various theaters, notably in preparing the way for D-Day.

THE DUTCH NAVY AT WAR. By A. Kroese. London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, 131 p. 6/.

A Dutch naval officer recounts his experiences in the ill-fated campaign to defend the Netherlands East Indies from the Japanese onslaught early in 1942.

SEA, SURF AND HELL. Edited by Commander Arch A. Mercey and Lee Grove. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945, 352 p. $3.50.

Some 50 short eyewitness accounts of numerous actions in which the Coast Guard took part during the recent war in various theaters.

THE GREAT PACIFIC VICTORY. By Gilbert Cant. New York: Day, 1946, 422 p. $3.50.

This well-articulated, reliable and readable story of the campaign in the Pacific from Guadalcanal to final victory is one of the better books on the war.

PEARL HARBOR TO TOKYO. Edited by Clarence L. Hodge and Murray Befeler. Honolulu: Tongg, 1945, 159 p. $3.00.

A pictorial record of America's part in the war in the Pacific, with brief text.

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WRATH IN BURMA. By Fred Eldridge. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, 320 p. $3.00.

The author was public relations officer to General Stilwell in the CBI Theater and is passionately loyal to him in this forthright account of the Burma campaign. Before he gets through telling his story, Mr. Eldridge has ventilated a lot of grudges against sundry British, Chinese and American personalities and has exposed quite an assortment of dirty linen to public gaze.

FORGOTTEN FRONTIER. By Geoffrey Tyson. Calcutta: Targett, 1945, 146 p. Rs. 8.

How the tea planters of Assam and Bengal helped evacuate many refugees who sought to escape overland from Burma in 1942. Several maps and many illustrations.

TWELVE MONTHS WITH TITO'S PARTISANS. By Major William Jones. Bedford (Eng.): Bedford Books, 1946, 128 p. 4/6.

A Canadian in the R.A.F. reports on his adventures with the Jugoslav Partisans in Croatia during 1943 and 1944.

LIDICE. Prague: Ministerstvo Vnitra, 1945, 123 p.

A detailed, documentary description of the Lidice massacre.

OUT OF CARNAGE. By Alexander R. Griffin. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1945, 327 p. $3.00.

Chapters from the amazing record of military medicine and surgery in the recent war.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES MOVES ACROSS THE PACIFIC. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper, 1946, 174 p. $2.00.

An authority on Far Eastern history retraces briefly the steps by which the United States became a great Pacific Power and analyzes the alternatives with which that position now confronts us.

CHINA AND AMERICA. By Foster Rhea Dulles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 277 p. $2.75.

This is a companion work to the author's review of Russo-American relations, "The Road to Teheran" (reviewed in the July 1944 issue of Foreign Affairs). Like its predecessor it is lucid, intelligent and readable.

MUST WE FIGHT RUSSIA? By Ely Culbertson. Philadelphia: Winston, 1946, 62 p. $1.00.

The author explains that he "decided to bring out into the open what is being whispered everywhere" — the danger of war with Russia. He is full of contempt for those who do not see how simple is the remedy: abolish the veto in the Security Council and adopt the Culbertson "Quota Force Plan."

AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. By Harold H. Fisher. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1946, 175 p. $2.50.

Lectures in which the Director of the Hoover Library at Stanford traces the impact of Russo-American relations on the wider problems of international organization.

AMERICA AND THE NEW WORLD. By Norman Angell and Others. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945, 155 p. $1.50.

The Merrick Lectures for 1945 at Ohio Wesleyan University by seven experts, British and American. They have divided the subject matter by area rather than by topic.

HANDBOOK OF POLITICS AND VOTER'S GUIDE. By Lowell Mellett. New York: Penguin, 1946, 138 p. 25 cents.

Mr. Mellett, in addition to extensive experience as a journalist, served for six years as one of the late President Roosevelt's assistants. In this little book he gives some sage

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advice to intelligent voters and presents the recent voting records of the members of both Houses of Congress on vital measures.

THE TRUE WOODROW WILSON: CRUSADER FOR DEMOCRACY. By Harold Garnet Black. New York: Revell, 1946, 270 p. $3.00.

This biography in no way adds to our knowledge or understanding of the man, though the author has evidently plowed through a great deal of material.

PATTON, FIGHTING MAN. By William Bancroft Mellor. New York: Putnam, 1946, 247 p. $3.00.

An admirer's hastily compiled review of the General's career in which the last phase is greatly slighted.

THE AMERICAN RHODES SCHOLARSHIPS. By Frank Aydelotte. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 208 p. $2.00.

How the experiment has worked during its first 40 years. There is a list of all American Rhodes scholars and their present occupations and addresses.

AGRICULTURE IN AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY. By Theodore W. Schultz. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945, 299 p. $2.75.

This book is a landmark in the application of competent economic analysis to the fundamental problems facing American agriculture. Written in a lucid style by one of the foremost experts in the field of agricultural economics, it investigates the significance of excess labor resources on farms; the relationship between industrial and agricultural output; the tendency for the supply of farm products to exceed the demand for them; the instability of farm income; the opportunity for agricultural exports and imports; governmental programs and control; and the solution to the farm problem without resort to price floors or restrictions on output.

PRIVATE MONOPOLY: THE ENEMY AT HOME. By David Lasser. New York: Harper, 1945, 306 p. $3.00.

The thesis of this volume, popularly presented, is that monopoly and cartels offer a growing challenge to the preservation of democratic institutions.

WARTIME RACKETEERS. By Harry Lever and Joseph Young. New York: Putnam, 1945, 226 p. $2.75.

Two newspapermen lift the lid on a sordid chapter in the history of the home front during the recent conflict.

MIDWEST AT NOON. By Graham Hutton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, 350 p. $3.50.

Mr. Hutton, formerly one of the editors of *The Economist* of London, passed most of the war years as head of the British Information Office in Chicago. This is not so much a book of reminiscences as a friendly description and analysis of the forces which make the Midwest and its inhabitants what they are.

ALL THESE PEOPLE. By Rupert B. Vance. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945, 503 p. $5.00.

This analysis of population trends in the southern states is replete with maps, charts, tables and the like.

AMERICA IS IN THE HEART. By Carlos Bulosan. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 327 p. $3.00.

How a young Filipino came to love America despite persecution and poverty.

Western Europe

À L'ÉCHELLE HUMAINE. By Léon Blum. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1945, 215 p. $1.50.

These pages were written by the French Socialist leader during the early months of

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his imprisonment by the Nazis, when things looked blackest for his countrymen. They are addressed to the young men of France, urging them not to condemn outright everything for which the Third Republic stood, above all its democratic ideals. He does not hide or condone the grave faults of that régime, but seeks to discern their origin and their remedy. The failure of the Third Republic, he holds, was the failure of the French bourgeoisie to play its rôle as an effective *classe dirigeante*. He believes that the salvation of France lies with her working class, organized to fulfill national aspirations, not to act as an instrument for a foreign Power.

FRANCE IS DIVIDED. By Jean Dorgot. London: Muller, 1945, 238 p. 8/6.

The author finds that ever since World War I France has been divided between those who, when the crisis came, were to line up either with Pétain or with the Resistance.

FRANCE AND HER ARMY. By Charles de Gaulle. London: Hutchinson, 1945, 104 p. 15/.

An English translation of a book first published in France in 1938. The work is both historical and critical, and affords the General an opportunity to state his ideas on war.

LA QUATRIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. By Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch. New York: Maison Française, 1946, 266 p. $1.50.

A noted student of political science briefly reviews the history of French parliamentary government under the Third Republic as a background for an analysis of the origins and future possibilities of the Fourth Republic.

LE PROCÈS DE RIOM. By James de Coquet. Paris: Fayard, 1945, 296 p. Fr. 85.

This is a record of the several pleas entered at the famous trial of some of the leaders of the Third Republic by the Vichy régime.

HIER: DEMAIN. By Vincent Auriol. Paris: Charlot, 1945, 2 v. Fr. 190.

This book, by a leading French Socialist, was written "underground" in France during 1942–43 and first printed in Tunis. In it M. Auriol presents an interesting version of the events of 1940 as well as many concrete proposals for political and economic reform.

TÉMOIGNAGE POUR LA FRANCE. By Henri Focillon. New York: Brentano, 1945, 212 p. $1.75.

Wartime articles and addresses by a French scholar who died as an exile in America.

LA CULTURE FRANÇAISE SOUS L'OCCUPATION. New York: French Press and Information Service, 1945, 131 p.

Documents (mimeographed) illustrating the notable part played by the intellectuals of France in the resistance to Nazi rule.

EUROPA TRISTE. By Anton Alfaro. Turin: Chiantore, 1945, 392 p.

The author, who is evidently a Paraguayan diplomat, has here recorded (in Spanish) his rather voluminous impressions of wartime Europe, notably France and Italy.

BELGIUM. By Marc Schreiber. London: Macdonald, 1945, 190 p. 5/.

This fast-moving review of Belgian history inevitably suffers from oversimplification but is, on the whole, well informed.

L'ÉCONOMIE BELGE SOUS L'OCCUPATION, 1940–1944. By Fernand Baudhuin. Brussels: Bruylant, 1945, 435 p.

This comprehensive treatment includes a description of the preparations which the Belgian Government made during the thirties to cope with the economic problems of war. There is also a discussion of several wartime developments outside the realm of economics.

LE CARDINAL VAN ROEY ET L'OCCUPATION ALLEMANDE EN BELGIQUE. Edited by Canon Leclef. Brussels: Goemaere, 1945, 360 p.

The story of the resistance to Nazi pressure offered by the Archbishop of Malines, worthy successor as a churchman and patriot to Cardinal Mercier. A large part of the text is given over to documents.

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NOTRE REINE ASTRID. By Louis Wilmet. Montreal: Variétés, 1945, 282 p. $1.75.

A very sympathetic portrait of the late Queen Astrid of Belgium.

A NEW GERMANY IN A NEW EUROPE. By August Weber. London: Drummond, 1945, 207 p. 10/6.

Weber, a German banker and industrialist, was a leader of the *Deutsche Staatspartei* under the Weimar Republic. He opposed the Nazis but not the militarism of the Junkers or the centralism of the Prussians. Bismarck meets with his approval but not Brüning. In general he exaggerates the political importance of liberalism in pre-Hitler Germany, and his faith in her democratic future is somewhat less than convincing.

THE PAN-GERMANIC WEB. By Vladimir Grossman. New York: Macmillan, 1945, 179 p. $2.00.

A review of certain episodes that have marked German expansion at the expense of the Danes, Poles, Czechs and French.

DIE DEUTSCHE FRAGE. By Wilhelm Röpke. Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1945, 252 p. Swiss Fr. 10.50.

The author, who held chairs in economics at several German universities, was dismissed in 1933 for opposing the advent of Hitler. More than most anti-Nazi German writers, he is aware of the moral and historical responsibility of the German people for the crimes of Nazism. He puts forward a plan to salvage Germany for western civilization, based in part on a reversal of the Bismarckian policy of enforcing Prussian hegemony. Toward Soviet Russia he evinces serious apprehensions.

A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM. VOLUME III, PART I. GERMANY: 1800 TO THE PRESENT DAY. By Jürgen Kuczynski. London: Muller, 1945, 268 p. 9/6.

The major, and most valuable, part of this latest volume in Mr. Kuczynski's comprehensive series consists of documents and statistics. When the author tries to interpret his data he is sometimes led astray by his pronounced Leftist predilections.

REPORT FROM GERMANY. By Leonard O. Mosley. London: Gollancz, 1945, 125 p. 3/6.

A man who had served as correspondent in Berlin before the war returns to Germany with the British Second Army and reports on what he sees and hears.

HITLER'S PROFESSORS. By Max Weinreich. New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946, 291 p. $3.50.

An abundantly documented monograph showing how Nazi "learning" was employed to justify the destruction of the Jews.

THE SWISS CONTRIBUTION TO WESTERN CIVILIZATION. By Raphael E. G. Armattoe. New York: Stechert, 1944, 91 p. $1.80.

Brief biographical comments on many Swiss individuals who have made contributions to progress in education, industry, agriculture, religion, humanity, the arts, politics, science and medicine. There is an index.

THE PROBLEM OF ITALY. By Ivor Thomas. London: Routledge, 1946, 96 p. 5/.

A keen analysis of the economic and social difficulties besetting post-Fascist Italy, by a leading Labor M. P., with suggestions for rehabilitating the country's economy.

THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV BOUNDARY. By A. E. Moodie. London: Philip, 1945, 241 p. 8/6.

This timely volume contains a good review of the history of the disputed region and an appraisal of the political factors involved in trying to determine its future.

GLI INGLESI E NOI. By Mario Borsa. Milan: Fasani, 1945, 111 p. L. 100.

Dr. Borsa wishes to clear away the erroneous ideas about Britain which the Fascists so sedulously inculcated. In the process he finds fault with various aspects of Italian policy — nor does he confine his criticisms to the period of Mussolini's régime.

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ESSAIS SUR LE HAUT ADIGE. Compiled by Carlo Battisti and Others. Florence: Institut de Linguistique de l'Université, 1946, 164 p.

This volume, which originally appeared as "L'Italianità dell'Alto Adige" (Florence: Edizioni d'Arte, 1945, 144 p.), was prepared by a group of teachers at the University of Florence. It contains a fund of pertinent information concerning the history, geography, economics and culture of the Southern Tyrol — all by way of demonstrating the validity of Italy's claim to retain this disputed region.

RICORDI DI UN EX-DETENUTO POLITICO. By Michele Giua. Turin: Chiantore, 1945, 191 p. L. 160.

The experiences of an anti-Fascist who spent nearly a decade in Mussolini's prisons.

VATICAN AND THE WAR. By Lawrence Fernsworth. Boston: Countercurrent, 1946, 84 p. 25 cents.

An American Catholic has much fault to find with the tolerance shown by his Church toward Fascist movements and tendencies in several countries.

PROFILE OF SALAZAR. By Luiz Teixeira. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional, 1944, 77 p.

Material illustrating the development of Salazar's thought and career up to 1928. This little volume appears to have been written in 1938.

A ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL EM PORTUGAL. Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional da Informação, 1945, 186 p.

An officially-sponsored presentation of the aims and achievements of social welfare policies in Portugal, illustrated with numerous photographs and statistical tables. This booklet is in the informative series "Cadernos do Ressurgimento Nacional," in which several other interesting titles have recently appeared, including "Repovoamento Florestal" (80 p. plus maps) and "Hidráulica Agrícola" (86 p. plus panoramas and charts).

Eastern Europe

STALIN. By Leon Trotsky. New York: Harper, 1946, 516 p. $5.00.

Trotsky was working on this biography when he was assassinated near Mexico City in August 1940. The first seven chapters, dealing with Stalin's youth and early career as a revolutionist, had been written and revised at the time of the author's death. The rest of the book has been pieced together by the editor, Charles Malamuth, from notes and other material found in Trotsky's files, and is less satisfactory. The book was on the point of publication when Pearl Harbor was attacked, and its belated appearance even now will certainly not make the occupant of the Kremlin any happier. Trotsky goes through many of the motions of objective analysis and appraisal, but it is hardly to be wondered that on balance his verdict is unfavorable to Stalin as a person, as a revolutionary and as a statesman.

USSR FOREIGN POLICY. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. New York: Coward-McCann, 1945, 311 p. $3.50.

General Yakhontoff, formerly of the Imperial Russian Army and for a number of years resident in the United States, presents a Stalinist interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. His book is based on a course of lectures which he gave at the New School for Social Research in New York.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM. By Alexander Baykov. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1946, 514 p. $6.50.

In this valuable monograph a Russian-born scholar traces the historical evolution of the government-planned economy in the Soviet Union. His approach is eminently factual and his gauge is broad. There is an extensive bibliography.

RUSSIA FROM A TO Z. By H. A. Freund. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1945, 689 p. 15/.

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A compendium of information on all aspects of life in the Soviet Union, prepared under the auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

RELIGION IN RUSSIA. By Robert Pierce Casey. New York: Harper, 1946, 198 p. $2.00.

The author, professor of religion at Brown University, has sought to thread his way carefully and courageously through the many pitfalls with which this highly controversial subject is surrounded. The chapters in this book were originally delivered as Lowell Lectures in Boston in 1945.

PRELUDE TO THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. By Grigore Gafencu. London: Muller, 1945, 348 p. 18/.

A translation of an important book, by a onetime Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow, reviewed in the April 1945 issue.

EUROPEAN DATELINE. By Patrick Maitland. London: Quality Press, 1946, 211 p. 15/.

As correspondent for the London *Times* the author observed the exciting course of events in southeastern Europe from 1938 to the Nazi conquest of Jugoslavia.

CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE: CRUCIBLE OF WORLD WARS. By Joseph S. Roucek and Others. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946, 679 p. $5.00.

A fact-laden, coöperative work treating under regional and national headings the main developments, political and otherwise, in the zone of smaller states that stretches from Finland to Greece.

A STUDY IN FORGERY. By Scaevola. London: Rolls, 1945, 123 p. 7/6.

An acid exposé of how the Lublin Government in Poland acted as a puppet for the Soviet Union.

CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY AT WORK. By Edward Táborský. London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, 159 p. 8/6.

A sound description and appraisal of the Czechoslovak constitutional system that operated with a remarkable degree of success, all things considered, between the wars.

THE "UNKNOWN" LITTLE DEMOCRACY. By Karel Eisner. Toronto: The Author, 1945, 128 p.

A brief review of the foundations of Czech democracy and how it fared in Nazi-dominated Central Europe.

EDWARD BENEŠ. Edited by Jan Opočenský. London: Allen and Unwin, 1945, 191 p. 8/6.

A collection of 15 appreciative "essays and reflections," chiefly by British and American personalities, marking the 60th birthday of the Czech statesman.

ČEŠI A SLOVÁCI. By Josef Rotnágl. Prague: Vilímek, 1945, 277 p. Kč. 140.

A systematic and scholarly summary of the historical relationships between the Czechs and Slovaks up to the present time.

KDYŽ JINÍ MLČELI. By Václav Vojtíček. Prague: Vilímek, 1945, 250 p. Kč. 90.

A series of brilliant articles, analyzing the various claims made on Czechoslovakia by the Nazis in terms of historical realities.

FIFTH COLUMN AT WORK. By B. Bílek. London: Drummond, 1945, 225 p. 15/.

A circumstantial account — supported by more than 200 documents — of the means by which the Nazis carried on their campaign to undermine the position of Czechoslovakia from 1936 to the capitulation at Munich.

PERSEKUCE ČESKÉHO STUDENTSTVA ZA OKUPACE. Prague: Ministerstvo Vnitra, 1945, 155 p. Kč. 100.

The first systematic and documented report on the manner in which the Nazis handled the Czech students during the German occupation.

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ZA SVOBODU DO NOVE ČESKOSLOVENSKÉ REPUBLIKY. By K. J. Beneš and Others. Prague: Knižnice Nové Svobody, 1945, 137 p. Kč. 20.

A statement of the ideological program for the political reconstruction of Czechoslovakia worked out by the Czech underground during the Nazi occupation.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA. By George Radin. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1946, 161 p. $2.50.

This "practical plan for the Balkans" was prepared by several officials of the United States Government, writing anonymously, who carefully eschew political considerations.

THE CASE FOR GREECE. By "Athenian." London: Hollis, 1946, 84 p. 2/6.

A pro-Royalist interpretation of events in Greece during the last decade and a call for the restoration of the monarchy in that country.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITAIN: PARTNER FOR PEACE. By Percy Elwood Corbett. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 177 p. $2.00.

A realistic, temperate evaluation of the present position of Great Britain as a Great Power. On the whole Professor Corbett finds that, while both economically and politically this position has deteriorated, it is still of pivotal importance. Anglo-American coöperation he regards as indispensable for world peace.

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Alfred E. Kahn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946, 314 p. $4.00.

A revised dissertation containing useful material on Britain's balance of payments position from 1919 to 1939, including an analysis of the problems of adjustment in both the declining and expanding industries.

WHAT LABOUR COULD DO. By Lord Latham and Others. London: Routledge, 1945, 104 p. 6/.

Among the six contributors to this series of revised lectures prepared for the Fabian Society are Kingsley Martin, Leonard Barnes and R. H. Tawney.

MEN ON TRIAL. By Peter Howard. London: Blandford, 1945, 103 p. 3/6.

Breezy thumbnail sketches of 15 British political figures, plus President Truman.

BENN'S PROTEST. By Ernest J. P. Benn. London: Gifford, 1946, 112 p. 7/6.

A "die-hard individualist" pays his respects to the Socialist trend of our times.

IN MY TIME. By Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood. London: Skeffington, 1945, 112 p. 10/6.

The non-military reminiscences of a British military leader of World War I.

IMPERIAL COMMONWEALTH. By Lord Elton. New York: Reynal, 1946, 544 p. $5.00.

A survey, reliable if not too readable, of the full sweep of British imperial development, by an Oxford historian.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE. By James A. Williamson. London: Black, 1944, 213 p. 8/6.

The story of the Empire treated as a part of the history of the British people.

ELECTION AND REPRESENTATION. By James Hogan. Oxford: Blackwell, 1945, 293 p. 15/.

A scholarly analysis and appraisal of the way proportional representation has worked in Ireland, by a professor of history at University College, Cork.

FENIAN MEMORIES. By Mark F. Ryan. Dublin: Gill, 1946, 226 p. 7/6.

The reminiscences of one who labored long in the cause of Irish freedom.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION ABROAD. By H. Gordon Skilling. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1946, 359 p. $3.50.

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A sound, scholarly history of the growth of the Dominion's diplomatic relations with other countries.

COMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE CANADIAN ECONOMY. By Orville John McDiarmid. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946, 397 p. $4.50.

A well-documented, historical treatment of the rôle of the customs tariff, and complementary techniques such as subsidies, shipping regulations, exchange rates and imperial preferences in Canadian commercial policy, from 1763 to 1939.

THIS IS THE PEACE. Edited by Violet Anderson. Boston: Humphries, 1946, 118 p. $1.75.

Eight addresses delivered at the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs, August 18–25, 1945, by American and Canadian scholars. The last three contributions deal specifically with Canadian problems.

NOUS FERONS L'AVENIR. By François Hertel. Montreal: Fides, 1945, 135 p. 75 cents.

In this sequel to his "Leur Inquiétude" (published in 1936) the author continues his discussion of the separate place which Quebec must occupy within the Canadian constitutional scheme.

BEHIND THE PRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA. By H. Lindsay Smith. Cape Town: Stewart, 1945, 152 p. 8/6.

The author examines, candidly and factually, the press and radio of South Africa — who owns them, how they are operated, and what part they play in the country's political life.

VERDICT ON SOUTH AFRICA. By P. S. Joshi. Bombay: Thacker, 1945, 365 p. Rs. 9/12.

An Indian resident of South Africa traces in considerable detail the story of the Color Bar and of other policies of racial discrimination practised in that country since the days of the Boer Republics.

GERMAN SETTLERS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA. By Charles A. Price. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1945, 89 p. 3/6.

The principal object of this little study is to determine the problems involved in trying to assimilate the German immigrants into the Australian community.

A PLAN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR INDIA. Parts I and II. By Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas and Others. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1945, 104 p. 1/.

A convenient edition of the much-discussed Bombay Plan prepared by a group of prominent Indian industrialists.

THE INDIAN WORKING CLASS. By Radhakamal Mukerjee. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1945, 336 p. Rs. 12/8.

The author acquired a first-hand knowledge of working conditions among the Indian laboring classes as a member of several investigating committees. He warns that the process of industrialization in India can go forward on a sound basis only if proper provision is made for enabling workers to obtain economic justice and social security.

SWORD OF GOLD. By Roy Walker. London: Indian Independence Union, 1945, 200 p. 7/6.

This very friendly biography of the Mahatma adds very little to what we know.

The Near East

VOIX DE L'ORIENT: SOUVENIRS D'UN DIPLOMATE. By Jacques d'Aumale. Montreal: Variétés, 1945, 318 p. $2.00.

A French diplomat reminisces on his sojourns and travels in the Near East, principally during the inter-war period.

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EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD. By Isaac Naiditch. Washington: Zionist Organization, 1945, 114 p. $1.75.

An appreciation of the invaluable assistance given the Zionist movement by Baron Edmond de Rothschild (1845–1934).

PALESTINE: JEWISH HOMELAND? Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1946, 342 p. $1.25.

Material selected to represent widely differing points of view.

TRANSJORDAN: AN ECONOMIC SURVEY. By A. Konikoff. Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency, 1946, 120 p.

A revised edition of the standard work on the subject, with a full bibliography.

The Far East

POPULATION AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. By Warren S. Thompson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, 397 p. $3.75.

A first-rate study of population growth as a primary factor in the need for a better distribution of the world's resources in the Pacific region (including India), by the Director of the Scripps Foundation of Population Research at Miami University.

FAR EAST. By Cecil Beaton. London: Batsford, 1945, 111 p. 15/.

A noted British photographer gives us his interesting impressions of India, Burma and China at war, together with a number of the pictures he took. Many more of these photographs will be found in his "An Indian Album" (London: Batsford, 1945, 77 p. 12/6) and "A Chinese Album" (London: Batsford, 1945, 78 p. 12/6).

SUN YAT-SEN: A PORTRAIT. By Stephen Chen and Robert Payne. New York: Day, 1946, 242 p. $3.00.

This political biography of the "Father of the Chinese Republic" is friendly, well-informed and quite readable.

CHUNGKING LISTENING POST. By Mark Tennien. New York: Creative Age Press, 1945, 201 p. $2.50.

The author, a Maryknoll missioner, writes interestingly of his experiences in "free" China during the war. He might have been well advised, however, to omit the chapters on Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists which are based on second-hand information.

DOCTORS EAST, DOCTORS WEST. By Edward H. Hume. New York: Norton, 1946, 278 p. $3.00.

The very human and instructive story of how an American physician took up the practice of his profession in a China only beginning to accept western ways.

HSIN-CHIANG YEN-CHIU. By Li Huan. Chungking: Anking, 1944, 365 p. $3.50.

A history of the remote province of Sinkiang, together with a survey of its political, economic and social conditions.

HSI-NAN CHING-CHI TI-LI. By Chiang Chun-Chang. Chungking: Commercial Press, 1945, 396 p. $4.20.

A survey of the economic geography of southwest China and an appraisal of what this region can contribute to the economic rehabilitation of the country.

KEY TO JAPAN. By Willard Price. New York: Day, 1946, 309 p. $3.50.

Mr. Price, who knows the Japanese people from long and intimate experience, warns that if we really wish to put an end to their militaristic and expansionist proclivities, we must abolish the imperial myth and emancipate the peasantry.

JAPAN'S PROSPECT. Edited by Douglas G. Haring. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946, 474 p. $4.00.

The idea behind this book is that the American people, having undertaken to govern Japan, ought to know something about the nature of that responsibility. Nine men,

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authorities in their fields, have contributed chapters concerning various aspects of Japanese life and how these may be affected by reform.

I SEE THE PHILIPPINES RISE. By Carlos P. Romulo. Garden City: Doubleday, 1946, 273 p. $2.75.

The reactions of a leading Filipino editor to the liberation of his homeland.

T'AI-WAN YU LIU-CHIU. By Hu Huan-yung. Chungking: Chinghua Press, 1945, 83 p. $3.00.

A description of the physical and economic geography of Formosa and the Liu Chiu Islands, with an appendix and some maps.

TRIALS IN BURMA. By Maurice Collis. London: Faber, 1945, 224 p. 7/6.

The second edition of a chatty book in which the author, a colonial official, conveys the flavor of life in Burma before the war.

THE NEW MALAYA AND YOU. By H. B. Egmont Hake. London: Drummond, 1945, 107 p. 6/.

A proposal that the administration of Malaya be simplified and rendered more responsive to popular wishes, and that a sincere effort be made to solve the region's social and economic problems with primary regard for the needs of its inhabitants.

MISSION INTERRUPTED. Edited by W. H. Van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk. New York: Elsevier, 1945, 254 p. $2.00.

A comprehensive and illustrated survey of the history, resources, peoples, culture, economic and social conditions, and government of the Netherland East Indies, prepared by a panel of Dutch experts.

Africa

MY AFRICA. By Mbonu Ojike. New York: Day, 1946, 350 p. $3.75.

A somewhat rambling book in which a Nigerian describes the culture of his own people and indicts British imperialism of sundry crimes.

ETHIOPIA UNDER HAILÉ SELASSIÉ. By Christine Sandford. London: Dent, 1946, 149 p. 10/6.

This is definitely one of the better books on modern Ethiopia. The author's husband, Brigadier Sandford, led the patriot troops in the reconquest of the country from the Fascists, and both of them have lived near Addis Ababa for a number of years. Mrs. Sandford describes in concrete detail the remarkable progress made during the reign of the present monarch.

Latin America

ESTUDIO DE LOS YACIMIENTOS FERRÍFEROS DE MÉXICO. By Luis Toron Villegas and Adrian Esteve Torres. Mexico: Banco de México, 1946, 147 p.

A profusely illustrated technical work on the iron ore resources of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León and Zacatecas.

BLOOD IN THE STREETS. By Albert C. Hicks. New York: Creative Age Press, 1946, 230 p. $2.75.

The thoroughly unsavory record of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, including his strong-arm tactics against Haiti, is here exposed to the public gaze. The author is a journalist with experience in the Caribbean.

RUY BARBOSA: BRAZILIAN CRUSADER FOR THE ESSENTIAL FREEDOMS. By Charles W. Turner. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945, 208 p. $2.00.

An appreciative biography of a noted Brazilian liberal lawyer and statesman.

BRAZIL. By Mulford B. and Racine Sarasy Foster. Lancaster (Pa.): Cattell Press, 1945, 314 p. $3.50.

An illustrated travelogue of the authors' trek through the back country of Brazil.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

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